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Introduction 
 
In 2004 the European Union expanded to include the countries of Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia – the largest round of enlargement in its history. In 2007, the EU was 
further joined by Bulgaria and Romania. In the years that preceded the 
enlargements, much academic attention focused on EU accession preparations. 
Since then, attention has shifted to analyse the impact of the new Member States 
upon the EU, particularly with respect to decision making within the Council (Arregui 
and Thomson, 2009; Mattila, 2008; Naurin and Lindahl, 2008; Plechanovová, 2011; 
Thomson, 2009). But what has been the impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements 
upon the process of European integration as a political project? At the heart of the 
European integration process is the political economy debate over whether the EU 
should be a market-making project, or if it should combine this with integration in 
employment and social policy. This book analyses the impact of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements upon the politics of European integration in the context of this debate.  
 
The politics surrounding the political economy of European integration has long 
been viewed as featuring a clash of capitalisms for the normative governance of the 
European political economy. When national actors step into the European political 
arena they bring with them the ideological convictions from their respective national 
arenas (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 76). Divisions within the EU integration process 
can be located within a two-dimensional space: the first dimension ranging from 
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social democracy to market liberalism and the second from nationalism to 
supranationalism (ibid) with the result that governments and the broader set of EU 
actors hold allegiance to either the liberal or regulatory coalitions. The two coalitions 
have their origins within the varieties of capitalism approach (VoC) which roughly 
divides EU Member States between Hall’s and Soskice’s (2001) liberal market 
economy (LME) / coordinated market economy distinction (CME). The two broadly 
defined coalitions are relatively loose groupings and as a result, no one social bloc is 
able to dominate and impose its interests across all the relevant regulatory sub-
spheres (Callaghan, 2008). The EU’s political economy is therefore a patchwork of 
policies that represents the various struggles between the two coalitions, with the 
liberal and regulatory capitalism coalitions pitted against each other in a direct 
tension concerning how the EU ought to be governed (Callaghan and Höpner, 2005; 
Callaghan, 2008; Clift, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Wincott, 2003).  
 
Existing studies of the EU’s clash of capitalisms have focused on the tensions within a 
pre-2004 EU, but since then the Union has enlarged twice to include Member States 
that have had very different historical developments within their political economies 
i.e. at the height of neoliberal globalisation. Debates concerning the VoC of the 
former state-socialist countries of Central and Eastern European (CEE) (Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia) remain inconclusive: for King (2007), King and Szelényi (2005), King and 
Sznajder (2006) and Vaughan-Whitehead (2003), the CEE states represent a 
neoliberal bloc of countries; but for Keune (2006), Bohle and Greskovits (2006; 
2007a; 2007b) and Feldmann (2006; 2007) there remain significant differences 
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between the CEE states and claims of a neoliberal bloc are too simplistic. Any 
attempt to predict the alignments of the CEE states within the EU’s political space 
would be speculative, and highlights the necessity of greater understanding about 
the clash of capitalisms within an enlarged EU.   
 
This book aims to contribute to this necessity, analysing the impact of the 2004 and 
2007 EU enlargements upon the EU’s clash of capitalisms within the European social 
dimension (ESD). After a decade of modest progress in EU employment and social 
policy, from 2004 progress in the ESD stalled. In part the blockages that emerged can 
be attributed to the neoliberal leaning preferences of the first Barroso Commission 
(ter Haar and Copeland, 2010); yet beyond such factors, the 2004 EU enlargement 
has had a profound impact upon the clash of capitalisms surrounding the ESD. This 
research analyses three policy negotiation case studies surrounding the ESD in a post 
2004 EU – the Services Directive, the revision of the Working Time Directive and the 
Europe 2020 poverty target. The case studies reveal that, with few exceptions, the 
CEE states have consistently joined the liberal coalition during the negotiations. EU 
enlargement, the European social dimension, and the clash of capitalisms argues that 
the alignment of the CEE states with the liberal coalition has strengthened its 
position during policy negotiations. The effect has been to make agreements 
increasing difficult, and, it is argued, makes unlikely more substantive progress and 
developments within EU employment and social policy. 
 
Chapter one analyses the political economy of European integration and explains the 
EU’s involvement within employment and social policy. The chapter argues that, 
  
4
compared to the Single European Market (SEM), the EU’s case study par excellence 
for integration, integration within employment and social policy has often been 
described as an ‘add-on’ or ‘after-thought’. The EU has developed more powers to 
regulate and coordinate employment and social policy than the redistributive 
policies found at the Member State level. When attempts to establish a more 
comprehensive policy have been made, they have predominantly featured legally 
non-binding agreements rather than harmonisation via the use of directives. It is 
therefore argued that EU governance within the field falls short of a model and is 
best understood as a European social dimension ESD). The ESD is comprised of a 
small hard law component (directives underpinned by the European Court of 
Justice), a majority soft law component (legally-non binding agreements between 
the Member States), and underlying norms and values regarding the acceptable level 
of welfare provision within the EU. Integration within the ESD is very much a work in 
progress and unlike the SEM, which tends to be a politically and institutionally stable 
component of the European integration process regardless of the EU’s political 
constellations, the ESD is much more susceptible to political shifts. The chapter 
concludes by highlighting the potential challenge posed by the 2004 and 2007 EU 
enlargements upon the development of the ESD.  
 
Chapter two explains the theoretical lens through which the research is conducted. 
Given that the case studies analyse policy-negotiations, the most obvious theoretical 
lens would be liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (Moravcsik, 1998; and Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfenni, 2009). However, the various assumptions within LI, such as 
unanimity voting, rarely feature within EU policy negotiations outside of Treaty 
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changes and the assumption that EU institutions have little or only limited impact on 
outcomes is disputed. Consequently, the chapter constructs a modified version of 
Stone Sweet’s and Sandholtz’s (1997; 1998) supranational governance approach. It 
argues that EU negotiations are conducted within a transnational political space, and 
that transnational actors are capable of exerting their influence. Divisions within the 
transnational political space feature a clash of capitalisms with governments of the 
Member States and a broader set of EU actors dividing into the regulatory and liberal 
coalitions during negotiations. The framework is then used to analyse the three 
subsequent case studies – the Services Directive, the revision of the Working Time 
Directive, and the Europe 2020 poverty target.  
 
The analysis of the three case studies is based upon the primary working documents 
of the negotiations produced by the EU institutions and the Permanent 
Representations of the Member States, as well as interest groups such as the 
European Trade Union Confederation and BusinessEurope. The analysis is 
complemented by 44 interviews that were conducted between 2006-2010. Semi-
structured interviews enable the analysis to ‘explore people’s experiences, practices, 
values and attitudes in depth’ (Devine, 2002: 207). They contextualise primary 
documentation by providing participants with the opportunity to offer reasons and 
motivations as to why particular courses of action and decisions are taken. The 
combination of primary documentation and interview material provides a more 
holistic account of developments than the utilisation of one method alone. 
Furthermore, the interviews enabled the gathering and analysis of primary 
documentation that is not within the public domain. Such confidential information 
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includes the inter-institutional files between the European Commission, the 
European Council and the European Parliament. Key actors from all of the main 
institutions and different political backgrounds were identified and targeted for 
interview. Targeted interviewees were then asked to identify other key actors within 
the case studies and this generated a snowballing sample of representatives. To 
further minimise bias, interviews were cross-referenced with each other and any 
aspect of an interview that was unclear was referred back to the interviewee for 
clarification. 
 
Chapter three analyses the negotiations of the Services Directive (2004-2006). 
Although the proposed directive related to the SEM, the ensuring debate focused 
upon the impact it would have on the potential to undermine the ESD. The 
negotiations witnessed a clear division along the clash of capitalisms political 
constellation. The regulatory coalition argued that the proposed directive would 
undermine the more extensive systems of social protection and labour law found 
within some EU Member States. In contrast the liberal coalition argued that the 
negative criticism of the proposal was based on both an exaggeration and a 
misconception of the directive. All of the CEE states joined the liberal coalition and 
their position was influenced by two factors: first, concerns regarding the free 
movement of workers from east to west and the restrictions placed on such by the 
majority of the EU-15 Member States; and second, sympathy towards the liberal 
underpinnings of the proposed services directive. On the latter point, the proposed 
directive was considered to be an opportunity to reform domestic service sectors 
and to catch-up in terms of growth and development with western neighbours. 
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Despite the outcome of the negotiations favouring the regulatory coalition, the 
chapter reveals the political tendencies of the CEE states to integration within the 
ESD.    
 
Chapter four focuses on the negotiations of the revision of the Working Time 
Directive. The WTD is often referred to as a cornerstone of the ESD and was agreed 
in 1993. The directive sets a 48-hour limit to an employee’s working week, as well as 
minimum requirements for rest and annual leave. The 1993 directive contained the 
opt-out whereby an employee would be allowed to work in excess of the 48-hour 
week providing that they signed an individual opt-out agreement. The directive 
contained a review clause whereby the opt-out and the 3 month reference period 
(i.e. the period in which a 48 hour week could be calculated as an average) were to 
be reviewed a decade after it had come into force across the EU. The opt-out had 
been included within the original directive to secure the agreement of the UK and it 
was hoped that over the following ten years, Britain would move away from its 
tradition of a long-hours working culture and thereby the opt-out could be removed. 
Negotiations for a revised directive began in 2004, and governments of the Member 
States and EU actors divided along the clash of capitalisms political cleavage. After 5 
years of negotiations the EU was unable to reach an agreement illustrating the 
inability of the EU to move forward on a piece of social legislation that is central to 
the ESD. As a result the original directive remains in force and the use of the opt-out 
across the Member States continues to spread. The chapter argues that the CEE 
states have had a significant impact on the failure to reach an agreement, as they all 
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(with the exception of Hungary) proved to be crucial allies for the UK, who was 
spearheading the liberal coalition.   
 
Chapter five concerns the negotiations surrounding the poverty and social exclusion 
target as part of the Europe 2020 strategy – the successor to the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy which aimed to make the EU: ‘the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010 (Council of the European Union, 
2000). In its first draft of Europe 2020 the European Commission proposed the 
headline target to reduce poverty and social exclusion within the EU by 25% by 2020. 
Poverty was to be calculated via one single measurement of ‘at risk of poverty’ (i.e. 
people living on less than 60% of the national median equivalised income). Initially, 
the EU was unable to reach an agreement on the target and this, along with 
disagreement on the education target, delayed the launching of Europe 2020. 
Governments of the UK, Ireland, Sweden and the majority of the CEE states (with the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia) formed the core of the liberal coalition and 
strongly opposed the Commission’s proposal. The coalition argued against having 
one unifying measurement of poverty, and particularly one which only focused on a 
relative poverty definition. Meanwhile, the regulatory coalition formed by Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain along with EU social actors 
(interest groups and NGOs) and the newly elected President of the European Council 
Herman Van Rompuy, defended the proposed target. This chapter argues that while 
a poverty target was agreed, it was very different to the initial proposal put forward 
by the European Commission as the liberal coalition proved successful in ensuring 
that the target remained as flexible as possible. As the chapter explains, it represents 
  
9
an uncertain compromise and it is questionable how seriously it will be taken 
forward. The CEE states were instrumental in this outcome.   
 
Chapter six brings together the findings of the research to argue that that the 2004 
and 2007 enlargements have had a profound impact upon the ESD. During policy 
negotiations within the ESD the majority of the CEE states joined the liberal coalition 
during making agreements over employment and social policy increasingly difficult. 
This is causing a political stalemate in EU negotiations and is gradually changing 
attitudes at the European level as to the desirability of further integration within the 
ESD. The chapter analyses the reasons behind the position taken by the CEE states, 
with high levels of dependency on foreign direct investment for growth, the general 
difficulties posed in constructing more CME institutions, and EU accession 
preparations all being identified as key factors. The chapter concludes by outlining 
the future of the ESD in the context of EU enlargement and the Eurozone crisis.      
 
In short, this book assesses the impact of the CEE states on the European social 
dimension by applying a modified version of the supranational governance approach 
to EU policy-making. It draws on original empirical research, including interviews 
with key actors, to analyse three EU policy negotiations relating to the three 
different components of the ESD (hard law, soft law, and norms and values). It 
demonstrates how as a result of enlargement, the liberal coalition has been 
strengthened at the EU level, particularly in the European Council, and this has 
undermined agreements on employment and social policy. Further substantive 
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integration in the ESD remains a regulatory ideal rather than reality, given the 
current dominance of the liberal coalition at the EU level.   
1: The Political Economy of European Integration and the 
Challenge of the 2004 and 2007 EU Enlargements 
In the fields of political economy and EU politics the process of European integration 
is widely acknowledged to be a predominantly market-making process. According to 
Scharpf (2002: 645) the EU suffers from a ‘constitutional asymmetry between 
policies promoting market efficiencies [which dominate] and policies promoting 
social protection and equality’. The EU has often been criticised for developing a 
relatively weak competence in social policy that is an ‘add-on’ or ‘after-thought’ to 
market integration. There is no transnational European welfare state that either 
complements or supersedes the social policies of its members. The EU has 
developed more powers to regulate and coordinate social policy than the 
redistributive policies found at the national level (Annesley, 2003; Leibfried, 2010; 
Leibfried and Pierson, 1995). Of the handful of directives that concern EU social 
policy, the majority have resulted from concerns to prevent a distortion of 
competition within the Single European Market (SEM) and relate to the protection of 
workers and not the broader social concerns of all EU citizens. When attempts to 
establish a more comprehensive EU social policy have been made, they have 
primarily featured legally non-binding agreements that have a limited impact in 
terms of Member State convergence and harmonization (Copeland, 2013).  
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Whether such developments within EU employment and social policy represent an 
emerging European social model, that is the existence of an EU social policy which 
Member States converged upon with delegation of authority/responsibility at the 
regional level, remains disputed (Hantrais, 2007; Jepsen and Serrano Pasual, 2005; 
Leibfried, 2010; ter Haar and Copeland, 2010; Wincott, 2003). A number of scholars 
have pointed to the variety of governance instruments utilized within the EU to 
promote integration within social policy, and combined with a comparison of the 
USA, it is argued that the EU promotes a unique quantitative and qualitative type of 
welfare state both in terms of its scope and content (e.g. Annesley, 2003; Hantrais, 
2007; Vaughan-Whitehead, 2003). However, the existence of a European social 
model is somewhat overstated. Comparing EU social policy to the Single European 
Market, the EU’s case study par excellence in terms of integration, it becomes 
obvious that a ‘model’ on a par with the Single Market does not exist. EU accession 
preparations for the 2004 and 2007 serve to illustrate this point further: of the 31 
chapters or areas of policy that the accession countries were required to transpose 
and implement prior to full EU membership, only one concerned employment and 
social policy. In short, while the concept of a European social model is something 
which social actors, particularly within institutions and organisations such as the 
Directorate-General for Employment and Social Affairs and the European Trade 
Union Confederation, can aspire to, in its current form EU governance surrounding 
employment and social policy falls short of a model.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the political economy of European 
integration and to examine the EU’s competence within employment and social 
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policy. It argues that the EU’s involvement in social policy and labour can best be 
understood as a European social dimension (ESD) – that is, although there is 
considerable political activity at EU level in terms of employment and social policy, 
unlike the SEM or Monetary Union, integration within the field is a work in progress. 
Its current and future developments are therefore very much dependent upon the 
EU’s political constellations. The first part of the chapter provides a historical 
overview of the political economy of European integration to highlight the EU’s 
competence in employment and social policy. Second, the chapter analyses the 
difficulty in referring to such a competence as a European social model and argues 
that EU has a social dimension, rather than a model. The final section of the chapter 
highlights the potential challenged posed by the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements 
upon the future development of the ESD. 
I: The political economy of European integration in context 
 
The 1970s witnessed turmoil in both the international and European political 
economies. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of stable exchange 
rates, the post war boom that had followed the ending of the Second World War 
came to an end. The Bretton Woods system of pegging major currencies to the US 
dollar and the enforcement of capital controls, gave rise to an international system 
of stable exchange rates. In turn this created a stable trading order, relatively closed 
economies and had enabled the ‘Keynesian compromise’ between capitalist 
production and the socialist state (Strange, 1998: 188). From 1971 onwards, 
Western states proceeded to lift capital controls and promote financial market 
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liberalisation/deregulation - effectively undermining the macroeconomic tools of 
Keynesian demand management (Helleiner, 2000: 165). Keynesian demand 
management, i.e. generating employment and economic growth through domestic 
reflationary policies (such as increasing the money supply or reducing taxation), 
presupposes a relatively closed economy. Reflation in an open economy can simply 
boost the demand for imports, rather than increasing domestic production (Mishra, 
1999). 
 
The demise of Keynesian corresponded with a turbulent decade for the international 
political economy in which stagflation, i.e. low growth and high inflation, became the 
key characteristic of the day, although the USA and Japan appeared to weather the 
1970s more successfully than the major European economies (Sandholtz and 
Zysman, 1989: 109-110). The abandonment of Keynesianism was, however, an 
uneven process in which the consequences of the collapse of Bretton Woods took 
over a decade to be realised by national governments of different political 
persuasions. Nowhere was this more pronounced than in France. France had blamed 
international conditions for the domestic economic crisis of the 1970s and in 1981 
François Mitterrand was elected President on a platform to revitalise the French 
economy via Keynesian policies. The policies of the socialist government 
(nationalisation, increases in public spending and increases in the higher rates of 
taxation) resulted in capital flight, speculative attacks on the Franc, inflation and a 
worsening of the economic situation. As a result, in 1983 Mitterrand announced the 
famous French socialist u-turn calling an end to socialism in one country, the 
prioritisation of controlling inflation and the subsequent introduction of monetarist 
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policies (Helliener, 1995; Schmidt, 1996). Against this backdrop the process of 
European integration stalled, as governments attempted to grapple with the 
international economic conditions at the domestic level. Furthermore, decision-
making gridlock in the European Council and an ineffectual coordinated response to 
the 1973 oil crisis all seeming combined to undermine the purpose of European 
integration (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991: 8). As Armstrong and Bulmer (1998: 15-16) 
put it, ‘the ensuing “dark ages” period was characterised by only limited progress in 
the deepening of European integration’ and ‘of muddling through’. Europe was often 
viewed as politically and economically stagnant with the term ‘Eurosclerosis’ used to 
describe its then current state (Keohane and Hoffman, 1991: 6).  
 
By the early 1980s progress towards European Community (EC) market integration 
had not only lost momentum, but in some respects was reversing. The turn of the 
decade scarcely gave much indication that Eurosclerosis would give way to a 
qualitative shift in the character and momentum of integration that appeared in the 
latter half of the decade. The customs union, established in 1968, had removed 
tariffs and quotas on intra EC trade and created a Common External Tariff, but there 
had been limited progress in other areas, such as the harmonisation of standards. 
For instance, attempts to harmonise product standards were limited because behind 
apparent technical discussions were major entrenched national interests. 
Furthermore, as technology and production had advanced in the 1970s, national 
governments set legal requirements and technological standards in isolation of each 
other - the result was that the common market had becoming increasing fragmented 
(Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 16).  
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A renewed Momentum in European Integration 
 
By 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) had been signed, came into effect from July 
1987 and signified the beginning of a new momentum for the European integration 
project. According to Nugent (1999: 49) the SEA was something of a ‘mixed’ bag in 
that it contained tidying-up provisions, provisions designed to give the Community a 
new impetus, and provisions that altered the Community’s decision-making system. 
Firstly, the completion of the Single European Market (SEM) by 1992 was added to 
the Treaty. This built upon the Milan agreement reached by governments in 1985 
and endorsed the Commission’s White Paper which contained some 300 proposals 
(later reduced to 282) and centred on the removal of physical, technical and fiscal 
barriers (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 23). The 1992 deadline and its addition to the 
Treaty ensured that the completion of the SEM legally binding, thereby providing an 
added incentive for the Member States to adhere to the legislative programme. 
Secondly, the SEA introduced qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of 
Ministers in several policy areas, effectively speeding up decision-making. The 
introduction of QMV offered a more rapid legislative route than unanimous voting in 
the Council which was considered to be one of the root causes of Eurosclerosis 
(Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998: 23). Thirdly, the role of the European Parliament was 
strengthened with the introduction of the Cooperation Procedure. This gave the 
Parliament a voice within the negotiations relating to the Internal Market and 
working environment. In conjunction, the Commission’s mediatory powers were 
increased enabling disagreements between the Council and the Parliament to be 
more easily resolved. Finally, linked to the institutional reforms were a series of 
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substantive changes to specific policy goals in the areas of social policy, 
environmental policy, research and technology, cohesion policy (see Armstrong and 
Bulmer, 1998: 27-28).  
 
For Young (2005: 100), the SEA represented ‘a strategic policy change and 
institutional reform [that] were linked symbiotically and symbolically’. In fact, the 
SEA represents a seismic shift within the process of European integration, as both 
the EC’s institutional structure and policy goals were substantively reoriented to 
deeper and much faster integration. Although the contents of the SEA were 
somewhat narrow, according to Armstrong and Bulmer (1998: 2) it ‘triggered policy 
activism in a range of policy areas beyond the SEA itself’. The SEA greatly boosted 
integration in many EU sectoral policies with transport, telecommunications, energy 
and services among the policy areas that were essentially a spill-over from the SEA. 
The Single European Market (SEM), as it became known, was therefore created by 
the dynamic spill-over effect of the SEA into a number of (predominantly) market-
making policy areas (Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; Schmidt, 2002). 
 
For Majone (1994; 1996) the creation of a pan-European market has transformed 
the post-war Keynesian state. The liberalisation and de-regulation of national 
economies has been accompanied by their re-regulation at the European level, 
which Majone terms the ‘regulatory state’. Financial constraints have ensured that 
the EU has more powers to regulate than to use other forms of public policy 
(McGowan and Wallace, 1996: 365). As to whether traditional state power has been 
diminished by the transformation is open to debate. McGowan and Wallace (1996: 
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563) argue that regulation and intervention (associated with Keynesianism) are not 
necessarily antithetical; what counts is rather how the government intervenes and 
for what purpose. In most cases, however, the regulatory state is likely to intervene 
to underpin rather than replace markets, as it is concerned with making markets 
work better and thus to compensate or to substitute where markets fail.  
 
A spillover into EU employment and social policy?  
From the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) until the SEA (1986) there had been 
little progress in the area of social policy. The Treaty of Rome (1957) set up a 
‘modest, cautious and narrowly focused social policy’ in which only 12 of the 248 
articles in the Treaty related to social policy (Hantrias, 2007: 2-3). The Commission 
was given the responsibility of promoting close cooperation between Member States 
in matters relating to training, employment, labour law and working conditions, 
social security and collective bargaining, but without specifying the form such 
cooperation should take. Directives were also allowed in order to eliminate laws and 
practices that were considered to be distorting competition and, importantly, to 
secure the free movement of workers between the Member States. Provision was 
also made for gender equality in pay, as well as to prevent discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality. Finally, the Structural Funds were established (one of the few 
redistributive EU policies) to provide financial assistance to areas affected by 
deindustrialization and high levels of unemployment.      
 
Despite progress in the areas of health and safety and social security rights for 
workers, the political momentum of the 1970s amounted to very little progress 
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within EU employment and social policy. The SEA signified a new momentum within 
EU social policy. Fearing that the SEM would primarily benefit employers, French 
President François Mitterrand, put forward the idea of an espace social in which 
workers’ rights were enshrined in law and social benefits were provided on a 
Europe-wide basis. The Commission exploited this opportunity and the proposal was 
subsequently taken up by the then Commission President Jacques Delors. Delors 
aimed to develop a social dimension as a means of strengthening economic cohesion 
and to counter-balance the EU’s market-making project. The limited EU budget 
meant that the only way for the Commission to expand its scope was through the 
regulation of industry and labour. The Commission’s strategy of policy expansion 
increased the publicity and reputation of the Directorate General for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion (then DGV) in an attempt to give the DG a greater role in 
EU policy. Delors also sought to initiate EU level social dialogue with the 1985 ‘Val 
Duchesse’ discussions between the social partners. The discussions broke down as 
the Union of Industries of the European Communities (UNICE – now know as 
BusinessEurope) failed to agree upon the scale and scope of the resultant 
agreements. The Commission decided to finance the internal activities of the ETUC, 
and although they were small in absolute terms, they allowed it to pay for new 
personnel and to build a larger, more autonomous organisation (Martin and Ross, 
1999). The Commission also nourished privileged networks of communication 
between itself and the ETUC (ibid). The relationship encouraged the internal 
restructuring of the confederation in that it became an organisation consisting of 
cross-national sectoral bodies rather than just national confederations. However, by 
the signing of the SEA, EU level social dialogue had yet to be established.   
  
19
 
In 1989 the governments of the Member States, with the exception of Britain, 
adopted the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, heralded 
as the social dimension of the SEA. The objective was to create a level playing field in 
the area of social policy (in a similar manner to the SEM), but disagreement 
remained as to whether the leveling should be one of an increase or decrease in 
standards. As such, the Community Charter did not have the force of law and 
decisions concerning its implementation were left to the Member States. The rights 
were set out under 12 headings including freedom of movement, working conditions 
and social protection.1 Despite this, the Charter was instrumental in the launching of 
initiatives in employment and industrial relations policy which produced a number of 
directives during the 1990s concerning: pregnancy and maternity leave; working 
time; posting of workers; and the 1994 European Works Council Directive. The 
efforts of the Commission to strengthen the ETUC proved successful and in 1991 the 
EU level social partners came to an agreement on the basic principles of social 
dialogue From 1993 onwards, EU level social dialogue as incorporated into the Social 
Chapter (see below) became a significant tool within the development of EU 
employment and social policy. To date there have been three EU directives based on 
the framework agreements of the social partners covering parental leave, part-time 
work and fixed-term work. Four legally non-binding framework agreements have 
also been concluded covering telework (2002), work related stress (2004), 
harassment and violence at work (2007), and inclusive labour markets (2010).    
 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
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The political momentum during the early 1990s resulted in the signing of the Treaty 
of the European Union (TEU) or Maastricht as it is better known. The significance of 
Maastricht for the political economy of European integration is twofold. First, both 
the Commission and a group of Member States (led by the Mediterranean countries) 
aimed to give the Community Charter full legal recognition in the Treaty, but 
continued opposition by the UK relegated such a provision to a ‘Chapter’ annexed to 
the Maastricht Treaty. The Chapter declared 30 general principles to guide EU social 
policy including the promotion of employment, proper social protection, dialogue 
between management and labour, combating poverty and social exclusion. The 11 
Member States that signed the Chapter were permitted to integrate in social policy 
without it affecting the UK, but these attempts to broaden the EU’s remit within 
social policy never quite matched the vision of an espace social: ‘there is no 
European welfare law granting individual entitlements vis-à-vis Brussels; there are 
no direct taxes or contributions, and no funding of a social budget to back such 
entitlements; and there is no Brussels welfare bureaucracy to speak of’ laments 
Leibfried (2010: 254). Delors, while unable to construct his vision and to capitalise on 
the spillover effects of the SEA, he is credited with placing social policy on the EU’s 
agenda and creating a political space in which discussion and some agreements 
could be made.  
 
Second, Maastricht is significant because it lay down the procedure and timetable 
for the moving towards and completion of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
Similar to the SEM, EMU had deep roots within the integration process with the first 
plan for monetary union originally floated as far back as 1969 (Tsoukalis, 1977). The 
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Werner Plan, endorsed by the Council in 1971, set the aim of monetary union within 
a decade, but the backdrop of the 1970s ensured that little progress was made (see 
– Cameron, 1998: 188-205: McNamara, 2005: 143-147). In 1979 the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was formed with the aim of stabilising exchange rates 
within the EU. Despite initial scepticism over the EMS, it proved to be relatively 
successful during the 1980s. Combined with the success of the SEM in removing 
barriers to trade and commerce, the creation of a single currency ‘seemed to form a 
logical link’ (McNamara, 2005: 145). At the 1988 Hanover Council meeting heads of 
state/government agreed for the then Commission President, Jacques Delors, to 
develop a plan for economic and monetary union. The ‘Delors Report’ was presented 
in 1989 and formed the basis of the TEU and EMU. A three-stage process was 
outlined in the Treaty, consisting of a period of convergence in policy, the creation of 
the European Central Bank and finally, the launching single currency (ibid).  
 
EMU was modelled on the success and independence of the German Bundesbank 
whose post-war responsibility had been to keep inflation low, the Deutschmark 
stable and to prevent political interference in monetary policy. The Bundesbank was 
seen as evidence that central-bank independence could function as an effective 
device for assuring price stability (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996: 1). In effect, ideas of 
‘sound’ finances and money had become institutionalised at the European level 
(Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 12) and subsequently EMU required all member 
central banks to be independent. The Maastricht Convergence Criteria required 
participants to have a budget deficit of no more than 3%, a public debt at or below 
60 % of GDP and an inflation rate of no more than 1.5 % above the average of the 
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lowest three countries (Schmidt 2001: 46). Following the creation of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) in 1998, the decision to begin the final stage of the EMU was 
taken in 1999, albeit with Denmark, Sweden and the UK declining to join. All 2004 
and 2007 new Member States are required to join the Eurozone. So far, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia have all joined.               
 
The pooling of sovereignty and the establishing of a supranational authority within 
monetary policy necessitated a simultaneous level of integration in the area of fiscal 
policy. Supranational integration within fiscal policy proved itself to be fraught with 
obstacles. In comparison, integration within monetary policy has been a more 
straightforward process. In the Post War period the majority of Central Banks within 
the Member States had featured, if not complete independence, then some level of 
autonomy and protection from political interference. The result was that monetary 
policy had been somewhat de-politicised and arguments for supranational 
integration within the policy area were relatively easy for governments to convey to 
their electorates. Fiscal policy however, is a more sensitive policy area with Member 
States having diverse levels of taxation and public spending, underpinned by 
different sets of priorities and institutions. 
 
It was decided at Maastricht that economic policy (including fiscal policy) would be 
coordinated with Member States ‘retain[ing] ultimate responsibility for their 
economic policies’ (Article 103). Under Article 103 Member States are required to 
regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and are obliged to 
coordinate them with the Council. A crucial role was attributed to the formation of 
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the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) which constitute a reference frame for 
conduct, and regular monitoring and assessment by the Commission and the Council 
(Commission, 1995: 7). Such guidelines were to represent ‘a distillation of, and a 
consensus on, the most appropriate macro and microeconomic policy framework’ 
(ibid 8). Article 103(4) empowers the Council to issue recommendations to individual 
Member States addressing specific concerns, but it was hoped that ‘normal peer 
group pressure at the Community level will be sufficient to elicit the necessary policy 
adjustments’. The EU’s economic pillar was therefore strongly intergovernmental 
and the Commission’s competences much weaker than in the Single Market, 
competition, external trade and monetary policy (Dyson, 2000; Verdun, 1996).     
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)  
The Convergence Criteria were later transformed into the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) under the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA). The SGP was intended to 
guarantee fiscal prudence by levying fines on any Member State that had an annual 
budget deficit greater than 3% of GDP and a government debt level of more than 
60% of total GDP. In reality, the governance procedure proved itself to be ineffective 
as Member States exceeded the requirements of the SGP with few consequences. By 
2002 Portugal had exceeded the 3% deficit rule. The next year, 2003, Greece Italy, 
France and Germany had all exceeded this level. And by this time, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, and Italy all had public debt over 60 per cent of GDP. While 
punitive proceedings were begun against some of these states (Portugal 2002, 
Greece 2005) the larger Member States largely escaped sanction, despite 
persistently breaching the SGP (Hay and Wincott, 2012: 158).   
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But while the Member States were pursuing a deepening of integration within 
economic policy during the early 1990s, developments within social policy continued 
to be modest and fraught with obstacles. The Commission’s 1994 White Paper on 
European Social Policy ‘A way to follow for the European Union’ outlined the EU’s 
agenda until the end of the decade. The paper stressed the importance of combining 
economic growth with social cohesion and furthermore future policy, while placing 
employment as a top priority, was to encompass people who were not in work and 
hence address the issue of social inclusion/exclusion (Hantrais, 2007: 13). 
Throughout the 1990s EU Member States were having mixed results in solving a 
common set of social problems, mainly related to the growth of unemployment and 
increasing social exclusion. The Commission quickly took advantage of the situation 
by launching a medium-term social action programme for 1995-1997 in which social 
policy was argued to be a productive factor rather than a burden of growth (ibid: 
14). By 1997 the political climate within the EU was changing.  The newly elected 
Labour Government in the UK opted into the Social Chapter allowing it to be 
incorporated into the Treaty changes agreed at Amsterdam. Furthermore, the 1995 
enlargement had expanded the EU to include Austria, Finland and Sweden – 
Member States with generous and extensive welfare states who were seeking to 
influence the EU social policy debate (Hantrais, 2007; Johnson, 2005; Velluti, 2010). 
One result was that the EU became explicitly engaged in the ‘promotion of the 
coordination of the employment policies of the Member States with the view to the 
enforcement of their effectiveness through the development of a coordinated 
employment strategy’ (Tidow, 2003: 86).   
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The European Employment Strategy (EES), launched at the Luxembourg Jobs Summit 
in November 1997 gave priority to three objectives: raising overall employment 
rates; extending lifelong learning and strengthening social partnership. The EES was 
to be achieved via a similar governance mechanism to the BEPG, with commonly 
agreed targets and benchmarks in the form of the Employment Guidelines. Progress 
within the Member States was to be reported in an annual national reform 
programme (NRP) with country specific recommendations (CSR) issued by the 
Council upon a proposal of the Commission, although it was hoped that peer 
pressure would be sufficient to encourage Member States to act (Ashiagbor 2004; 
Copeland and ter Haar, 2013; Trubek and Mosher, 2003; Velluti, 2010). For Rhodes 
(2005a: 290) what emerged from the EES was a broad, multifaceted job creation 
strategy, based on non-binding, soft law instruments of peer review, benchmarking 
and persuasion.    
 
From the Lisbon Strategy to Eurozone crisis  
Following the launch of the EES (the Luxembourg Process) in 1997, in 1998 the UK 
Presidency introduced a light reporting procedure to stimulate structural reforms in 
the product and capital markets (the Cardiff Process), and in 1999 the German 
Presidency introduced stronger macro-economic dialogue between the EU social 
partners (the Cologne Process) (see Linseemann et al, 2007). What connected these 
three initiatives was a preference for new soft modes of governance, designed to 
facilitate coordination and reform (James, 2012: 13). Simultaneously, the 
Commission and subsequently the Council became increasing aware of the EU’s 
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competitive lag, added to which the constraints imposed by EMU via the SGP 
‘constitute[d] a significant change in the macro-economic policy environment’ and 
further narrowed the policy options of the Member States (Begg and Berghman, 
2002: 187). A coordinated European effort building on the EU’s soft modes of 
governance seemed best to address these economic problems. The result was the 
launching of the Lisbon Agenda which aimed to make the EU: ‘the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth and with more and better jobs and with greater social cohesion’ 
(European Council, 2000b: 5). The Lisbon Agenda incorporated all three coordination 
processes by institutionalising the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) and 
extending it to a range of new policy areas including microeconomic policy, social 
inclusion, research and development, education and sustainable development (see 
Best and Bossaert, 2002; European Council, 2000b; James, 2012). 
 
A lack of progress in the Member States promoted a mid-term review of the Agenda. 
The newly formed Barroso Commission appointed the former Dutch Prime Minister 
Wim Kok to analyse the Agenda. The Kok Report (2004), as it became known, argued 
that Member States were failing to achieve their targets as a result of its overloaded 
policy agenda (there were some 50 benchmarks in the area of employment and 
social policy alone), poor coordination, conflicting priorities and weak national 
ownership. The Barroso Commission re-launched the Agenda under the banner of 
the ‘Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs’ with a simplified number of aims and 
governance structure (known as Lisbon II). The result was a ‘meta-OMC’ in which the 
BEPGs and EES guidelines were merged into a single guidelines package structured 
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around macroeconomic, microeconomic and employment pillars (Tholoniat, 2010: 
107). The OMCs of social protection and inclusion, and education and training were 
separated from the process and were to be organised independently, albeit they 
were feed in and out of the meta-OMC. The re-launch of Lisbon not only reflected a 
desire to improve its governance mechanism, but also a modification within its 
political priorities. A newly formed centre-right Commission and a majority of 
centre-right governments in the Council shifted the aims and objectives of Lisbon 
from one in which economic growth was to be combined with social cohesion, to 
one in which economic growth was to create social cohesion (ter Haar and Copeland 
2010). In other words, rather than being an independent objective in its own right, 
social cohesion in Lisbon II became a function of, and dependent upon, progress 
made within the ‘economic’ pillars.        
 
The Lisbon Strategy has spawned an extensive academic literature (e.g. Begg 2007, 
2008, 2010; Borras and Radaelli, 2011; Collignon, 2008; Copeland and Papadimitriou, 
2012; de la Porte and Pochet, 2003; Radaelli, 2003; Zeitlin et al, 2005; Zeitlin, 2009), 
but most empirical studies with respect to concrete policy outcomes at the Member 
State level remain sceptical. A number of scholars have taken a much broader 
understanding of outcomes to conceptualise the impact of the OMC at the national 
level. Zeitlin (2009) conceptualises substantive policy change in terms of changes in 
national policy thinking (cognitive shifts), in national policy agendas (political shifts) 
and in specific national policies (programmatic shifts) and argues that there is 
evidence of cognitive and political shifts, but little to suggest that there have been 
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programmatic shifts within the Member States. This claim has been subsequently 
confirmed by the empirical findings of Büchs (2007).  
 
However, the financial crisis, which started in 2007/2008, reveals the limitations of 
the achievements made during the EU’s experiment with new modes of governance. 
The collapse of the US housing bubble and exposure of many European banks to the 
US sub-prime mortgage market gradually spilled over into a financial crisis and a 
fully-fledged Eurozone crisis. The crisis has provided an exogenous shock that has 
not only tested the resilience of the European economy, but the progress made 
within the Lisbon decade, the robustness of EU economic governance and the unity 
of the Eurozone. Lisbon II attempted to link and streamline the governance 
mechanisms of the BEPG with the micro-economic and employment guidelines of 
the Lisbon Strategy. Macro and micro economic policy, as well as employment 
policy, were to be simultaneously reported into a single document with 
developments in one policy area being sympathetic to events in others. However, 
the crisis has demonstrated that some governments paid little attention to the 
macro-economic policy guidelines, as well as the relationship between the macro-
economic, micro-economic and employment policy spheres.  
 
For Dyson and Quaglia (2012) the crisis has exposed the serious weaknesses in the 
construction of EU economic governance over the last two decades. During the 
boom years of the Lisbon Strategy low interest rates within the Eurozone enabled 
countries such as Greece, Italy and Portugal to postpone structural economic 
reforms and generate growth via credit-based consumption. While in Ireland and 
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Spain cheap credit generated housing bubbles that burst with spectacular effects in 
2007/2008. In short, Eurozone Membership has, if anything, reinforced the 
structural imbalances within the EU between Northern exporters posting current 
account surpluses and Southern importers posting current account deficits.   
 
Since the assent of the crisis various attempts have been made to strengthen EU 
economic governance and to reduce structural imbalances across Europe. The 
political backdrop to such a movement is not just one of ‘crisis’ but also one of 
caution regarding the deepening of European integration.  Amsterdam and 
subsequent Treaty revisions (Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2008) have been modest in 
comparison to the SEA and Maastricht. Rather than expanding the EU’s 
competences, they have been more concerned with reforming the EU’s decision-
making process and other procedural matters. In this respect there is a tension 
between the EU constitutional discourse concerned with limiting and constraining 
EU powers and a policy discourse that often looks to the EU for responses to 
problems and challenges facing the EU Member States (Armstrong, 2012: 212). The 
solution to this dilemma in Europe 2020, the successor to the Lisbon Strategy, is to 
provide an enhanced role for Country Specific Recommendations and the creation of 
the European Semester. The European Semester is an annual economic governance 
cycle of macro-economic, budgetary and structural policy coordination with the 
simultaneous reporting of National Reform Programmes for Europe 2020 and their 
Stability and Convergence Programmes under the SGP (European Commission, 2010: 
27). The priorities of Europe 2020 place a much greater emphasis on correcting 
macro-economic imbalances.  The dominant discourse surrounding Europe 2020 has 
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been one of ‘smart’ budgetary consolidation and ‘sound’ public finances 
underpinning long-term growth and employment (Copeland and James, 2013). 
Furthermore, the agreement of the Euro Plus Pact in March 2011 introduced six 
legislative proposals on economic governance to enhance fiscal discipline and to 
avoid excessive macroeconomic imbalances. This includes a reform of the SGP aimed 
at enhancing the surveillance of fiscal policies, a strengthened role of the Council to 
monitor the situations in the Member States, and the possibility of being able to 
impose financial sanctions where compliance is breached (European Council, 2011). 
Following the continuation of the Euro Zone crisis, the reform of the EU’s Monetary 
Union has continued to gather momentum. No sooner had the ‘Six Pack’ been 
adopted (November 2011), but the Commission proposed the addition of two new 
regulations – called the ‘Two Pack’ – to the Six Pack. The Two Pack came into force 
on 30 May 2013 and is designed to further enhance economic integration and 
convergence amongst Eurozone state. It introduces a common budgetary timeline 
and common budgetary rules for the Eurozone. Starting with the forthcoming 
budgetary cycle states must publish their medium-term fiscal plans (Stability 
Programmes), together with their policy priorities for growth and employment over 
the next 12 months, by 30 April. By October, states must publish their draft budgets 
for the following year and these must be adopted by 31 December. During this 
period the Commission will examine and give an opinion on each draft budget by 30 
November and if it detects severe non-compliance with obligations under the 
Stability and Growth Pact, it can ask the Member State concerned to submit a 
revised plan.   The second regulation is based on the premise that the intensity of 
economic and budgetary surveillance should be proportionate to the seriousness of 
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the financial difficulties encountered by a Member State. Member States facing 
serious problems of financial stability or receiving budgetary assistance would be 
subject to intense monitoring by the Commission and the ECB (European 
Commission, 2013).  
 
In parallel to the reforms surrounding the governance of EMU, discussion at EU level 
has also centred on a fiscal and banking union. Progress on the former has been 
more modest that the term ‘fiscal union’ would imply and current agreements and 
proposals have resisted any attempt towards a ‘fiscal transfer union’. The ‘Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance’, agreed in January 2012 by 25 Member 
States (the Czech Republic and the UK refused to sign the agreement) is an 
intergovernmental Treaty Committing Member States to the ‘balanced budget rule’, 
according to which annual public budgets need to be in balance or surplus, and 
thereby not in a deficit except in exceptional circumstances. With respect to a 
banking union, the a Single Supervisory Mechanism for Eurozone banks was agreed 
march 2013, but as with the negotiations surrounding fiscal policy, at the time of 
writing the outcome of current proposals for further integration are unclear.  
II: The European social dimension 
 
Analysing the political economy of European integration illustrates that there has 
been some modest progress within the construction of an EU employment and social 
policy, but what does such policy cover? Ter Haar and Copeland (2010) provide a 
stocktaking exercise of its various components. EU social policy associated with hard 
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law found in the Treaty and EU Directives predominantly concerns the rights of 
workers and their freedom of movement. This has often led to claims that EU social 
policy is predominantly based on establishing ‘social rights’ (Keune, 2012; Leibfried, 
2010). The EU has been responsible for the harmonisation of Member State social 
policies in several areas to create a level playing field in order to ensure ‘the creation 
of the Single Market did not lead to a lowering of labour standards or the distortion 
of competition’ (DG EMPL).2  There are five main areas covered by hard law 
comprising of health and safety, equal opportunities and anti-discrimination, free 
movement of workers, as well as social partner recognition and the Structural Funds. 
In the field of health and safety legislation the main Directive has been 89/391/c of 
12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the 
health and safety of workers. From this Directive 17 daughter Directives have been 
adopted to establish minimum requirements of health and safety. Second, in the 
area of equal opportunities and anti-discrimination Article 119 of the 1957 EEC 
Treaty referred explicitly to the right of women to equal pay with men. Throughout 
the various Treaty revisions the Commission has been able to prepare Directives not 
just on equal pay, but also on the equal treatment of workers. Thus various Treaty 
revisions have all strengthened the rights of women. A number of secondary 
legislative achievements have also been constructed to include issues such as access 
to benefits, parental leave and access to childcare and maternity pay.  
 
Labour mobility was included in the EEC Treaty, Articles 48-51 EEC contain the main 
clauses establishing the right to the freedom of movement of workers. Council 
regulation 118/97 provides for the equal treatment of workers in the matters of 
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social security. This enables workers to transfer their social security entitlements, 
including pensions and unemployment benefits, to another Member State. From 
1993 onwards EU social dialogue was incorporated into the Social Protocol. Since 
1985, sectoral dialogue committees have been set up in 33 different industrial 
sectors. The European social partners have adopted over 40 cross-industry and 300 
sectoral joint texts (Commission, 2004d). The final component of the EU’s hard law 
social acquis relates to the Structural Funds created in 1957 which grant financial 
assistance to resolve structural economic and social problems. The Structural Funds 
are comprised of four main components, but the European Regional Development 
Funds (ERDF) and the European Social Funds (ESF) are the most significant with 
respect to EU Social Policy. The principle of the ERDF is to promote economic and 
social cohesion within the EU through the reduction of imbalances between regions 
and social groups. The ESF concerns itself with reducing unemployment, as well as 
developing human resources and promoting integration in the labour market (DG 
REGIO 2013).3   
 
The soft law component of EU social policy is predominantly associated with 
attempts to create a broader social policy for all citizens. Policy areas governed by 
soft law include poverty and social exclusion, the EES, education and training, 
pensions, youth policy, social protection, adequate healthcare provision and the 
reconciliation of work and family life. These policy areas are governed by traditional 
soft law such as white and green papers, Council resolutions, action programmes, 
but also the OMC. It is important note however, that some policy areas developed a 
more formalised and comprehensive version of the OMC than others, with a 
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correlation between the particular OMC and the progress made within the policy 
area (Copeland, 2012: 234). The OMC social inclusion, for example, had no specific 
targets, no recommendations, and few benchmarks or deadlines other than for the 
purpose of reporting (Daly, 2012: 74-75); while the EES had an annual governance 
cycle with specific targets, recommendations, and benchmarks.     
 
In terms of the normative component of the EU employment and social policy, there 
is a general consensus across the EU as to where the boundaries of acceptable state 
involvement lie. This boundary can be identified via an international comparison of 
the EU with that of the USA. Pontusson (2005: 8–12) argues that American levels of 
poverty, social protection, labour law, and healthcare contrast significantly with 
those in the EU. In this respect there is something unique about employment and 
social policy in the EU, and a neoliberal welfare state on a par with the USA is 
unacceptable to the majority of the European electorate. Hence what is particularly 
distinctive about EU society is the belief that economic growth should be combined 
with social cohesion and that the state has an active part to play within the provision 
of welfare. Furthermore, there is a general consensus that the state should provide 
public services, or at least guarantee them, as well as services of general interest (ter 
Haar and Copeland, 2010: 280-281) . 
 
Is there a European social Model?  
Whether such developments within EU employment and social policy represent an 
emerging European social Model, (that is, the existence of a transnational model 
which Member States converged upon with delegation of authority and 
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responsibility at EU level) remains disputed within the academic literature. A number 
of scholars have pointed to the variety of governance instruments utilized within the 
EU to promote integration within social policy and it is argued that the EU promotes 
a unique type of welfare state both in terms of its scope and content (Pontusson, 
2005; Vaughan Whitehead, 2003). However, in their 2005 work Jepsen and Serrano 
Pascual highlight no less than four definitions of the European social model within 
the current academic literature, highlighting the difficulties posed by using the term. 
First, the European social model can be defined as an entity (comprising of common 
institutions, values or forms of regulation) that has specific aims or focuses on the 
capacity for political regulation of the market economy. Second, it can be defined 
whereby specific models of welfare state are identified as paradigm cases with the 
aim of the EU moving towards a particular type. Third, there are those who see the 
social model as a ‘European project’ under which the European welfare states are 
committed to a certain basic level of welfare provision that distinguishes them from 
the more strictly liberal models like the USA (which includes the argument that the 
UK is not a strict liberal welfare state). Finally, Jepsen and Serrano Pascual (2005) 
add their own definition in which they argue that the existence of a European social 
model is utilised within the European discourse as an instrument for optimising the 
adjustment of social protection systems to market forces. 
 
In this respect there is no single definition of the European social model within the 
literature. To add further confusion to the debate the European Commission has 
been reluctant to provide an official definition, yet has continuously made reference 
to its existence in various documents. In this respect, the Commission seemingly 
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assumes that the European social model is understood and that any reference to its 
content is superfluous. Furthermore, on a number of occasions the Commission has 
made reference to the European Social Model and the European social models and 
the two are clearly different. To make reference to the European social model would 
be to highlight the EU’s competence in the fields of employment and social policy, as 
well as the similarities and convergence within the Member States under the banner 
of EU governance; while to make reference to the European social models is to 
highlight the different welfare states that exist within the EU. The heads of state at 
the Nice European Council (described the European social model in the following 
terms: 
  
‘The European social model, characterised in particular by systems that offer a high 
level of social protection, by the importance of the social dialogue and by services of 
general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, is today based on […] on 
a common core of values. […]. It now includes essential texts in numerous areas; free 
movement of workers, gender equality at work, health and safety of workers, 
working and employment conditions and, more recently, the fight against all forms 
of discrimination.’Again there is a tension here between acknowledging the diversity 
of welfare states within the EU and a description of the EU’s actual competence 
within employment and social policy. The statement also tends to underestimate the 
differences between the varieties of welfare state found within the EU. For example, 
when compared to Sweden, it is difficult to claim that welfare benefits in the UK 
offer a ‘high level of social protection’. (European Council, 2000a) 
 
  
37
If we compare developments in employment and social policy with  the SEM, the 
EU’s case study par excellence in terms of integration, it becomes obvious that a 
‘model’ on a par with the Single Market does not exist. Even if we take the view that 
the EU is unlikely to construct a redistributive welfare state (given the political effort 
and resources required for such) and that any European social model is likely to 
feature the characteristics of Majone’s ‘regulatory state’, at present the vast 
majority of the EU’s acquis communautaire concerns the functioning of the SEM. 
This is upheld by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (ECJ) by means of judicial review, in particular the infringement 
procedure. In 2002, ten years after the completion of the Single Market, the 
Commission had 1,500 infringement proceedings open against the Member States 
for failing to correctly apply directives. The majority of the infringement proceedings 
concerned themselves with the SEM and not employment and social policy. In 
reality, the majority of EU employment and social policy is comprised of soft law. The 
effectiveness of the latter as a governance tool has been called into question. While 
the implementation of traditional EU hard law  (directives) varies between the 
Member States (references on compliance), over the last decade Member State 
engagement within the OMC and more generally EU soft modes of governance, has 
been disappointing. Initially, the Lisbon Strategy and the OMC were greeted with 
optimism. In 2002 Barnard and Deakin argued that the OMC was to be seen as a way 
of regulatory intervention which attempts to provide space for experimentation in 
rule-making and to encourage regulatory learning through the exchange of best 
practice between different levels. Rhodes (2000:3) claimed that providing the 
political will exists, ‘Lisbon may one day be considered Europe’s “Maastricht” for the 
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welfare state’. But by the middle of the decade, and confirmed by the Commission’s 
own independent review in the form of the Kok report, the inability of Lisbon (and 
thereby the OMC as a governance) to deliver on its promise was becoming apparent. 
Not only were governments engaging in the OMC to varying degrees, they could also 
ignore more domestically contentious objectives/policies with very little short-term 
consequences.  
 
Not only did the OMC fail to generate political engagement, but it was also 
particularly susceptible to shifts within the EU’s political constellations, especially 
when compared to the SEM. As Phillip et al (2004: 33) argue: ‘the OMC [or more 
generally EU soft law and norms and values] remains vulnerable to changing political 
majorities’. That is, as the EU’s political space is something of a revolving door, with 
actors of different political constellations continuously coming and going, EU soft 
modes of governance are more susceptible to these changes. A criticism of the 
Lisbon Strategy (and thereby EU social and employment policy) has been precisely 
this: that the fluid nature of EU politics resulted in continually shifting goalposts and 
the means through which they were to be governed (Copeland, 2012: 233). The 
result was that the aims and objectives of Lisbon were constantly evolving, thereby 
creating confusion and uncertainty as various levels of governance as to what was 
supposed to be achieved. As Bulmer (2012: 36) notes following its launch in 2000, a 
‘sustainable development strategy’ was added at the 2001 Gothenburg European 
Council, it was then completely re-launched in 2005, only for the Spring 2006 
European Council to identify an additional narrative of ‘greening up the European 
economy’. This stands in contrast to the SEA which remained consistent in its aims 
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and objectives between it coming into force (1987) and its completion (1992). All of 
this highlights that the weaknesses of EU soft modes of governance may not simply 
relate to the weak incentive structures inherent in such governance to promote 
actor engagement (with little European Commission and ECJ oversight), but the 
susceptibility of new modes of governance to the fluid nature of EU politics.  
 
Therefore, given that the majority of employment and social policy is governed by 
soft law, the EU’s competence and the corresponding transnational political activity 
within the field are best understood as being a ‘dimension’ of the European 
integration process, rather than a model. The European social dimension (ESD) 
therefore refers to the EU’s hard and soft law competence within employment and 
social policy, as well as the normative component of the policy area. Similar to all 
policy areas, the ESD features considerable political activity at the European level, 
but unlike the SEM or Monetary Union, it is a work in progress rather than a fait 
accompli. Its current and future developments are therefore very much dependent 
upon the EU’s political constellations, as not only is soft law susceptible to political 
shifts, but given that the ESD has a small hard law component, the whole process of 
integration within employment and social policy remains fragile.      
III: The challenge of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements 
 
The current literature identifies the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements as a potential 
threat to future substantive developments in the ESD. Relative to EU-15, the 
majority of the EU’s new Member States have had very different historical 
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developments and have experienced a unique transformation of their political 
economies. Having radically overhauled their state-socialist systems, the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) states currently represent middle-income capitalist 
democracies integrated into the regional (EU) and international political economy. 
‘The transition to capitalism from Communism is different from earlier transitions to 
capitalism’ note King and Szelényi (2005: 222), highlighting the different 
international political economy conditions under which the transition process has 
occurred CEE. Debates regarding their political economies remain inconclusive, as 
the institutional legacies of the state-socialist systems are pitted against the 
domestic politics of reform and the influence of international institutions, such as 
the World Bank, the IMF and the EU, as well as the dominant discourse surrounding 
the 1997 Washington Consensus (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 2007b, 2006; Bruszt, 
2002; Deacon, 2000; Feldmann, 2006, 2007; Keune, 2006; King, 2007; King and 
Szelényi, 2005; King and Sznajder, 2006; Muller, 1999a, 1999b; and Vaughan-
Whitehead, 2003).  
 
For Vaughan-Whitehead (2003), King and Szelényi (2005), and King and Sznajder 
(2006) neoliberal forces have clearly been the dominant influential factor within the 
CEE states. In a detailed analysis of the political economies of CEE and Cyprus and 
Malta, Vaughan-Whitehead (2003) points to the neoliberal tendencies of institutions 
and policies within such countries. For Vaughan-Whitehead (2003) this represents a 
clear threat to the political economy of the EU and enlargement is predicted to 
threaten developments within the ESD. King and Szelényi (2005), and King and 
Sznajder (2006) focus on the social structures of the emerging political economies 
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within CEE and their significance to the overall determination of their political 
economies. Despite their internal differences of class structure, the argument here is 
that neoliberalism has served as the ideological cement that united different class 
factions against the state-socialist systems and provided a powerful narrative in 
which to frame the transition to a market economy. The result of which has been the 
creation of liberal capitalism in CEE in which foreign direct investment has an 
overwhelming dominance and influence. Economic growth is dependent on the 
investment strategy of particular multinational corporations, the lending decisions of 
foreign owned banks, and the ability to import industrial inputs and capital from, 
and export manufactured goods to, the core of the capitalist world economy (King 
and Szelényi, 2005: 219-220). CEE states have adopted a more liberal-individualistic 
approach to welfare policy, as well as weak social dialogue and worker 
representation, and this, combined with the related migration of some of their 
workers to the EU-15 Member States, has been conceived has providing the best 
means through which the region can converge upon Western European levels of 
productivity and per capita income (see Adnett and Hardy, 2005). These particular 
claims have been further substantiated by Draxler and Van Vliet (2010) who 
demonstrate that in terms of welfare spending as a percentage of GDP, there is ‘no 
convergence from the East’. 
 
The available empirical evidence of the region appears to support this argument. 
Between 2000 and 2008 with the exception of Belgium, net union membership 
across the whole of the EU has declined (measuring membership as a proportion of 
wage earners in employment). However, the trend towards dwindling unionisation 
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on employees has been more pronounced in CEE where on average, union density 
shrunk from just below 29% to just under 19 %. In EU-15 the decline was from 28% 
to 25% (Visser, 2011). In addition to the general trends of de-industrialisation, 
growing unemployment and extensive migration to Western Europe, according to 
Glassner (2013: 6) the causes of the steep decline in CEE include, legal obstacles to 
the recognition of trade unions, weak institutional support for unions in collective 
bargaining, and the marginalisation of unions in political decision-making). Other 
employment related data for CEE supports the general trend found within trade 
union membership: employer association density stands at 38% (62% in EU-15); and 
collective bargaining coverage rates at 30% (71% in EU-15) (Visser, 2011).     
 
However, Bohle and Greskovits (2007a, 2007b, 2006), Cernat (2006), Keune (2006) 
and Feldmann (2006 and 2007) argue that the transition process in CEE is more 
complex and that domestic social structures and the influence of international 
institutions has varied considerably. The result is a difference between the varieties 
of capitalism of CEE with a neoliberal variety in the Baltic States, an embedded 
neoliberalism version in the Visegrád four, neo-corporatism in Slovenia, and cocktail 
capitalism in Bulgaria and Romania. The Baltic States are distinguished by radically 
liberalised markets, a thoroughly reformed market-supporting institutional 
framework, and the least generous welfare states among in CEE. In comparison, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have maintained more generous 
welfare states (relative the Baltic States) and have prioritised industrial upgrading, 
rather than macro-economic stability, as in the Baltic States. Slovenia represents an 
entirely different capitalist trajectory, which features neo-corporatist institutions, a 
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much stronger representation of labour with its mixed sectoral and economy wide 
bargaining, and a more generous welfare state (Bohle and Greskovits, 2007a, 
2007b). Cocktail capitalism, found in Bulgaria and Romania, combines elements of 
the three previously mentioned models: a weak state, but a large public sector, 
privatization paradigms that have hesitated between Anglo-Saxon and continental 
templates, weak employer associations and an activist but fragmented labour union 
movement that has supported weak neo-corporatist institutions (Cernat 2006).  
Recent studies of cocktail capitalism suggest that it is drifting more towards the 
liberal variety (Ban 2013).  
 
Despite the differences between the CEE states Bohle and Greskovits (2007a, 2007b) 
characterise them as all featuring ‘liberal dependency’. This particular argument is 
also highlighted by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) who also extend their analysis to 
include Bulgaria and Romania. The argument of liberal dependency is similar to 
points made by King and Szelényi (2005), and King and Sznajder (2006): that 
economic growth is dependent upon multinationals and foreign owned banks. It may 
therefore be that the differences highlighted between the CEE states are not 
particularly significant in terms of the overall direction of their political economies, 
but as Hay and Wincott (2012: 63-64) argue regarding the region  ‘more research 
and better data is required before we will be in a position to provide clear and 
robust answers to these questions’.    
 
Given the differences of opinion regarding the political economy of the CEE states, 
the impact of EU enlargement upon the ESD remains unclear. There are two likely 
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outcomes; first, that the CEE states bolster liberal forces within the EU and this 
undermines progress within the ESD; or secondly, that the actual differences 
between the political economies of CEE prove significant, and that the 2004 and 
2007 enlargements have little impact on the overall direction of the ESD. In this 
respect, EU enlargement will simply add to the EU’s existing diversity of varieties of 
capitalism with little overall impact on policy direction and outcomes. The purpose 
of the research presented in subsequent chapters is to analyse the impact of the 
2004 and 2007 enlargements in the context of this uncertainty.       
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been concerned with the political economy of European integration 
and in particular, developments within employment and social policy. The process of 
European integration has predominantly been a market-making exercise, and if 
compared to developments within the SEM, those in the field of employment and 
social policy have been more modest. The majority of the acquis communautaire 
concerns the Single Market and when progress via hard law in employment and 
social policy has been achieved, it has predominantly resulted from concerns that 
differences within social and labour standards across the Member States could 
distort competition and thereby undermine the Single European Market. When 
attempts to establish a more comprehensive EU social policy have been made, they 
have primarily featured legally non-binding agreements that have a limited impact in 
terms of Member State convergence and harmonisation. Such agreements made 
between the Member States, such as the European Employment Strategy (1997), the 
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Lisbon Strategy (2000), and Europe 2020 (2010), are predominantly 
intergovernmental governance structures with few short term consequences should 
governments be unwilling to engage in the process. The result is that the EU has 
often set itself ambitious targets in policy areas such as employment and social 
inclusion, but governance mechanisms such as the open method of coordination 
(OMC) have not lived up to their potential.   
 
In the context of the process of European integration, this chapter has argued that 
claims of a European social model are exaggerated. Developments within the field 
are not only modest, but they are also very much a work in progress. The concept of 
a European social dimension (ESD) is therefore more appropriate when referring to 
developments within EU employment and social policy, and the associated 
transnational political activity. The concept of a ESD therefore refers to the EU’s hard 
and soft law competence within the field, as well as the normative component of the 
policy area. Similar to all policy areas, the ESD features considerable political activity 
at the European level, but unlike the SEM or Monetary Union, its development is a 
work in progress. Given the ‘incomplete’ nature of the ESD, it is susceptible to shifts 
within the EU’s political constellations and the chapter identified the 2004 and 2007 
EU enlargements as potentially undermining future developments. The current set 
of literature concerning the CEE, their political economies, and the subsequent 
impact of the ESD is divided. The first school of thought argues that the CEE are 
much closer to a liberal model of capitalism, as they are dependent for economic 
growth upon multinationals and foreign owned banks. The argument here is that 
CEE states will be opposed to further integration within the ESD and bolster liberal 
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forces within the process of European integration. The second school of thought 
argues there to be significant political economy differences between CEE, with a 
liberal model in the Baltic States, an embedded liberal model in the Visegrad four, a 
neo-corporatist variety in Slovenia, and ‘cocktail capitalism’ featuring elements from 
different models in Bulgaria and Romania. In this respect, EU enlargement is 
conceived to have little impact on the overall direction of the ESD, as it will simply 
add to the current diversity of interests within the EU’s transnational political space. 
The purpose of the following chapter is to provide a theoretical framework from 
which to analyse the question of the impact of EU enlargement upon the ESD.                                                                 
1 Under this Charter, the Community is obliged to provide for the fundamental social 
rights of workers under the following headings: freedom of movement; employment 
and remuneration; improvement of living and working conditions; social protection; 
freedom of association and collective bargaining; vocational training; equal 
treatment for men and women; information and consultation and participation for 
workers; health protection and safety at the workplace; protection of children and 
adolescents; elderly persons; and disabled persons.  
2 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=157&langId=en – accessed 
06/03/2013 
3 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/regional/index_en.cfm 
- accessed 06/03/2013 
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2: Governance and the Clash of Capitalisms 
  
This chapter provides a theoretical lens through which to analyse the impact of EU 
enlargement upon the European social dimension. At the heart of the theoretical 
debate on European integration lies the fundamental division between those who 
view the EU as an international organisation in which the Member States are the 
ultimate determinants of outcomes, as opposed to those who consider integration 
to generate its own momentum and thereby undermine Member State sovereignty. 
This division has its origins within international relations theory and is often referred 
to as the intergovernmentalism versus neo-functionalism debate. Such theoretical 
claims are proven via extensive case study analysis of EU policy negotiations. The last 
two decades have witnessed a shift within EU studies from the dominance of 
international relations (IR) approaches to those drawing on comparative politics and 
public policy perspectives. This shift is known as the ‘governance turn’ within EU 
studies and has concerned itself with the more day-to-day political processes of 
European integration (Hix, 1994; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). In this respect 
the EU theoretical debate has shifted from a debate within IR to a debate between 
the sub-disciplines of politics, i.e. between those who use the IR discourse and view 
the EU as an international organisation (in which intergovernmentalism is dominant) 
and those who view the EU as an emerging polity and use the discourse and 
approaches of comparative politics/public policy. For Verdun (2003) this particular 
divide also corresponds to a North American/European divide within EU scholarship 
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with the former more likely to view the EU as an international organisation, while 
scholars in the latter are more likely to view the EU as an emerging polity.  
 
Given the long history of IR inspired negotiation theory within EU studies, an obvious 
theoretical framework to utilise for this research is liberal intergovernmentalism 
(Moravcsik, 1998; Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning, 2009)  (LI). However, despite LI 
remaining a broadly useful framework, its assumption that EU level actors bare little 
or no influence on the European integration process has proved itself to be true in 
only a small number of cases, usually Treaty changes. Furthermore, the strict 
conditions required for the assumptions of LI to hold (such as unanimity voting) 
rarely feature within EU policy negotiations. The theoretical lens constructed in the 
chapter and used to guide the analysis within the following three case studies is 
therefore situated in the governance approach to European integration. EU level 
actors can, and do, have an influence on the process of European integration and 
analysing policy negotiations requires a broader analysis of the various actors 
involved, rather than simply focusing on governments.  
 
This chapter presents a modified version of Stone Sweet’s and Sandholtz’s (1997, 
1998) ‘supranational governance’ approach to account for the integration dynamics 
of the EU. It argues that EU negotiations are conducted within a transnational 
political space, and that transnational actors are capable of exerting their influence. 
Divisions within the EU’s political space can be understood as a clash of capitalisms 
between two broad coalitions - the liberal and regulatory coalitions which are 
centred on different conceptions of how the EU ought to be governed. Put simply, 
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divisions exist over whether the EU should be a simple market-making process 
inspired and guided by neoliberal ideology with minimal regulation and the 
promotion of competition; or whether it should enhance more market supporting 
legislation to create a more social democratic approach to integration with the 
construction of a European social dimension. The constructed framework can 
therefore be used to guide the analysis within the following three case studies. The 
chapter begins by outlining liberal intergovernmentalism as a framework in which to 
analyse EU policy negotiations. In the second part it is argued that the supranational 
governance approach to EU integration is a more appropriate framework through 
which to analyse negotiations, but requires the incorporation of the role of political 
ideology within the framework. The third and final section outlines the features of 
the EU’s political space in the context of the clash of capitalisms.  
I: Theorising European Integration: Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) has established itself as a ‘baseline theory’ in the 
study of the EU and is ‘an essential first cut explanation against which other theories 
are often compared’ (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 67). LI represents a 
bottom-up perspective of European integration and is concerned with how to 
conceptualise and explain relations between the Member States and of the 
processes and outcomes of European integration (Börzel, 2005). The theory was 
initially developed by Hoffmann (1966 and 1995) and refined and defended by 
Moravcsik (1998). Underpinning the LI framework is the assumption that the EU 
represents an international organisation (and not an emerging polity) with Member 
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States controlling the pace and scope of the integration process. The EU institutions 
are technocratic, their purpose is to bolster the creditability of interstate 
commitments, and importantly they do not influence decisions or outcomes.   
 
At its most fundamental level, LI rests on two basic assumptions about politics. First, 
that states are actors and achieve their goals through intergovernmental negotiation 
and bargaining, rather than through a centralised authority making and enforcing 
political decisions. For Moravcsik (1993: 480) the EU ‘is best seen as an international 
regime for policy coordination’, and Member States are ‘masters of the Treaty’ and 
continue to enjoy pre-eminent decision-making power and political legitimacy. 
Second, states are rational. Actors calculate the utility of alternative courses of 
action and choose the one that maximises their utility under the circumstances. 
Agreement to cooperate, or to establish international institutions, is explained as a 
collective outcome of interdependent rational state choices and intergovernmental 
negotiations (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68). Based on an extensive 
empirical analysis of the process of European integration (1955-1992), decisions to 
cooperate internationally can be explained in a three-stage framework: states first 
define preferences, then bargain to substantive agreements, and finally create (or 
adjust) institutions to secure those outcomes in the face of uncertainty (Moravcsik, 
1998). Each of the three stages merits further attention.  
 
First, in determining state preferences national governments aggregate the interests 
of their domestic constituencies, as well as their own interests. State preferences are 
neither fixed nor uniform, they vary among states and within the same states across 
  
52
time and issues according to issue-specific societal interdependence and domestic 
institutions (Moravcsik, 2008). Importantly, economic interests are the ultimate 
determining factor within national preference formation and are a function about 
how to manage globalisation (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 70), although 
the LI framework provides some room for geopolitical and ideological considerations 
(Moravcsik, 1998). 
 
Second, bargaining between the Member states reflects the LI concept of 
asymmetrical interdependence, that is, the uneven distribution of the benefits of a 
specific agreement and information about preferences and agreements play a crucial 
role. Actors that are least in need of a specific agreement are best able to threaten 
others with non-cooperation and thereby force them to make concessions; those 
who gain the most economically from a proposal compromise the most on the 
margin to realise such gains, whereas those who gain the least tend to enjoy more 
clout to impose conditions and extract concessions (Moravcsik, 1998: 3). 
Furthermore, those actors that have more and better information about other 
actors’ preferences and the workings of institutions are able to manipulate 
outcomes to their advantage. For the LI bargaining theory to hold, negotiations are 
required to take place within a non-coercive, unanimous voting system where 
transaction costs are low and asymmetrical interdependence defines relative power 
(Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 63).  
 
Third, once agreements have been made EU Member States delegate authority to 
international institutions. Directly, such institutions increase the credibility of mutual 
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commitments and reduce the temptation for Member States to cheat or defect. As 
Moravcsik explains: ‘governments transfer sovereignty to international institutions 
where potential joint gains are large, but efforts to secure compliance by foreign 
governments through decentralised or domestic means are likely to be ineffective’ 
(Moravcsik, 1998: 9). Indirectly, institutions help states to collectively superior 
outcomes by reducing the transaction costs of further international negotiations on 
specific issues and by providing the necessary information to reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding the future preferences and behaviour of other states (Moravcsik and 
Schimmelfennig (2009: 72). Beyond implementation and advisory functions, the role 
of institutions is limited and ‘supranationalism is a controlled means of 
implementing intergovernmental bargains’ (Wincott, 1995: 602). Governments 
control the level and speed of the European integration process driven by the 
domestic political and economic issues of the day. Any increase in power at the 
supranational level is a direct result of decisions made by national governments and 
not the influence of international institutions.       
 
Theoretical Criticism  
Moravcsik’s LI has been a major influence on the contemporary work in EU studies 
(Rosamond, 2000: 145), but the governance turn in the study of European 
integration has resulted in significant criticism of the theory. One of the most 
common criticisms of LI is that of the central analytical focus on states and the claim 
that EU institutions, such as the Commission, the European Court of Justice and the 
European Parliament, as well as transnational actors such as business and social 
interests, have little influence on the integration dynamic or outcomes. 
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Governments remain in the driving seat of the process and ultimately determine 
outcomes. According to the LI framework, the process of European integration is not 
about replacing the nation state, but about rescuing and adapting it to cope with 
globalisation (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 73). Wincott (1995) argues that 
such an emphasis within the theory focuses on the ‘supply-side’ of European 
integration and provides a one-sided account of the process. For Wincott (1995: 603-
606), the everyday practises of the EU institutions are important factors behind the 
integration trajectory and supranational institutions are key determinants of the 
overall process.  
 
Wincott’s (1995) criticism of LI points to a broader institutionalist critique of the 
theory that EU institutional arrangements can drift away from their initial 
expectations. As such, institutions are important mediating variables to understand 
the policy processes and policy outcomes of European integration. Pierson (1996) 
argues that despite the initial primacy of Member States in the design of EU 
institutions and policies, gaps may occur in the ability of governments to control 
their subsequent development for four reasons: firstly, the in-built short-termism in 
which governments will make decisions to satisfy an electorate can result in agreeing 
to EU policies that lead to a long-term loss of national control; secondly, the 
unintended consequences of a decision can create additional gaps which 
governments may not be able to close through subsequent action; thirdly, 
government change is likely to result in future governments with different 
preferences being constrained by the weight of past activities; and finally, EU 
institutions can become locked-in not just as a result of change resistant institutions 
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from above, but also through the incremental growth of entrenched support for 
existing institutions from below, as societal actors adapt to and develop a vested 
interest in the continuation of specific EU policies.   
 
A second criticism from the institutional perspective is that the functional 
understanding of international institutions within LI excludes the prospect of them 
exerting their own influence within the integration process. Historically, the 
European Court of Justice has actively pursued an integrationist agenda. During the 
1960s and 1970s the ECJ interpreted its competences in an integrationist manner 
and this was unanticipated and initially undesired by governments. One of the most 
well known cases in EU integration history is the ECJ’s Cassis de Dijon (1978) ruling - 
an event that is underplayed within Moravcsik’s analysis. The ECJ ruled that 
restrictions on imports between the Member States justified over concerns of the 
quality of a product constituted an obstacle to trade. The Court asserted that the 
regulatory structures of different Member States served similar ends and that 
regulations introduced in one state should be recognised as basic standards being 
met and goods should therefore be free to circulate (Wincott, 1995: 604). 
Essentially, this ruling was a broad interpretation of the free movement of goods 
(Article 28), as opposed to its narrow understanding within the Member States 
(Chalmers and Haasbeek, 2007: 78). The European Commission can also exert its 
influence during the integration process - again the Cassis ruling serves as example. 
The Commission was able to use the ECJ judgement to entrench the principle of 
mutual recognition, whereby a Member State should accept that the regulatory 
requirements of one Member State were equivalent to those of another (Chalmers 
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Haasbeek, 2007: 78). This alleviated the need for total harmonization of regulatory 
requirements by the Community and thereby avoided bottlenecks within the 
integration process. Rather than having to achieve a general agreement on a single 
standard – the traditional total harmonisation method used by the EC, the 
Commission could simply allow national differences to flourish, knowing that they 
could not be allowed to interfere with the circulation of goods (Wincott, 1995: 605). 
To prevent a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ in which Member States competitively 
cut regulatory standards the Commission simultaneously developed the notion of 
minimum harmonisation embodied in legal requirements. 
 
For Wincott (1995), the fundamental point of the previous example is not asserting 
the importance of standalone entrepreneurial institutions, rather it is to emphasise 
the interaction between institutions i.e. the relationships between the different EU 
institutions and the network and exchange of ideas that this creates. Therefore, the 
institutional setting of the EU has an impact on the behaviour of state actors, both 
constraining their behaviour and providing opportunity structures. This leads to a 
third broader criticism concerning the role of ideology and the influence of a broader 
set of transnational actors. As Wallace (see Wallace et al, 1999: 159) argues: ‘over 
the period of EU evolution more of a tussle has occurred between competing 
economic doctrines than Moravcsik acknowledges’. The Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), the Single Market and Monetary Union have been achieved as a specific 
political-economic doctrine gained transnational ascendency at a particular moment. 
Furthermore, Moravcsik (1998) dismisses the lobbying activities of interest groups 
and their strategic alliances with the Commission (e.g. the European Round Table of 
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Industrialists), but their activities and influence is well documented (Green-Cowles, 
1995; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989). That the EU is a quasi-polity that represents 
neither a traditional international organisation nor a fully-fledged federal state is an 
argument that has gained increasing significance over the last two decades (see: Hix, 
1999; Marks et al, 1996).   
 
II: Theorising European Integration: Supranational Governance 
 
In response to the shortcomings of LI, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997; 1998) 
provide an alternative theoretical framework anchored within the governance 
approach to European integration. If LI predominantly focuses on the ‘supply-side’ of 
the process, then the supranational governance approach attempts to incorporate 
the ‘demand-side’ to ‘develop a framework – a common vocabulary and heuristic – 
for understanding the dynamics of European integration’ (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz, 1997: 298). The Supranational Governance framework draws insights 
from neo-functionalism, particularly its emphasis on social exchange, 
communication, transactions, and the relationship between global interdependence, 
political choice and supranational institutions (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997: 
300). For Stone Sweet and Sandholtz intergovernmentalism and supranationalism 
represent two ideal forms of governance within the EU. In reality, European 
integration is a dynamic process and EU policy areas can be located along a 
continuum that stretches between the two ideal types. At the left-hand pole sits 
intergovernmental politics in which negotiations and governance within policy areas 
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feature the characteristics of LI. The right-hand pole is constituted by supranational 
politics. A supranational mode of governance is one in which:  
 
‘[The] centralised governmental structures (those organisations constituted at the 
supranational level) possess jurisdiction over specific policy domains within the 
territory comprised by the Member states. In exercising that jurisdiction, 
supranational organisations are capable of constraining the behaviour of all actors, 
including the Member States, within those domains’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1998: 8).  
 
European integration is provoked and sustained by the development of causal 
connections between three factors: European Community rule-making (EU rules – 
both legal and less formal); supranational organisations (EU institutions that 
produce, execute and (re)interpret EU rules); and transnational exchange (actors on 
the pan European stage (social, economic, political) who engage in EU exchanges 
and influence policy-making processes at the European level).    
 
The first dimension measures the legal-normative component of the continuum. At 
the far left rules are few and weak, but as we move along the continuum, rules 
stabilise state bargaining, delegitimize exit, and at the level of law lay down binding 
standards of conduct enforceable by courts. The second dimension measures the 
influence of EU institutions on the policy-making process and outcomes. 
Supranational organisations include the Commission, the ECJ, the Parliament, and at 
times the Council of Ministers. At the left-hand pole, the regime’s organisations 
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exhibit little if any meaningful autonomy from the most powerful Member States. As 
we move along the continuum the capacity of supranational institutions increases 
i.e. their ability to define and pursue a politically relevant agenda. At the 
supranational pole, institutions may exercise substantial autonomy in the face of 
Member State indifference or hostility. The third dimension is the presence and 
influence of transnational actors –interest groups, business, and knowledge based 
elites – on policy processes and outcomes. In intergovernmental politics, national 
executives mediate between domestic actors and supranational organisations and 
rules. In supranational politics, transnational actors can exert their influence on 
national governmental structures, as well as supranational bodies (Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz, 1998: 10).  
 
Taken together, the three dimensions are constitutive of supranational politics and 
the continuum provides the tools with which to describe EU governance. However, 
the framework also accounts for some of the dynamics as to why movement of a 
policy area along the continuum occurs. The supranational governance approach 
emphasises the role of society, particularly non-state actors who engage in cross 
border transactions and communications. Such actors require European standards, 
rules, and dispute mechanisms. In the beginning the causal mechanism for 
integration is quite simple: increasing levels of cross border transactions and 
communications by societal actors will increase the perceived need for EU-wide 
rules that in turn exert pro-integration pressure on their own governments. At this 
particular stage intergovernmental bargaining is a specific mode of decision-making 
within the EU policy process. Once the most obvious hindrances to cross-national 
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exchange are removed, new obstacles to such transactions are revealed and become 
salient. With the removal of tariffs and quotas, for example, differences in national 
regulatory standards (environment, health and safety, technical compatibility) 
become more apparent as obstacles. Actors seeking to benefit from intra-EU trade 
will then target these obstacles by attacking regulatory barriers through litigation 
and by pressuring EU legislative institutions to widen their jurisdiction into new 
domains (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 15).      
 
Therefore once such rules are established, they generate a dynamic of their own. But 
from the supranational governance perspective, the process of European integration 
is not one that is simply driven by exogenous pressures from cross border exchange - 
EU institutions can also generate their own endogenous dynamic. People acting 
within a rule context inevitably encounter the limits of the rules, that is, situations in 
which their context is unclear or undisputed. In either case actors may push for the 
creation of new rules or seek a reinterpretation of the existing rules. The new or 
changed rules then guide subsequent interactions, as people adapt their behaviour 
to the rules. The disputes that arise thereafter take shape in an altered rule structure 
and initiate the process that will again reinterpret and modify the rules. Since rules 
are central to this dynamic, the Treaty is the crucial starting point for subsequent 
integration, but when there is no Treaty bases competence for such a development, 
the relevant actors will create one (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 17).  
 
The final argument within the supranational governance approach is that it provides 
an explanation of the general direction of European integration. As argued in 
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Chapter One, the process of European integration has predominantly been a market-
making exercise. Despite some modest developments surrounding the construction 
of an EU social policy, the European social dimension has not been a counter-balance 
to market integration. This trend, according to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998: 
15), is a result of business being the sector for which the material stake in cross-
border transactions is the greatest and most obvious. Companies with an interest in 
cross-border transactions will press for the reduction of national barriers, but the 
consequences of integration for people in their role as workers and consumers are 
less transparent. This explains why European companies have had a greater impact 
on integration than either labour or consumers.  
 
Theoretical Criticism       
The Supranational Governance approach is immensely valuable, but it is not without 
criticism. Branch and Øhrgaard (1999) argue that Stone Sweet and Sandholtz fail to 
escape the intergovernmental-supranational dichotomy and simply offer a mirror 
image of LI. While LI privileges national actors and intergovernmental bargaining and 
thereby concentrates on the ‘grand bargains’ of decision-making, at the other 
extreme Stone Sweet and Sandholtz privilege transnational business actors and 
supranational actors and thereby predominantly focus on decision-making in the 
Single Market. A second criticism of the Supranational Governance approach is the 
argument that European integration is essentially a market-driven process and a 
function of transnational exchange. For Branch and Øhrgaard (1999: 128-131) the 
implication is that where there is no market-driven transnational exchange, there 
will be little, if any, integration. This fails to account for attempts by the European 
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institutions and some Member States to promote market-correcting integration 
precisely to compensate for the absence of transnational exchange. Branch and 
Øhrgaard (1999: 129) point to the area of social policy which was promoted in the 
late 1980s for mainly political reasons to counterbalance the effects of the 
deregulatory Single Market programme and to combat the view that the EU was a 
predominantly market-making exercise.  
 
A third more general criticism relates to the continuum put forward by Stone-Sweet 
and Sandholtz in terms of measuring exactly where a policy domain should be 
situated. At the two extremes of the continuum the framework provides a clear 
understanding of the features of a policy area, but what would be the determining 
factors behind situating a policy area along the continuum at say points 3, as 
opposed to point 4? Does QMV in the Council ‘count’ for as much as the 
Commission’s power to issue decisions? Furthermore, how can movement along the 
continuum be assessed? Although according to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
disjunctures between the three dimensions are short-lived and movement in one 
dimension initiates shifts within the other two, this does not help to determine at 
what stage a given policy domain makes the leap from one point on the continuum 
to the next (Branch and Øhrgaard, 1999: 135). In short ‘without clear criteria for, first, 
situating a policy domain on the continuum and, second, reassessing its position, the 
continuum would appear to be of limited use in determining any form of governance 
short of the two ideal-types’ (ibid). 
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A final major criticism of the Supranational Governance approach is similar to 
Wallace’s (see Wallace et al, 1999:159) critique of LI in that it lacks a role for political 
ideology. For Stone Sweet and Sandholtz European integration results from 
increased levels of transnational exchange which in turn creates pressure from 
transnational business for the removal of barriers and the harmonisation of 
standards. Although such an assumption may be necessary for a theory that aims to 
explain the process of European integration, the assumption constructs such actors 
as a relatively homogeneous group of individuals and this masks important 
differences between them. For example, Hooghe and Marks (1999) argued that 
transnational political divisions surrounding the formation of the Single European 
Act represent the emergence of an EU polity. Accordingly, when national actors step 
into the European arena they bring with them the ideological convictions from their 
respective national arenas, resulting in two broad multi-level coalitions: liberal and 
regulated capitalism (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 76). 
 
In defence of the Supranational Governance approach  
Despite its shortcomings, the Supranational Governance framework remains a 
valuable approach through which to understand the process of European integration. 
The major criticisms of the framework by Branch and Øhrgaard (1999) result from a 
particular reading and interpretation of the approach (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1999). While Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz concentrate on the more ‘day-to-day’ 
policy processes for their empirical case studies, this is precisely the point - during 
the penning of the Supranational Governance framework, case studies of 
intergovernmental negotiations already featured within the EU literature. The 
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argument formed within their volume is that these negotiations are to be positioned 
towards the intergovernmental pole on the continuum, and that Stone Sweet’s and 
Sandholtz’s case studies volume are examples of the ‘other’ policy areas. Perhaps 
their biggest mistake, however, was that they never explicitly indicated where such 
case studies were to be situated along the continuum, thus providing the impression 
of a continued intergovernmental/supranational dichotomy within the grand 
theories of European integration.  
 
A second point to re-consider is the argument by Branch and Øhrgaard that EU 
integration does not always result from increases in transnational exchange, as 
demonstrated by the case of EU social policy. However, although Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz (1999: 146) emphasise that transnational exchange tends to activate EU 
integration, they do not argue that such activity is the only factor behind the 
process. Rather the concern of empirical case studies should be with how their three 
variables interact overtime. Furthermore, they also argue that relative levels of 
transnational activity measured across time and policy sector explain the significant 
variations in the level of integration between policy areas. Therefore, although the 
initiative for integration within the social dimension came from the EU social actors, 
certain Member States and the Commission, that the social dimension has failed to 
develop as a counter-balance to the SEM is a result of the low levels of transnational 
exchange exerting harmonisation pressures within the EU. Rather than disproving 
the Supranational Governance framework, the case of EU social policy serves to 
illustrate the main tenets of the approach.  
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A third point relates to the limited value of the continuum and the problems 
associated in determining the precise location of any given policy domain. However, 
unlike LI, the Supranational Governance approach is not a deterministic framework 
through which to view the process of European integration, rather it is a heuristic 
device intended to aid the organisation of research (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 
1999: 148). The framework reasonably depicts how to conceptualise variation on the 
dependent variable, and embodies certain specified causal relationships between 
the three main independent variables. The empirical policy case studies within the 
original analysis represent several illustrations of how the framework can be utilised; 
they are not the only examples and future research agendas can draw from them as 
example.  
 
A final criticism of the approach to consider is the role of political ideology. Within 
the Supranational Governance perspective the issue is distinctively absent. Given the 
lengths taken by Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz to prove that transnational actors have 
an influence on the process of European integration, it is unfortunate that they do 
not elaborate on how such interests are organised. In short, politics matters in 
furthering the understanding of the origins, formation and potential impact of a 
particular policy. The following section modifies the supranational governance 
continuum to incorporate the politics of European integration.    
III: The Clash of Capitalisms and Supranational Governance of the European 
Political Economy  
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The EU’s Political Space as a Clash of Capitalisms  
How are we best to understand the EU’s political space within the context of the 
supranational governance framework? For Hooghe and Marks (1999: 71) the EU’s 
political space is best understood as a clash of capitalisms centred on different 
conceptions of how the EU ought to be governed. For them the signing of the Single 
European Act not only signifies a deepening of the European integration process, but 
also the emergence of a transnational political arena in which decision-making has 
become: ‘a conscious political struggle among coalitions of political actors having 
distinctly different conceptions of how Europe should be configured politically’. Such 
different conceptions manifest themselves within two dimensions. The first 
dimension ranges from left to right and concerns economic equality and the role of 
the state. When national actors step into the European arena, they bring with them 
ideological convictions from their respective national arenas (ibid, 76). The left-right 
dimension is therefore imported into the EU from national polities. 
 
Central to understanding the left-right dimension is Hall’s and Soskice’s (2001) 
distinction between liberal market economies (LME) and coordinated market 
economies (CME) within the varieties of capitalism literature (VoC). For Hall and 
Soskice (2001: 6-7) the differences between the two VoC are evident in five 
institutional spheres: industrial relations; vocational training and education; 
corporate governance; inter-firm relations; and employer-employee relations. 
National political economies ‘can be compared by reference to the way in which 
firms resolve the coordination problems they face in these five spheres’ (ibid: 8). In 
LMEs the activities of firms are coordinated via competitive market arrangements in 
  
67
which market relationships are characterised by the arm’s length exchange of goods 
and services. In CME, firms depend more heavily on non-market relationships to 
coordinate their activities. Such non-market modes of coordination generally entail 
more extensive relational contracting within private and established networks and a 
strong reliance on collaborative relationships between firms (ibid: 7-9). While LMEs 
are underpinned by a legal system that supports formal contracting and a 
hierarchical competitive system, CMEs provide a legal environment designed to 
facilitate information sharing and collaboration, and are supported by 
complementary institutions, such as powerful employer associations, strong trade 
unions and extensive networks of cross share-holding.  
 
Underpinning the VoC are the issues of comparative institutional advantage and 
institutional complementarities (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2006; Estevez-Abe et al,  
2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall, 2007; Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Huber and 
Stephens, 2001; Rhodes, 2005). National institutional frameworks provide nations 
with comparative institutional advantages in particular activities, products and 
services. Firms can perform some types of activities, which allow them to produce 
some kinds of goods, more efficiently than others because of the institutional 
support they receive for those activities in the political economy. Conversely, policies 
that serve LMEs well can erode the capacity of CME firms and vice versa (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). Underpinning a comparative institutional advantage within the VoC is 
a set of complementary institutions. Institutional practices are said to be 
complementary when each raises the returns from each other (Hall and Gingerich, 
2009: 151).  For Hall and Soskice (2001: 18), ‘nations with a particular type of 
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coordination in one sphere of the economy tend to develop complementary 
practices in other spheres as well’. This also extends to social policy and the welfare 
state, as Huber and Stephens (2001: 199) observe: ‘within each country certain - 
though not all – aspects of its welfare state and production regimes do fit each 
other’. Welfare state - economy linkages within VoC demonstrate a strong 
correlation, as evident from the relationship between their social policies and: their 
systems of industrial relations; production systems and employment regimes; and 
financial and corporate financial systems (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2006).   
 
Alongside the left-right dimension is a second, distinctively European dimension of 
contestation of nationalism versus supranationalism, depicting conflict about the 
role of the nation state as the supreme arbiter of political, economic and cultural life. 
At one extreme are those actors who wish to preserve or strengthen the nation state, 
while at the other end are those who wish for deeper integration within the EU and 
believe that nation states can coexist with supranational institutions. The 
nationalism versus supranationalism distinction has its origins within the Eurosceptic 
vs. pro-European dimension evident within national political arenas. At the one 
extreme are those who wish to preserve or strengthen the national state; at the 
other extreme are those who wish to press for ever close European Union and 
believe that national identities can co-exist with an overarching supranational 
identity (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 76).   
 
Within the EU’s political space, attitudes within the two dimensions coalesce to form 
a dominant political cleavage ranging from: leftist orientations and supranationalism 
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which support ‘regulated capitalism’ known as the regulatory coalition; to right-wing 
orientations and nationalism which support neoliberalism known as the liberal 
coalition. Put simply, divisions exist over whether the EU should be a simple market-
making process inspired and guided by a neoliberal ideology with minimal regulation 
and the promotion of competition between the Member States; or whether it should 
enhance more market supporting legislation to create a more social-democratic 
approach to integration with the construction of a social dimension (and eventual 
European social model). Yet although this particular cleavage is the dominant way of 
combining these dimensions, it does not encompass all actors. For example, there 
are left leaning nationalists in the Danish Social Democratic Party and right-leaning 
supranationalists among the German Christian Democrats (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 
77).    
 
The neoliberal coalition conceives the process of European integration as a means to 
insulate markets from political interference by combining a European-wide market 
under selective supranational surveillance with intergovernmental decision-making 
vested in national governments. The coalition aims to constrain national barriers to 
trade and promote competition between national governments for mobile factors of 
production. It also aims to limit the ability of social groups to pressure governments 
into regulation. In contrast, the regulatory coalition has the aim of creating a 
European liberal democracy, capable of regulating markets, redistributing resources, 
and shaping partnership among public and private actors. The coalition emphasises 
supply-side policies and the capacity to provide collective goods to promote 
comparative advantage in international economic competition. It also argues for a 
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deepening of democracy at the EU level, with directly elected institutions, 
democratic scrutiny and interest representation. The coalition has promoted and 
supported social dialogue at the EU level, structural funds to support poorer regions, 
progress within the social dimension, environmental policy, European-wide 
infrastructure in transport, communications and information technology, and a 
variety of less ambitious measure in research and development, education and 
consumer protection (Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 82-96).    
 
Successive British governments since the 1980s have staunchly defended the 
neoliberal coalition. It has also gained broad support among strategically placed 
political and economic elites. These include leaders of European multinational 
corporations such as those represented within the European Round Table of 
Industrialists (ERT), business associations such as BusinessEurope, financial interests 
within international finance and central banks, pressure groups, think tanks and 
opinion leaders such as the Economist (see Hooghe and Marks, 1999: 83). The 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and trade unionists at the national 
levels, as well as interest groups such as the European Anti Poverty Network support 
the regulatory coalition. But organised labour is not nearly as influential at the 
European level as it has historically been in most Member States. In contrast to 
multinational firms that have adapted smoothly to the process of regional 
integration, organised labour has had great difficultly, partly because unions are 
deeply embedded in distinctively national institutions, but also because the power 
and representation of trade unions has witnessed a steep decline over the last thirty 
years as a result of the internationalisation of economic activity (Marks and McAdam, 
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1996). It should also be noted that the regulatory coalition is much weaker than the 
liberal coalition because it is extraordinarily heterogeneous (Hooghe and Marks, 
1999: 89). National institutional variations underpin different constellations of 
interest and it is difficult to create winning coalitions for regulations that apply to 
such heterogeneous institutions (Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Majone, 1996).  
 
Governance and the Clash of Capitalisms  
In short, politics matters in further understanding policy-making within the EU. Stone 
Sweet’s and Sandholtz’s supranational governance continuum is situated within a 
complex political arena, and while business may be the ultimate beneficiaries of 
European integration, the policy negotiation process represents a transnational 
political conflict featuring a clash of capitalisms. The simple supranational 
governance continuum is modified to incorporate the EU’s political space (figure I). 
 
Insert figure 2.1 here 
 
Figure 2.1: The Dynamics of European Integration 
 
 
 
Shaping the political economy continuum are the political dynamics at both the EU 
and Member State level. Governments of the Member States form alliances with 
each other as well as transnational actors – such as different supranational actors 
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(e.g. the Commission) or various interest groups (e.g. the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) and BusinessEurope). The outcome is then a function of a 
complex interaction of toing and froing bargaining. As transnational actors increase 
their influence on policy outcomes in policy areas towards the supranational pole, 
they do so within a clash of capitalisms political constellation. Towards the 
intergovernmental pole, negotiations also feature a clash of capitalisms, but the 
governments of the Member States become more central to outcomes. 
 
There are a number of inherent features within the supranational governance of the 
EU’s political economy that render negotiations, outcomes and day-to-day 
governance very different to policy-making in Member States. First, at the EU level 
there is a more pronounced power asymmetry between the left and right than at the 
Member State level. Labour organisations and social NGOs have struggled to 
establish themselves at the transnational level owing to their embeddedness and 
historical differences. Transnational exchange, which drives the process of market 
integration, is relatively low between the EU Member States in the social dimension 
and this limits the integration momentum within policy area. Add to this the 
declining power of the traditional social democratic left over the last thirty years, 
and the result is that the left within the EU’s political space is much weaker than that 
which can be traditionally found within the Member States.  
 
The second point to note is that the two coalitions are significantly less stable and 
more fluid than political coalitions found in government in the Member States, and 
this adds a high level of uncertainty to the EU policy-making process. During EU 
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policy negotiations Member States predominantly concern themselves with 
‘goodness-of-fit’ of a proposed policy within their domestic situation so as to avoid 
high adaptational costs in their domestic setting, as well as negative political 
consequences (Börzel, 2002). But while the varieties of capitalism literature is useful 
for understanding Member State positions within the clash of capitalisms, it can only 
ever be indicative of a position a government will take for three important reasons. 
First, the LME/CME dichotomy within the VoC literature has come under attack for 
being too simplistic - there are a number of countries situated somewhere between 
the two ideal types (e.g. Allen, 2004; Amable, 2003; Crouch, 2005; Deeg and Jackson, 
2007; Hay and Wincott, 2012). This is particularly true for the Mediterranean 
Member States (MME) that Rhodes (2005b) refers to as Mixed Market Economies 
(MME). The current literature therefore points to the existence of a spectrum in 
which to position countries, ranging from a pure LME to a pure CME at the two 
extremes, with MMEs situated around the centre. Second, even if the VoC approach 
proved to be a more useful framework to understand the political positions of 
Member States in the two coalitions, the idea that their VoC wholly determine such 
positions is overly institutionalist. Indeed, governments may support the domestic 
status quo and take a position in accordance with their VoC, but there is nothing to 
stop a government from using the EU as a political opportunity structure to 
legitimise a domestic reform that does not represent a ‘goodness-of-fit’ and thereby 
shift the domestic status quo. Third, EU policy negotiations do not occur in isolation 
of each other. At anyone time there can be a number of individual policy 
negotiations that governments are required to participate in, and as such, they will 
attach a greater significance to some policy areas, relative to others.  Governments 
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may be willing to compromise during certain policy negotiations to achieve desired 
objectives in other policy areas, in doing so they may also enter into agreements 
with other governments.    
   
Member State positions within the governance of the EU therefore reflect complex 
calculations and are much less predictable than would first appear. What are the 
consequences of this for the governance of the European integration process? The 
liberal and regulatory coalitions should be understood as coalitions representing 
‘political tendencies’, as oppose to the ‘political factions’ found within domestic 
arenas. A political faction represents a relatively stable long-term strategic coalition 
to further a broad range of policy objectives through consciously organised political 
activity (Rose 1966). By contrast, a political tendency represents a body of attitudes 
about a broad range of problems and the attitudes are held together by a more or 
less coherent political ideology, rather than a stable group of members (Rose, 1966: 
319).1 The number of Member States and transnational actors who adhere to a 
tendency varies from issue to issue, but while certain transnational interest groups, 
such as the European Anti Poverty Network, are consistent in which coalition they 
attach themselves to, Member States are much more fluid. Participants within a 
faction are therefore not necessarily self-consciously organised in support of a single 
policy, and they do not expect, nor are they expected, to continue to operate as a 
group supporting the same tendency over a period of time. Member States can 
therefore shift positions from one policy area to another and they may be attached 
to different coalitions in different policy arenas at anyone given time. The result of 
such a political environment in the EU’s transnational political space is that no one 
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coalition is able to get full control of the political agenda and EU policies often 
represent a patchwork of ideological priorities. While the Single European Act (1986) 
was a victory for the liberal coalition (Hooghe and Marks, 1999), it is more 
questionable which coalition won EMU (van Apeldoorn, 2002). The 1995 EU 
enlargement, which extended EU membership to Austria, Finland and Sweden, is 
attributed to an increased momentum within EU social policy from 1995 onwards 
(Velluti, 2010). There have also been documented clashes of capitalism within 
specific policy areas such as Cohesion Policy (Hooghe, 1998) and the Takeover 
Directive (Callaghan and Höpner, 2005; Clift, 2009).  
 
The European social dimension and the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargements 
Where is the European social dimension to be situated with respect to the modified 
supranational governance framework? On the face of it and certainly compared to 
the SEM (the case study par excellence of European integration and the foundation 
for Stone Sweet’s and Sandholtz’s typology), developments suggest that the social 
dimension tends to be considerably more intergovernmental. Comparing 
supranational governance in the social dimension to SEM, for example, we find the 
following: the Acquis Communautaire is less developed and extensive; the EU 
institutions have less supranational autonomy; and transnational society is less 
developed and influential. However, the social dimension is not purely 
intergovernmental and EU actors can and do have an influence on the process of 
integration. Developments in EU social policy around the forging of the Lisbon 
Strategy in 2000 serve as example: progress can be attributed to the large majority 
of centre-left governments in power in the Member States in the period when it was 
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being negotiated; the entrepreneurship and vigour of the Portuguese Presidency; 
the left-leaning position of the Prodi Commission; support from the Parliament; and 
the lobbying of NGOs. Integration within the social dimension is therefore situated 
somewhere around the centre of the supranational governance continuum. At this 
point on the continuum supranational actors may often be the source of successful 
policy innovation, but the Member States remain in the driving seat of the 
integration process, and can significantly determine outcomes and even block 
progress (Copeland and Daly, 2012: 275-276). 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding Member State positions within the EU’s clash of 
capitalisms, how can we assess the impact of EU enlargement upon the ESD? The 
empirical case studies that follow analyse policy negotiations centring on the ESD 
and reflect a six-year timeframe (2004-2010). During this period, governments can 
change and there is the possibility that Member States will take positions during 
negotiations that are influenced by some of the factors outlined above. By analysing 
Member State positions and impact overtime, the analysis is able to draw on the 
general political tendencies of the CEE towards the ESD. Between 2004-2010 there 
were a variety of governments in power across CEE: Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia had 
centre-right governments; while Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia all had 
centre-left governments; The Czech Republic, Poland, each had two or more 
governments during the period, with at least one government from the centre-left 
and one from the centre-right.2 And between EU accession in 2007 and 2008 
Romania had a centre right coalition government followed by a grand coalition 
between the main centre-left and centre right parties.    
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As a result of EU enlargement we can expect one of the following to happen within 
the clash of capitalisms surrounding the ESD:   
1) That the 2004/2007 enlargements have little impact upon the clash of 
capitalisms surrounding the European social dimension. Central and Eastern 
European Member States join the two different coalitions with little overall 
impact on the EU’s political space.  
2) That the 2004/2007 enlargements have a significant impact upon the clash of 
capitalisms surrounding the European social dimension. Central and Eastern 
European Member states predominantly join either the liberal or regulatory 
coalition and this either undermines the European social dimension or 
strengthens it.   
Selection of case studies  
The following three case studies therefore analyse the positions and impact of the 
2004 and 2007 Central and Eastern European states. The three case studies concern 
the respective negotiations of the Services Directive (2004-2006), the revision of the 
Working Time Directive (WTD) (2003-2009), and the Europe 2020 poverty and social 
exclusion target (2010). The three case studies represent the most significant 
developments in the ESD since 2004 and importantly, they represent a six-year 
timeframe. Furthermore, they each represent one of the three constituent elements 
of the ESD. The revision of the WTD represents a hard law component of the ESD. 
Originally agreed in 1993, the WTD contained a clause requiring it to be reviewed 
after ten years. The poverty and social exclusion target was included within Europe 
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2020, the successor to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy. It builds on the OMC social inclusion 
(2000-2010) and aims to remove 20 million individuals across the EU from living in 
poverty and social exclusion by 2020. It therefore represents a soft law component 
of the ESD. Finally, the Services Directive concerns the underlying norms and values 
component of the ESD. The Directive relates to the SEM, but the debate surrounding 
the negotiation process focused on the impact the proposed directive would have on 
the ESD. The concern was that a liberal Services Directive would create competitive 
pressures that would indirectly undermine the more extensive systems of labour law 
and social protection found across the EU.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the process of European integration can be understood 
with reference to the supranational governance approach. Contrary to claims made 
by liberal intergovernmentalists that transnational actors have little influence on the 
outcomes of EU policy negotiations, the supranational governance approach argues 
that such actors can and do influence the process. The level of influence 
transnational actors have on policy outcomes depends and the level of integration 
within the particular policy field. Put simply, in policy areas where national 
sovereignty has been pooled, transnational actors can and do have an influence on 
policy outcomes, whereas in those areas in which the level of European integration 
is low, outcomes and negotiations are much more intergovernmental. For Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz (1997, 1998) the supranational governance continuum features 
intergovernmental policy negotiations at the left-hand side, supranational politics at 
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the right-hand side, and policy areas situated in the middle feature elements of both 
extremes. However, to fully understand the process of European integration, this 
chapter has argued that the supranational governance approach requires 
modification to account for the political dynamics of the EU. It argues that EU 
negotiations are conducted within a transnational political space in which actors 
divide into two broad coalitions – the liberal and regulatory coalitions – that centre 
on different conceptions of how the EU ought to be governed. Division between the 
two coalitions concern whether the EU should be a simple market-making process 
inspired and guided by neoliberal ideology with minimal regulation and the 
promotion of competition; or whether it should enhance more market supporting 
legislation to create a more social democratic approach to integration with the 
construction of a European social dimension. But while the two coalitions represent 
a relatively stable body of attitudes held together by a more or less coherent 
political ideology, the members in such coalitions are less stable. This results from 
the dynamic nature of politics both at the EU and Member State levels. Within such 
a political environment no one coalition is able to gain full control of the political 
agenda, resulting in EU policies often representing a patchwork of ideological 
perspectives. 
 
The following three case studies apply the framework constructed within this 
chapter to analyse the impact of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements upon the ESD.  
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Given the uncertainty surrounding Member State positions within the EU’s political 
space, the three case studies represent a six-year timeframe. This enables the 
analysis to draw out the political tendencies of the CEE states over time.  
 
 
                                                         
1 It is important to note that Rose (1966) was referring to political factions and 
political tendencies in the British party system.  
2 The Czech Republic had a centre-left coalition government between 2002-2006, no 
government between 2006-2007, and a centre-right coalition government from 2007 
and 2009, followed by a brief caretaker grand coalition government in 2009, and a 
centre-right government following the 2010 parliamentary elections. From 2001-
2005 Poland had a centre-left government, 2005-2007 a populist government, and 
2007-2010 a centre-right government.  
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3: The Negotiation of the Services Directive 
 
This chapter is the first of the three case study chapters that analyse the impact of 
the 2004 and 2007 Central and Eastern European (CEE) States upon policy-
negotiations surrounding the European social dimension (ESD). The chapter concerns 
the negotiations of the Services Directive, which has become known as one of the 
most contentious pieces of EU policy negotiated over the last decade. Despite the 
freedom to provide services being one of the four founding principles of the Treaty 
of Rome (along with goods, people and capital), in reality a fully functioning single 
market for services did not exist. The Single European Act (SEA) concerned the 
physical product market and while its spill-over had included some services (such as 
air transport, telecommunications) integration within the service sector had been 
piecemeal. The Prodi Commission argued that not only was the EU’s service sector 
an untapped potential source of growth and jobs, but it would also enable the EU to 
meet some of the Lisbon Strategy targets. In 2003 service providers such as 
architects and lawyers wishing to offer their services outside of their Member States, 
still faced huge obstacles in the form of national standards. In its report The State of 
the Internal Market for Services the Commission noted: ‘a decade after the 
envisaged completion of the Internal Market, there is still a huge cap between the 
vision of an integrated EU economy and the reality as experienced by European 
citizens and European service providers’ (Commission, 2002: 9). 
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While the proposed Services Directive directly related to the Single European Market 
(SEM), the ensuing debate focused upon the impact it would have on the potential 
to undermine the European social dimension. The negotiations witnessed a clear 
division along the clash of capitalisms political constellation. The regulatory coalition 
argued that the proposed directive would undermine the more extensive systems of 
social protection and labour law found within some Member States. It argued that 
the use of the country of origin principle, which was to be used for temporary cross 
border service providers, would allow workers to ignore certain aspects of labour 
law not found within the Posting of Workers Directive. There was also a lack of 
clarity with respect to the supervision of temporary service providers, as they were 
to be supervised via a complicated relationship between the country of origin and 
the country of destination. Questions were raised about the incentive a Member 
State would have to supervise a service provider operating temporarily in another 
Member State. Finally, the proposed directive was broad in scope and included 
services of general economic interest (SGEI) such as healthcare. Opponents were 
concerned that EU public services would be opened to competition, possibly 
privatised and eventually undermined. In contrast, the liberal coalition argued that 
the proposed directive would generate significant gains in growth and employment 
that would outweigh any negative effects of the directive. Furthermore, the negative 
criticism of the proposal was based on an exaggeration and misconception of the 
directive.  
 
The proceeding chapter analyses the negotiations of the proposed directive from 
2004-2006. In particular it pays attention to the positions and contribution of the 
  
83
CEE states during the negotiations. The first part of the chapter analyses the political 
economy of the service sector within the EU, thus highlighting the potential for 
political divisions between actors within the EU’s political space. The second part of 
the chapter focuses on the negotiations and the final agreed version of the directive. 
The chapter concludes by reflecting on the positions and contributions of the CEE 
states during the negotiations.  
I: The Political Economy of Services  
 
Services within the EU 
Freedom to establish and freedom to provide services is a fundamental principle of 
the 1957 Treaty establishing the EC1. Despite this, in reality a fully functioning single 
market for services has not existed. The completion of the Single Market in 1992 
mostly liberalised trade in goods, not services, and the sector was therefore largely 
left out of the 1987 SEA. By early 2000 the liberalisation of the service sector had 
been piecemeal with only a handful of areas forming a single market (e.g. 
telecommunications, financial services, broadcasting and the recognition of 
professional qualifications). For example, service providers such as architects, 
lawyers or construction workers who wished to offer their services outside of their 
home country on either a temporary or permanent basis, still faced huge obstacles 
in the form of differing national standards. Although cross border flows in services 
had steadily increased (the value of EU intra-service trade on average grew by 10.5 % 
annually in the period 1985-2001 – Kox et al, 2004: 5) so too had the number of ECJ 
rulings aimed at enforcing the founding Treaty principle (between 01/01/1997 and 
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31/12/2000 there were 15 ECJ rulings on the Freedom to Provide Services, between 
01/01/2001 and 31/12/2003 this had increased to 85). In terms of employment, in 
2000 services accounted for 116 million jobs in the then EU-15 Member States which 
represented 72 per cent of the active workforce. In comparison, manufacturing 
accounted for 33 million jobs (19.45% of the total workforce). Furthermore, between 
1997 and 2002 services accounted for approximately 11.4 million jobs in the EU, 
representing 96 % of total net job creation during that period (ibid: 10).      
 
Given the fragmented nature of the EU’s services sector, Member States have been 
able to maintain a high degree of autonomy, and as such distinct national 
differences remain. Since the 1970s more liberal regimes such as the UK have been 
able to shift resources into the service sector relatively easily. The flexibility of the 
labour market, combined with an educational system that privileges general skills 
and a welfare state well suited to the creation of jobs in services via low levels of 
employment protection and unemployment benefit, has suited the creation of jobs 
in services at the expense of traditional manufacturing (also see: Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Hall, 2007; Pontusson, 2005; Rhodes, 2005). Traditionally, more CMEs have 
developed a different strategy to service sector development. For example, to 
complement its high value export-led sector in manufacturing and to prevent low 
paid/low skilled jobs developing within the service sector, the Swedish government 
increased public sector employment and expanded a public day care system to make 
it easier for women to work. The Swedish model therefore provides exceptionally 
high levels of public services based on high levels of female employment which 
ultimately crowd-out low paid service sector jobs (Esping-Andersen, 1990). This 
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particular trajectory has enabled the Swedish economy to cope with the pressures of 
a post-Bretton Woods era by ensuring that the complementary institutions of its 
export-led sector have remained intact.2 
 
However, not all regulatory economies have followed the Swedish example. 
Germany has been faced with what Scharpf (2006) refers to as the ‘Continental 
dilemma’ of rising unemployment and an inability to create sufficient jobs within the 
newly developed service sector. The German economy provides a number of formal 
and informal structures, such as high social security and healthcare costs for 
employers, extensive dismissal protection and a German identity closely associated 
with industrial employment, which have inhibited the expansion of the service 
sector (Annesley, 2004: 46-54). From the early 1990s until the recent financial crisis 
the German economy witnessed a decline in economic performance (Dyson and 
Padgett, 2005: 115) and its pre-financial crisis reform proved to be a crucial 
economic and political challenge. In an attempt to preserve the institutional 
complementarities of the core industrial sector, the German economy has developed 
a dual labour market based on the promotion of part –time ‘mini jobs’ now occupied 
by more than 4 million workers on whom there are reduced social charges for the 
employer, such as healthcare insurance (Hall, 2007: 70). The key issue is whether this 
development will gradually enforce similar changes on the core labour market, 
although evidence from Japan suggests that such a dual labour market model can be 
sustained (ibid). Broadly speaking, the expansion of the service sector within 
Germany has developed consensually and incrementally, and any signs of the 
creation of a low-wage service sector have met with resistance due to concern over 
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the spill-over effects to the institutional complementarities of the economy (Allen, 
2006: 359; Annesley, 2004: 65). 
 
As a result there remain significant differences between the service sectors of the 
EU’s Member States and there is a spectrum along which they can be positioned. 
The UK, Sweden and Germany provide clear examples of the different types of 
service sectors found within the EU, with more liberal countries such as the UK at 
one extreme and countries such as Sweden at the other, while Germany’s service 
sector lies somewhere in between the two.  
 
The Prodi Commission had long believed that the EU’s service sector was an 
untapped source of growth and jobs. It argued that growth had been limited owing 
to a number of barriers which restricted the freedom to establish services 
(permanent establishment in another Member State) and the freedom to provide 
services (temporary cross border service provision) and a rapid liberalization of the 
EU service sector was therefore justified (European Commission, 2004b). In its 
contribution to the Lisbon Special European Council the Commission proposed two 
over-arching objectives for the Lisbon Strategy: the pursuit of economic reform to 
prepare the knowledge economy; and the strengthening of the European social 
model by investing in people (European Commission, 2000b: 2). To achieve the 
former the Commission put forward six sub-objectives of which one was for 
improvements to the Internal Market which required ‘attacking’ restrictions to the 
growth of cross-border services by 2004. As a result, the March 2000 Presidency 
Conclusions briefly called for the Commission to outline a strategy for the ‘removal 
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of barriers to services’ before the end of 2000 (European Council, 2000b: 6). This 
request was followed by a review of the EU service sector in early 2001 by the 
Commission, the launch of a public consultation in 2002, and the release of the first 
draft of a proposed directive in early 2004. It was initially anticipated that following 
the review the Commission would publish a ‘systematic and comprehensive list of 
persistent barriers and a request for their removal to Member States’ (European 
Commission, 2001: 1). However, ‘informed by the latest economic research’ the 
Commission used the opportunity to propose a directive arguing that ‘the key global 
competitiveness goal set by the Lisbon European Council could not be met unless 
sweeping changes were made to the functioning of the Internal Market for services 
in the near future’. The result was the EU’s Services Directive agreed in 2006 which 
remains one of the largest and most controversial pieces of EU legislation.    
 
The Negotiation of the Services Directive and the European Social Dimension 
 
On face value the Services Directive concerns the Single Market, is the policy domain 
of the Directorate General for the Internal Market and Services, and therefore has 
little direct relationship with the ESD. Yet when the Directive was transmitted to the 
European Parliament it was placed under the Enhanced Cooperation procedure 
rather than it being given the as the sole responsibility of the Committee for Internal 
Market and Consumer Affairs (IMCO). The Enhanced Cooperation Procedure is used 
when a directive affects more than one policy area and indicates that in the case of 
the Services Directive, the proposal had policy implications beyond the functioning 
of the Internal Market. For the proposed Directive IMCO was appointed as the lead 
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committee, with the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL) appointed as 
the second committee.3 This indicates that the proposed directive affected not just 
the Internal Market, but labour law and social policy. In fact, the ensuing debate and 
negotiations of the proposed directive focused upon the preservation of ‘social 
Europe’, the expansion of unfettered neoliberalism, and the negative effects such 
competitive free market forces would have on employment protection and social 
policy across the EU Member States. As Kowalsky of the ETUC (2005: 8) noted at the 
time: ‘seldom has controversy related to a legislative proposal been so clearly linked 
with the struggle to shape a European Social Dimension. It [was] a question of 
whether there [was] to be an internal market with a social dimension or merely a 
glorified free trade zone.’  
 
In January 2004 the first draft of the proposal was released, penned by the then 
Commissioner for the Internal Market Frits Bolkestein – a former Dutch Cabinet 
Minister who made no secret of his neoliberal preferences for the EU (cf. Clift, 2009; 
Höpner and Schäfer, 2010). Bolkestein favoured the rapid liberalisation of the service 
sector and the solution was a directive that had a horizontal approach to reforming 
the sector. According to the Commission’s Extended Impact Assessment of Proposal 
for a Directive on Services in the Internal Market a horizontal approach combined 
administrative cooperation, the application of the country of origin principle and the 
harmonisation of some basic requirements for services (Commission, 2004b: 27-28). 
Furthermore, a horizontal approach could also be agreed upon relatively quickly and 
would encourage the process of regulatory and administrative simplification in a 
more coherent way than unilateral action by Member States. The Commission 
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argued that it would provide legal certainty for service providers without imposing 
over complex rules, and it would be possible to agree essential requirements at the 
Community level whilst providing for the necessary flexibility for member states and 
economic operators (ibid). In short, to aid the freedom to establish services 
(permanent establishment in another Member State) certain barriers and 
authorisation schemes were prohibited and Member States were to create single 
points of contact for service providers to assist their completion of the necessary 
administrative procedures. To improve the freedom to provide services (temporary 
cross border services) providers were to utilise the country of origin principle 
whereby they would be subject to the laws of their country of establishment (with 
the exception of the Posting of Workers Directive), thereby encompassing the 
principle of mutual recognition. Finally, to increase consumer protection and mutual 
trust between the Member States, the directive proposed a harmonisation of 
legislation in order to protect general interest (European Commission, 2004a: 3-4).   
 
The negotiations witnessed political division between EU actors in accordance with 
the clash of capitalisms political constellation. The liberal coalition aimed for a fully 
liberalised EU service sector in line with the first draft proposed by the European 
Commission (see below). The main concern of political actors within the regulatory 
coalition was that the proposed directive utilised the country of origin principle for 
temporary cross border service providers, included public services within its scope, 
and created uncertainties with respect to who was responsible for supervising 
temporary cross-border service providers. First, the utilisation of the country of 
origin principle for such purposes would essentially provide temporary cross border 
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service providers with exemptions with respect to certain aspects of labour law 
within the host country. This would inadvertently place a downward pressure on the 
more extensive employment and social protection systems of some member states. 
Second, the inclusion of services of general interest in the directive potentially 
opened-up healthcare systems to competitive market pressures. The particular 
concern here was the regulations governing easier access to healthcare, especially 
provided in another Member States, which could a pressure on costs and thereby 
the quality of healthcare services across the EU (ETUC 2005). Thirdly, there were 
uncertainties surrounding the monitoring of temporary service providers and the 
regulatory coalition argued that, as a result, they could essentially be unsupervised 
(see below for more detail). In the eyes of actors surrounding the regulatory 
coalition if the proposed Directive was agreed, the result would be the erosion of 
both social Europe and the more generous welfare states within the EU. In the eyes 
of the more liberal individuals, such an argument was based on misinformation and 
an exaggeration of the truth.  Central to the analysis in the following section is the 
position, contribution, and impact of the CEE states to the negotiations.    
 
II: Negotiating the Services Directive: Proposal, Negotiation, and Compromise 
 
The European Commission and proposal for reform  
 
Under the co-decision procedure the draft directive was transmitted to the Council 
and the Parliament on 6th February 2004. The proposed directive was discussed in 
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the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) meeting of 11th March 2004, but 
the negotiations did not gather momentum until after the May 2004 EU 
enlargement, the subsequent European Parliamentary elections and the formation 
of the first Barroso Commission. The delays in forming the first Barroso Commission 
meant that the newly appointed Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, 
did not begin work on the Directive until early 2005.4 Although all of the Member 
States had expressed their support for liberalization and further integration within 
the service sector, the majority of governments did not form official positions in 
2004. As one Swedish Representative noted: ‘it was the largest EU proposed draft 
Directive I have ever come across and for the remainder of the year almost every 
Ministry at the national level was involved in trying to interpret its scale, scope and 
consequences’.5 Nevertheless, within the actors of the EU’s broader political space 
the release of the first draft caused something of a storm. On 4th June 2004 Belgian 
trade unions organised what was to be one of several street protests during the 
negotiations in Brussels objecting to the Services Directive. 5000 trade unionists took 
to the streets of Brussels demanding that the national and regional governments 
make an assessment of the impact of the proposed directive (Van Gyes, 2004). The 
Belgian trade unions, as well as the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), 
argued that the proposed directive would undermine the ESD and modify the 
Posting of Workers Directive through the back door (see below); the Commission 
and Business Europe considered this to be a misinterpretation of the proposal.  
 
Regulatory coalition objections to the proposed directive 
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Towards the end of 2004 a split between the liberal and regulatory coalitions 
emerged. The ten new Member States, along with Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, the 
Netherlands, the UK and BusinessEurope, formed the liberal coalition and supported 
the proposed draft of the directive. The regulatory coalition, which Jacques Chirac 
claimed was being spearheaded by France and Germany (BBC, 2005), also included 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Sweden (as well as 
the ETUC) (see Lindstrom, 2010). It argued that the directive would undermine their 
domestic service sectors and had three main objections with the proposal. First, its 
broad scope included services of general interest (SGI) and services of general 
economic interest (SGEI), which included healthcare and social services. The 
coalition argued that this would result in the introduction of market principles to 
European healthcare systems that could create pressures for privatisation. By easing 
the restrictions of EU patients to receive treatment in another Member State, 
patients who were subjected to long waiting lists could potentially find it easier to 
shop around in other member states and get the costs of such treatment 
reimbursed. The directive would also enable patients to receive temporary cross 
border treatment (and possibly cheaper and more competitive) from a service 
provider more easily. Therefore the inclusion of SGEI in the draft directive would 
potentially open-up healthcare systems to competitive market pressures. The 
particular concern here was the regulations governing easier access to healthcare, 
especially provided in another Member States, which could places a downward 
pressure on costs and thereby the quality of healthcare services across the EU 
(ETUC, 2005). 
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Second, the coalition objected to Article 16 for temporary cross border service 
providers, which utilised the country of origin principle. Article 16 stated that: 
‘Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national 
provisions of their Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field’ 
(Commission, 2004a: 55). Article 17 contained a number of derogations for the 
country of origin principle including the Posting of Workers Directive. Temporary 
cross border service providers would therefore comply with the legislation of their 
country of origin with the exception of the labour law contained within the Posting 
of Workers Directive. The Posting of Workers Directive specifies a number of 
employment conditions which host states are obliged to guarantee workers posted 
to their territory (Article 3.1). The binding rules are to be laid down by law, 
regulation, administrative provisions, and/or in collective agreements and 
arbitration awards that are declared universally applicable (Ahlberg et el, 2006; 
Dølvik and Visser, 2009).  
 
A problem with the Posting of Workers Directive is that it is considered to be a 
minimum of standards for labour law, as some Member States have more extensive 
formal and informal labour laws and practices that are not covered by the Directive. 
In countries such as Germany and Sweden where there is no national universally 
applicable minimum wage, collective agreements are used to determine sectoral and 
regional minimum wages, as well as some aspects of labour law which are not 
covered by the Posting of Workers Directive, such as employment contracts and 
dismissal rules. Traditionally, Swedish trade unions and employers reach an 
agreement on the minimum wage through sectoral dialogue with 90% of employees 
  
94
working in the private sector being part of a collective agreement.  As such, the 
negotiated labour conditions resulting from collective agreements are not 
universally applicable and are therefore not covered by the Posting of Workers 
Directive. Regulatory coalition Member States could point to a number of examples 
where the directive had been detrimental to the established practices of some 
sectors, such as the German construction industry (Kahmann, 2006). The coalition 
argued that the derogation of the Posting of Workers Directive, as opposed to all 
labour law, would provide temporary cross border service providers with 
exemptions with respect to certain aspects of labour within the host country. This 
would turn EU minimum standards into maximum standards thereby placing a 
downward pressure on Member States with more extensive social protection 
systems (ETUC, 2005).    
 
Thirdly, by making the Posting of Workers Directive a derogation from Article 16 
rather than all labour law, the legal uncertainty of the areas not covered by the 
directive was unclear. This was further complicated by the uncertainty surrounding 
the supervision of temporary service providers.  Article 16 (2) stated that: ‘the 
Member State of origin shall be responsible for supervising the provider and the 
services by him, including services provided by him in another Member State’ 
(Commission, 2004a: 55). The regulatory coalition argued that Member States, 
particularly more liberal countries, would have little incentive to supervise their 
service providers who were temporarily operating in another Member State. Articles 
24 and 25 dealt more specifically with the supervision of temporary service providers 
and stated that while supervision was the responsibility of the country of origin, the 
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host country was responsible for supervising the Posting of Workers Directive. There 
were two problems with such a system. First, host Member States were unable to 
make declarations on temporary service providers other than those included in the 
Posting of Workers Directive, thereby confirming to the regulatory coalition that the 
directive was being narrowly interpreted. Secondly, Article 24 prohibited host 
Member States from requiring temporary service providers from holding 
employment documents in its territory, making supervision difficult. In reality this 
meant that a Polish temporary cross-border service provider could operate in 
neighbouring Germany or any other Member State, and with the exception of the 
Posting of Workers Directive, would be subject to Polish operating laws and 
procedures. The country of destination (Germany) would supervise the Posting of 
Workers Directive, while the country of origin (Poland) would supervise all other 
legislation. Such arrangements would result in the parallel coexistence of 25/27 legal 
systems for temporary service providers in a single country (Kowalsky, 2005: 2). The 
proposed solution to such difficulties would be close cooperation between the 
relevant Member State authorities, but trust issues, particularly between the two 
coalitions, persisted.  
 
For the regulatory coalition the proposed directive, particularly the application of the 
country of origin principle, would result in EU companies flocking to establish 
themselves in Member States with the lowest levels of social protection – known as 
‘social dumping’. Subsequently, the workers that such companies export could have 
poorer employment conditions and pay compared to the host country, which could 
lead to a further decline in consumer protection and welfare. Opponents of the 
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legislation therefore feared that the directive would open the door to competition 
based on low pay and poor working conditions, as well as lower levels of consumer 
protection (Economist, 2005). According to those in the liberal coalition, such an 
argument was based on misinformation and an exaggeration of the truth.     
 
Negotiating the proposal and the increasing tension between the two coalitions   
 
In the Parliament the Internal Market and Consumer Affairs Committee (IMCO) 
appointed Evelyn Gebhardt, a French born German socialist (PSE) MEP as the 
rapporteur and the Employment and Social Affairs Committee (EMPL), appointed 
Anne Van Lancker, a Belgian socialist, as the draftsperson. Following the 
Parliamentary elections although the reconvened Parliament returned a majority of 
the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), it was decided that the rapporteur 
and draftsperson would remain unchanged. The reconvened Parliament began work 
on the directive in late September 2004 and up until this point, the directive had 
received only negative publicity. The liberal coalition argued that opposition to the 
Directive was protectionist and undermined the Internal Market. ‘Europe is not 
making the best use of its Internal Market’ argued Balkenende the Dutch Prime 
Minister, in response to criticisms of the directive, ‘one of the biggest mistakes we 
can make is to hamper the dynamism of the economy by protectionism that can save 
some jobs, but in the long term will make us weaker, not stronger’ (Reuters, 2005).     
 
To one observer, the introduction of the CEE states had brought a fresh perspective 
to the debate.6  Governments of the CEE states proved to be the most enthusiastic 
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supporters of the directive within the liberal coalition and their accession into the EU 
resulted in a shift to the centre of gravity within the debate (Europe Information, 
2005). For example, ‘for the Polish government, as well as the governments of the 
other new Member States, only a Services Directive that was truly liberal was 
acceptable’.7 CEE support for the liberal coalition was founded on two principles. 
First, the directive concerned the free movement of workers and following the 2004 
enlargement the majority of EU-15 Member States had placed transitional 
arrangements to limit the movement of workers from the new Member States (with 
the exception of Ireland, Sweden and the UK). All of the new Member States argued 
that regulatory coalition opposition to the directive was a further attempt by some 
EU-15 members to maintain the restrictions on the free movement of labour. They 
argued that old Member State opposition to the directive was because such states 
did not want to open their economies to competitive forces. Second, the ideological 
principles underlying the proposed directive were also significant, as one Hungarian 
representative noted: ‘the free movement of workers was clearly an issue in 
determining the position of the Hungarian government, but it was also concerned 
that if it opposed the country of origin principle, then it would be criticised at home 
for being anti-free market’.8 The Commission estimated that the CEE states would 
benefit the most from a liberal Services Directive, owing to the relative under-
development of the sector (Commission, 2004b: 29). The Commission’s Extended 
Impact Assessment claimed that a fully liberalized EU service sector would increase 
EU GDP by between 3 and 6 percentage points, but that the more regulated 
economies found in the CEE would benefit from the upper rate. For the CEE states a 
liberal services directive would be easy to implement and unlock much needed 
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growth and jobs to catch-up with levels in EU-15 Member States. The proposed 
directive would not only increase cross border service provision from east to west, 
but it would also complement the deregulation and liberalisation process of the 
previous 15 years in the former state-socialist economies. As the Commission noted 
in its Extended Impact Assessment (2004b: 37), following accession preparations and 
screening by the Commission “significant changes are already being made to the 
regulation of services in the Accession and Candidate Countries and a number of 
barriers to establishment of service providers and to cross-border service provision 
are being removed”.  As such, enlargement had resulted in a profound change in the 
EU, torn apart between Member States reluctant to change and those which have 
already changed (Messerlin, 2005: 120).  
 
What annoyed the CEE states and other members of the liberal coalition was not 
only the choice of rapporteur, but that Evelyn Gebhardt remained in position after 
the 2004 Parliamentary elections.9 Evelyn Gebhardt was openly negative about the 
Directive and clearly favoured one which sympathised with the left and the trade 
union movement, rather than being based on a consensual agreement between the 
different sides.10 In the Parliament MEPs from CEE claimed that they had little 
chance of success in ensuring that their opinions would be heard by the rapporteur. 
As a result, from the beginnings of the negotiations the CEE states felt sidelined and 
excluded, despite their alliance with some of the old EU-15 Members. This feeling 
was to continue for the duration of the negotiations. For many who were working in 
the various EU institutions there had been concerns that EU enlargement would 
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create an old versus new Member State divide in the union; just a few months after 
the enlargement, it appeared as if such a fear had become a reality.     
 
During the latter half of 2004 the Commission was forced to respond to the 
mounting criticism of the proposed directive by members of the regulatory coalition 
and released a number of documents clarifying the proposal. It was in the European 
Parliament, however, where the fiercest battle between the two coalitions was 
fought. Eveleyn Gebhardt had begun re-drafting the directive and favoured the 
regulatory coalition;11 it was also alleged that she was taking instruction from the 
Élysée.12 On 11th November 2004 IMCO and EMPL organised a joint hearing in the 
Parliament with experts and representatives of the social partners. The ensuing 
report, drafted by Gebhardt and with a clear backing from the Party of European 
socialists (PES) (at this stage predominantly drawn from the EU-15 Member States), 
argued that although all the participants were, in principle, in favour of the 
Commission’s initiative to remove obstacles and promote freedom of services, most 
participants and the rapporteur were in favour of maintaining high standards of 
quality and protection in the interests of fair competition. It called on the 
Commission to withdraw or radically redraft the proposal (European Parliament, 
2004a: 2).  
 
By now, the liberal coalition was becoming concerned with the seemingly growing 
criticism voiced in the hearing. The shadow rapporteur, the then British European 
People’s Party (EPP) MEP Malcolm Harbour, organised a EPP lead hearing on 9th 
December to defend the directive. Harbour argued that although certain aspects of 
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the directive needed clarification, in principle the EPP supported the proposal, 
including the country of origin principle. Harbour was also able to draw support from 
the PSE MEPs from the CEE states who had decided not to support Gebhardt and 
sided with the EPP. Although partisan support in the European Parliamentary 
coalitions is relatively fluid, this particular occasion was unique in that there was a 
clear split in the PSE between old and new Member States. Being a socialist MEP in 
CEE clearly means something very different to those found within EU-15. As one 
Hungarian MEP noted at the time: ‘as a socialist MEP it is my belief that my duty is to 
secure jobs for those who want to work, barriers to the formation of job creation are 
wrong and I do not believe that such an approach is beneficial to anyone’.13 Such an 
opinion contrasts heavily with the ‘more but better jobs’ slogan which was used at 
the time by the PSE when referring to job creation in the EU.    
 
Laval, the French referendum on the EU Constitution and the strengthening of the 
regulatory coalition  
 
Negotiations in the Parliament coincided with the first of what was to be two 
external events that were not directly related to the proposed directive, but 
increased its publicity, created the belief that social Europe was under threat and 
heightened tensions between the two coalitions. The first was the Laval case in 
Sweden, which involved the Latvian based, but Swedish owned subsidiary of L&P 
Baltic AB, Laval. Laval had secured a contract to build a school in the Swedish town 
of Vaxholm and posted workers from Latvia. Although Laval complied with the 
Posting of Workers Directive, it refused to enter into a collective agreement with the 
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Swedish Building Workers’ Union arguing that such agreements were not universally 
applicable in Sweden. Furthermore, as the posted workers were not part of the 
trade union, Laval argued they were exempt from the collective agreement. With 
minimum wages organised by collective agreement, the company refused to 
guarantee the local minimum wage for the posted workers who were effectively 
being paid less than the sectoral agreement and had less generous employment 
contracts than if they had been Swedish. In November 2004 the trade union voted 
for industrial action that consisted of a blockade to encourage its members not to 
perform work at Laval’s workplace. In February 2005 Laval withdrew from the 
contract and challenged the obstruction of the trade unions in the Swedish Labour 
Court; the case was referred to the ECJ for clarification (ETUC, 2008; 2006). The case 
illustrated the tension between the EU’s freedom of movement for labour and the 
Swedish collective bargaining model, as it appeared to undermine Swedish industrial 
relations (Financial Times, 2005a). The opposition and publicity which surrounded 
Laval should not be underestimated, as it helped to spread knowledge of the 
Services Directive across the EU and create an environment in which it appeared that 
social Europe was under threat (Agence France Press, 2005). The ETUC was quick to 
point out that Laval would be just one of many similar incidences for some (i.e. more 
CMEs) Member States if the proposed Services Directive was agreed (see: Leslie, 
2009).   
 
By the end of 2004 / early 2005 the opposition movement to the Directive had 
spread to the trade union movement across the EU. Although such opposition was to 
be found in the trade unions of the CEE states, unlike the majority of the EU-15 
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members, it was not to be found in the public at large. Furthermore, governments 
within the CEE states remained skeptical of the criticism which the opposition 
movement had focused its attention. That the Services Directive would undermine 
labour law was ‘a complete exaggeration to the Polish government as it was clear to 
us in the first draft that the Posting of Workers Directive was a derogation from the 
Country of Origin Principle’.14  
 
At the beginning of 2005 Gebhardt and Van Lanker had finalised their positions. The 
two agreed on most of the main issues: a more limited scope for the Directive and 
the exclusion of healthcare; the exclusion of the posting of workers Directive; and 
clarity that a country of destination would supervise a temporary service provider.15 
Mrs Gebhardt and Mrs Van Lancker had however reached very different conclusions 
on the country of origin principle. Mrs Gebhardt believed that a harmonisation 
approach to individual sectors was the best solution and where that was not 
possible, there would be mutual recognition upon the decisions or jurisprudence of 
the ECJ (ibid). Mrs Van Lancker believed that the country of origin principle should 
remain and be used where there was a high degree of harmonisation (which was 
very few places). In sectors where there was no harmonisation, the country of 
destination principle would be used and temporary service providers would follow 
the rules and regulations of the host member state (ibid). Although this was basically 
the current situation in the EU services sector, it was hoped that such pressures 
would eventually create harmonisation.   
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By the beginning of 2005 the regulatory coalition held the initiative and was acting as 
a single coherent voice within the debate. Despite not representing the majority of 
the Member States, the regulatory coalition was successfully communicating its 
points to the media and public. The political debate had been reduced to a few 
issues and focused on the negative consequences of liberalizing the service sector 
rather than the real benefits. On March 22 Jacques Chirac announced that the 
regulatory coalition was demanding ‘far reaching revisions’ to the Services Directive 
to preserve social Europe (BBC, 2005). The opposition movement appeared to be 
much stronger and more influential in the debate, even though it did not necessarily 
represent the majority of the Member States in the European Council. The 
opposition movement had the support of the trade unions which, in terms of 
numbers and ability to raise awareness, was much more effective than 
BusinesEurope which had sided the liberal coalition. On this occasion the defenders 
of the ESD were in a minority position, but what they lacked in numbers was gained 
by their cooperation with each other, support of the trade union movement, and the 
ability of the latter to raise public awareness.  
 
Furthermore, of the group countries who favoured a liberal directive, the vast 
majority of them were from the new member states that were relatively 
inexperienced in the EU policy-making process. The liberal coalition was becoming 
increasing frustrated, as the general public and the press appeared to believe the 
distorted claims of the regulatory coalition - that the country of origin principle 
applied to both temporary and permanent cross border service providers. Within the 
liberal coalition although old member states, such as the Netherlands and the UK, 
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were in favour of the proposed directive, they were disinclined to fully defend it 
because even a less radical version of the directive would improve the current 
situation and represent a starting point for future developments and ECJ rulings.16 In 
this respect they were supporting the status quo, as can sometimes be the case with 
the liberal coalition (Hooghe and Marks, 1999). The CEE states felt differently about 
the situation and argued that the proposed directive should not only be defended, 
but be more radical with the removal of any derogations from the utilisation of the 
country of origin principle for temporary cross-border services providers. Slovakia’s 
finance minister, Ivan Miklos, said “if we want the updated Lisbon Strategy to be 
taken seriously this time, efforts to hamper the [Services] Directive must be resisted” 
(Reuters, 2005). The minor differences within the liberal coalition over whether or 
not the directive should be defended, inadvertently gave the regulatory coalition an 
advantage. Furthermore, the new member states within the liberal coalition were 
relatively inexperienced in the EU policy-making process and struggled to influence 
the debate.   
   
On 19 March 2005 75,000 to 100,000 trade unionists protested in Brussels against 
the directive, the largest protest ever seen over a piece of EU legislation (Kowalsky, 
2005: 7). Evelyn Gebhardt and Anna Van Lanker had finalised their positions and 
agreed on most of the main issues to amend, which favoured the regulatory 
coalition (Agence Europe, 2005). They included: a more limited scope for the 
directive and the exclusion of healthcare; the clarification that temporary cross-
border service providers would adhere to all host country labour law; and that the 
country of destination would supervise temporary service providers. However, they 
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reached very different conclusions on the country of origin principle. Gebhardt 
believed that a harmonisation approach to the individual sectors was the best 
solution and where that was not possible, there would be mutual recognition upon 
the decisions of jurisprudence of the ECJ. Van Lancker believed that the country of 
origin principle should remain and be used where there was a high degree of 
harmonisation (which was very few places). In sectors where there was no 
harmonisation, the country of destination principle would be used and temporary 
service providers would follow the rules and regulations of the host Member States. 
Although this was the current situation, it was hoped that such pressures would 
eventually create harmonisation.  
 
The French referendum on the EU Constitution in May 2005 was the second external 
event that helped to strengthen the cause of the regulatory coalition. The French 
rejection of the constitution was multifaceted, but the rhetoric attached to the 
Services Directive was a key determinant of the ‘non’ vote.17 During the debate the 
French trade unions made a tenuous link between the Services Directive and the EU 
constitution, arguing that the constitution was a neoliberal project and that the 
Services Directive was a perfect example of how the EU would develop if the 
constitution were to be approved. The symbolic ‘Polish plumber’ featured in the 
French debate to illustrate the threat between the free movement of workers and 
the French welfare state; at times the reference bordered on xenophobia (Franck, 
2005; Hainsworth, 2006). Nevertheless, the episode strengthened the regulatory 
cause within the negotiations.  
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Representatives from the liberal coalition publically expressed their disappointment 
and frustration with the positions taken by the regulatory coalition. Jan Maria Rokita, 
a senior official in Poland’s then coalition government openly referred to the French 
and German stance on the Services Directive as a ‘scandal’. He argued that: ‘if we 
don’t manage to fight against this social protectionism, then there might be the 
impression that the entire EU will rather contract than develop’ (eureferendum 
2005). Krisjanis Karins, Latvia’s Economics Minister said: ‘this notion of social 
dumping is insulting. I think what they mean to say is fair and real competition’ 
(International Herald Tribune, 2005). There was clearly considerable tension 
between the two sides and the UK threatened that if necessary, it had sufficient 
broad support to push the directive the Council (The Business, 2005).  
 
Gebhardt presented her draft of the directive to the Parliament in May 2005 which 
contained some 1602 amendments. The scale of the amendments was such that it 
was required to be released in two parts.18 The country of origin principle was 
replaced with a complex relationship of mutual recognition, harmonisation and the 
country of destination principle. The release of the amended proposal ‘created a 
feeling of discontent in the directive’s supporters, particularly in the CEE states, as it 
had been crafted with little representation from the east’.19 At the end of June 2005 
there were three important developments in the debate. First, it was the beginning 
of the British Presidency and in a speech to the European Parliament on the 23rd 
June, Tony Blair committed the UK Presidency to resolving ‘some of the hard 
dossiers’, of which the Services Directive was one (Blair, 2005). This implied to the 
CEE states that Britain would be able to use its expertise and resources to push for a 
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liberal directive. Yet Britain was concerned over the political tensions between the 
two sides and a preoccupation with a deal on the revision of the Working Time 
Directive, which held much greater domestic political significance, compared to the 
Services Directive.20 The British Presidency was unable to break the deadlock in the 
Council and could do little other than to get the Member States to formally declare 
their positions.  
 
Secondly, the governments of the CEE states were alarmed by Gebhardt’s 
amendments and a realisation that the liberal coalition might be losing the debate. 
As one representative noted: ‘because the liberal group of countries were in a 
majority position, we never thought that the opposition movement would be able to 
influence the debate to the full extent that it did’.21 Governments of the CEE states 
lobbied their MEPs to get more involved in the debate, stressing the importance of a 
liberal directive for growth and jobs in the region. MEPs from CEE therefore spent 
the summer of 2005 researching into the directive with the aim of ensuring that 
Gebhardt’s amendments would not pass the IMCO and Parliamentary votes.22 The 
only group of MEPs from CEE Europe that was able to exert any real influence on the 
debate was the socialists. They formed a close relationship with Malcolm Harbour 
with the aim of ensuring that the rapporteur’s amendments did not pass the 
scheduled IMCO vote. In fact, they turned out to be the shadow rapporteur’s 
strongest allies.23   
 
Finally, in what was to be one of several moves by the Polish government to 
influence the debate, Poland launched its own publicity campaign on the Services 
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Directive and the free movement of labour. Concerned over the negative publicity 
which Polish workers had received in the French referendum campaign and now the 
Services Directive, the Polish government launched a publicity campaign promoting 
the Polish plumber and the Polish nurse; names which had become a symbolic 
reference in the debate on the free movement of labour from EU-10 to EU-15. At the 
informal Competitiveness Council on 11-12 July 2005 in Cardiff, the Polish 
government organised the distribution of posters and t-shirts promoting the Polish 
plumber and the Polish nurse in an attempt to reduce the negative reputation they 
had unfairly received. Although the campaign was ‘very ingenious’ it failed to have 
any real impact, as it was much more concerned with the publicity of the case rather 
than having a direct effect on the policy-making process (ibid). 
 
Parliamentary vote and acceptance of a compromise  
 
Gebhardt’s amended proposal was scheduled for a vote in IMCO for September 
2005, but the vote was postponed until 22 November, as Harbour was constructing 
his own draft which maintained the Country of origin principle. With the support of 
his own party and that of the socialists from the CEE states, Habour and his 
colleagues renamed the country of origin to the ‘freedom to provide’ services in the 
hope that such renaming would reduce the negative publicity which Article 16 had 
attracted. In an attempt to compromise with regulatory coalition, Harbour removed 
healthcare from the scope of the directive, as well as including the clause that 
temporary cross-border service providers were to adhere to all labour law of the 
host country, and not just that contained within the Posting of Workers Directive. 
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The scheduled IMCO vote took place on 22 November 2005, but was a defeat for 
Gebhardt and the regulatory coalition, as they failed to achieve any of their high 
profile amendments. The Committee voted 25 in favour and 10 against with five 
abstentions to the proposal put forward by Harbour to maintain the country of 
origin principle, albeit renamed.24 The Financial Times (2005b) noted that ‘a coalition 
of centre-right, liberal and eastern European lawmakers succeeded in pushing 
through a version of the law that emphasises cross-border freedom’. The vote in the 
Committee had been secured by a deal reached between the EPP and socialist MEPs 
from CEE; without such a deal a liberal version of the directive would have been 
lost.25 Although there was relief within the liberal coalition, the CEE states argued 
that the directive had been watered down.26 The amended proposal was due to be 
voted in plenary on 16th February 2006 and there was a sigh of relief in the liberal 
coalition. In the scheduled plenary vote the EPP planned to form an alliance with 
ALDE (liberals) and the PES MEPs from the CEE states.  
 
However, the Commission had become increasingly concerned that subsequent 
negotiations in the Council would be as problematic as the Parliament and the 
Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie McCreevy, had switched from defending the 
proposal to admitting that it may require some revisions and concessions. 27 In light 
of the negative publicity surrounding the proposal, McCreevy was able to distance 
himself from the proposal, given that it had been drafted by his predecessor and 
there was fear of a deadlock in the Council. Furthermore, the Barroso Commission 
had relatively few achievements to its name and it was anxious, not just to reach an 
agreement of the directive, but to expand its reputation.28 Despite the victory of the 
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liberal coalition in the IMCO vote, pressure from the regulatory coalition was clearly 
having an effect. Shortly after the IMCO vote McCreevy informed the Parliament 
that if a two-thirds majority could be achieved in plenary, then the Commission 
would accept the amendments and transmit them to the Council for voting. By 
presenting a draft to the Council that had the backing of the only directly elected EU 
institution, the Commission hoped that the Council would accept the proposal. Such 
a move is unprecedented in the history of EU policy-making, as the Commission 
effectively gave control of the directive to the Parliament.   
 
To achieve such a vote the directive needed to gain broad support in the Parliament. 
The EPP realized that if it was to achieve a two-thirds majority in a plenary vote, then 
it would the broad support of all PSE MEPS, and not just those from the CEE states.29 
Towards the end of 2005, a high level working group in the Parliament between the 
EPP and the PSE was formed in an attempt to reach a compromise. The group 
consisted of six MEPs and included Mrs Gebhardt, Mr Harbour and Mrs Van Lancker. 
The exact negotiation process is unclear as the group met in secret, but the outcome 
resulted in the EPP abandoning its position on the country of origin principle and 
accepting a proposal in which it was removed. Further concessions were also made 
which included: the reaffirmation that healthcare would be excluded from the 
directive; the explicit recognition that labour law and working conditions would not 
be affected; and the clarification that temporary service providers would be 
monitored by the country of destination (European Parliament, 2006). Clearly 
influential in achieving the parliamentary compromise was the ‘unique opportunity’ 
given to the institution in forging the final outcome.30  
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The high level working group contained no representative from the CEE states and 
governments from the region claimed that they were being further sidelined. 
Further frustration within the liberal coalition, particularly the CEE states, deepened 
when a study by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in February 
2006 revealed that not only would the inclusion of the country of origin principle 
result in higher levels of GDP, but that the CEE states would be its ultimate 
beneficiaries. Unlike previous reports, the February 2006 report analysed the trade 
effects of the Services Directive with and without the country of origin principle. If 
the Services Directive included the country of origin principle, then the long-term 
effect would be to increase EU GDP by approximately 0.3 - 0.7 per cent per year by 
2040; if the country of origin principle was removed then the estimate was 0.2 - 0.4 
respectively (De Bruijin, Kox and Lejour, 2006). But the report also included 
estimates for individual countries with and without the country of origin principle 
and this caused the greatest amount of friction between the two sides, as it became 
clear that the CEE states, not the old EU Members, would ultimately benefit from a 
liberal Services Directive. If a liberal Services Directive was implemented, the report 
calculated that an old member state such as France would have an increase in GDP 
per annum of 0.45 per cent, but CEE states such as Hungary and Poland would 
benefit from growth rates of 2.6 per cent and 1.0 per cent respectively. If the 
country of origin principle was removed, the estimates for France, Hungary and 
Poland became 0.3, 1.7 and 0.6 of an increase in GDP per annum (ibid: 34)31. What 
was therefore obvious to the CEE states within the liberal coalition was that the 
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removal of the country of origin principle was estimated to be more damaging to 
their prospective growth.   
 
A plenary vote on the parliamentary compromise was scheduled for 16th February 
2006. Just before the vote Piotr Wozniak, the then Polish Economy Minister, along 
with like-minded colleagues Alan Johnson, the British Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry, Etele Baráth, the Hungarian Minister for European Affairs, Laurens Jan 
Brinkhorst, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs and Milan Urban, the Czech 
Minister of Industry and Trade – wrote an open letter to Charlie McCreevy warning 
against any watering down of the Directive (Open Democracy, 2006). The letter 
called on the Commission to support an ambitious version of the Services Directive 
that would lead to a ‘truly functioning internal market’ (BBC, 2006). However, the 
efforts of the liberal coalition failed to have an impact and on 16th February 2006 the 
scheduled Parliamentary vote produced a near two-thirds majority of 395 votes in 
favour of a weak directive, with 214 votes against and 31 abstentions.32 Most 
regulatory coalition members followed the German example of their MEPs from 
both the EPP and the PES voting in favour of the draft directive. In the liberal 
coalition the majority of countries followed the Hungarian and Polish example of PES 
MEPs voting in favour of the draft directive, but their EPP MEPs voting against what 
they considered to be a weak directive. Although PES MEPs from the CEE states had 
supported the country of origin principle, they regarded the second draft of the 
directive to be a realistic and a very typical European compromise. In contrast the 
vote against the directive by the EPP was a protest over the watering down of the 
directive and the removal of the country of origin principle.33  
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Following the Parliamentary vote, the Austrian Presidency announced that it would 
aim for a common position in the Council by the end of June 2006. Shortly after the 
vote Wozniak, the Polish Economy Minister, had declared, “I’m not sure if it’s worth 
supporting the law in its present form” (Open Democracy, 2006). At the meeting of 
EU economy ministers Wozniak also claimed that as many as 15 countries were 
unhappy with the amended version of the directive and that the Council should 
refuse to accept the amendments (ibid). Latvia’s Economics Minister, Karins, said 
that the new directive was “unacceptable” and claimed that members of the liberal 
coalition, including the Netherlands and the UK, were prepared to from a blocking 
minority in the Council (Baltic Business Weekly, 2006). The Commission released an 
amended proposal of the Directive on the 4th April 2006 which was ‘98 per cent in 
line with the parliament’s position’ according to the EPP-ED MEP Jacques Toubon 
(European Parliament, 2006b). The Austrian Presidency had prepared a number of 
informal Council meetings prior to the formal vote scheduled on 29th May 2006 and 
warned the liberal coalition of the dangers of reopening the negotiations. Within the 
liberal coalition the CEE states continued to express their disappointment with the 
amended directive during meetings and continued to push for a weaker directive. 
However, both the Commission and the Austrian Presidency were determined to 
stick to the agreements made in the Parliament and were advising governments not 
to re-open negotiations. This political pressure created a general acceptance in the 
UK, the Netherlands and Spain to vote in favour of the directive and to accept a 
compromise. The latter group of governments within the liberal coalition maintained 
their position that it was much better the have the agreement reached in the 
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Parliament, rather than to re-open negotiations and risk the directive being 
withdrawn.34 The proposed directive still liberalized the EU’s service sector, but it 
was just less ambitious than the Commission’s original proposal. And as mentioned 
above, it was hoped that the agreement would provide a foundation for ECJ rulings 
and further liberalization within the sector. This weakened the liberal coalition and 
eventually persuaded the CEE states to vote in favour of the directive in the Council. 
 
The remaining six months of the Directive were relatively straightforward in 
comparison to the previous two and a half years. After the Council vote, the 
Parliament debated the second draft of the Directive on 13 October 2006 with a vote 
in favour of the draft during the 13 November 2006 IMCO meeting. On 15 November 
2006 the Parliament voted on the Directive and it was passed with a two-thirds 
majority. During the second reading, the PPE MEPs in the Parliament from the CEE 
states continued in their efforts to water down the Directive. 35  The Finnish 
Presidency worked hard to defend the text and reiterated the problems of re-
opening the debate (ibid). The voting statistics and their traits remained near 
identical to the previous Parliamentary vote in February 2006 and so too did the 
contents of the Directive. The final Directive contained eight chapters each 
concerning a specific aspect of liberalising the EU services sector and Member States 
were given until 2009 to transpose the directive into national law.36  
 
Conclusion 
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The negotiations of the Services Directive witnessed deep divisions between the EU 
actors along the clash of capitalisms political constellation. During the negotiations 
the concern within the regulatory coalition was that the Commission’s proposal to 
liberalise and de-regulate the EU’s service sector was too radical, as it would 
undermine some of the more generous systems of social protection and labour 
regulation across the EU. While the aim of the Services Directive was to liberalise the 
EU’s service sector, promote further market integration, and ultimately to increase 
growth and jobs, the political debate surrounding the negotiation process focused 
on the effects the proposal would have on the European social dimension. The 
regulatory coalition argued that the scope of the directive, the utilization of the 
country of origin principle for temporary cross border service providers, albeit with 
the exception of the areas covered by the Posting of Workers Directive, and the lack 
of certainty surrounding the supervision of temporary service providers. The 
regulatory coalition argued that such ultra-liberalism would create a race to the 
bottom in terms of welfare and labour regulation, and that EU companies would 
seek to establish themselves in Member States with the lowest standards (i.e. social 
dumping). In contrast members of the liberal coalition not only supported the 
Commission’s proposal, but argued that regulatory coalition claims of the proposed 
directive were an exaggeration of the truth. Furthermore, any negative effects of the 
proposed directive would out way the benefits gained from increases in growth and 
jobs. As a result of deep political divisions within the EU’s transnational political 
space, the final agreed directive represented a compromise: for the regulatory 
coalition, all of the contentious points of the proposal were removed; while for 
members of the liberal coalition, a directive was agreed which would form both the 
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basis of a single market for services and the foundation for future further 
liberalisation.    
 
What about the Central and Eastern European states? All eight of the then new 
members joined the liberal coalition. Central to their position was the issue 
surrounding the post-2004 restrictions placed on the free movement of labour from 
the new Member States to EU-15. These restrictions created a sense of injustice and 
a feeling of a second-class status within the EU. Tensions were further heightened by 
the Vaxholm case and the French referendum on the EU constitutional Treaty, which 
further highlighted the issue of the free movement of workers from east to west. 
However, the restrictions on the post 2004 free movement of workers were just one 
factor influencing the position of CEE governments during the negotiations – political 
economy considerations were also significant. Interviews conducted for the research 
confirm that CEE governments perceived a liberal version of the directive as an 
opportunity to reform their service sectors in a relatively simple way to maximise 
growth and jobs. That the Commission’s proposal would cement a liberal service 
sector within the east appeared to be of little concern, as one interviewee from the 
Czech republic noted: ‘how else are we supposed to catch-up with western levels of 
growth and jobs?’.37  
 
But while the CEE states joined the liberal coalition, they failed to have any impact 
on the debate. The negotiation process might have concluded very differently had 
Commissioner Charlie McCreevy not taken the unusual step of intervening and 
allowing the Parliament to take control of the directive. McCreevy intervened in the 
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negotiations because of the negative publicity that the proposed directive was 
receiving combined with the desire to forge a quick agreement. The result was there 
were no real negotiations in the Council and this is where the CEE states could have 
been useful to the liberal coalition. In short, while the services directive was a victory 
for the regulatory coalition, it does reveal the sympathetic tendencies within the CEE 
states for the liberal coalition. .  
                                                         
1 Article 49 of the EC Treaty stipulates that ‘restrictions on freedom to provide 
services within the Community shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member 
States who are established in a state of the Community other than that of the person 
for who the services are intended’ (Treaty Establishing the European Community, 
1957: 22). 
2 Furthermore, despite economic turmoil and significant structural reforms to the 
economy during the 1990s, which included a rationalisation of the welfare state and 
the outsourcing of some social services to private organisations, the public sector 
was expanded to absorb those individuals who could not find work, rather than a 
deregulation of the service sector towards more LME practices (Benner and 
Bundgaard, 2000; Hall, 2007).  
3  The Enhanced Cooperation Procedure enables a lead committee to take 
responsibility for the coordination of a directive and a second committee is allowed 
to have an input. The second committee votes on the articles of the directive which 
are within its policy domain, while the lead committee votes on everything else 
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before the directive goes to plenary, and both committees are unable to vote on 
each other’s amendments.   
4 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007). 
Although the Council appoints the President of the Commission, the appointment 
and that of the individual cabinet members requires an absolute majority vote in 
favour from the Parliament. During the election of the first Barroso Commission, the 
Parliament had delayed the ratification of the Commission and blocked several 
Commissioner Appointees, thereby forcing a re-shuffle.  
5 Interview 1, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (25 March 
2007).   
6 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007). 
7 Interview 15, Representative from a Representative of a Permanent Representation 
in Brussels (5 March, 2007). 
8 Interview 7, Member of the European Parliament (21 March, 2007).  
9 The 2004 European Parliamentary elections returned a centre-right majority but it 
was decided that Evelyn Gebhardt would remain as the rapporteur for the directive.  
10 Interviews:  11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007); and 17, 
Member of the European Parliament (19 March, 2007),  
11 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007). 
12 Interview 6, Member of the European Parliament (19 March, 2007).  
13 Interview 22, Member of the European Parliament (21 March, 2007).  
14 Interview 12, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (5 March, 
2007).    
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15 Interview 13, Administrator of the European Parliament (22 May, 2007). 
16 Interview 8, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (21 March, 
2007).   
17 The French rejection of the EU constitution was based upon the objection to 
Turkish membership, the polarisation of the debate between Anglo-Saxon economic 
liberalism and the European Social Model, and objection to the Services Directive. 
See: Franck (2005); Hainsworth (2006); Schmidt (2007); Stefanova (2006).   
18 Interview 13, Administrator of the European Parliament (22 May, 2007). 
19 Interview 8, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (21 March, 
2007).   
20 Interview 8, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (21 March, 
2007).   
21 Interview 4, Representative from BusinessEurope (09 March, 2007).  
22 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007).  
23 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007).  
24 Interview 13, Administrator of the European Parliament (22 May, 2007).  
25 Interview 23, Representative from the European Commission (23 May, 2007).  
26 Interview 23 Representative from the European Commission (23 May, 2007). 
27 Interview 11, Member of the European Parliament (11 April, 2007). 
28 Interview 13, Administrator of the European Parliament (22 May, 2007).  
29 Interview 7, Member of the European Parliament (21 March, 2007). 
30 Interview 8, Member of the European Parliament (27 March, 2007). 
  
120
                                                                                                                                                              
31 The report calculates an upper and lower estimate for all of the data and the 
figures presented in this paragraph are an average of the two estimates.   
32  Raw data is available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+PV+20060216+RES-RCV+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN - 
accessed  12/03/2013.   
33 Interview 7, Member of the European Parliament (21 March, 2007). 
34 Interview 8, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (21 March, 
2007).   
35 Interview 8, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (21 March, 
2007).   
36 For an analysis of the final version of the Directive see Barnard (2008); also see 
Höpner and Schäfer (2010) who argue that the ECJ’s ruling on the Laval case partly 
reversed the political compromise on the Services Directive.  
37 Interview 21, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (20 
March, 2007).   
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4: The Revision of the Working Time Directive  
 
This second of three case study chapters analyses the negotiations of the revision of 
the Working Time Directive (WTD). How much people work is an important and 
contested aspect of economic life. By some normative standards, working fewer 
hours is an important measure of the ‘good life’, to be weighed against growth, 
employment, and other measures of economic wellbeing (Burgoon and Baxandall, 
2004: 439-440). In 1993 the WTD was introduced to regulate and harmonise working 
time across the EU. It set out a 48-hour limit to an employee’s working week (to be 
calculated as an average over a three month reference period), as well as 
requirements for rest and annual leave. Importantly, the original directive contained 
the opt-out whereby employee’s would be allowed to work in excess of the 48-hour 
week, providing that they signed an opt-out agreement. The opt-out had been 
included to appease the UK government, who was opposed to any regulation of 
working time. When the UK transposed and implemented the directive in 1998, it 
was the only Member State to use of the opt-out and to apply it to all sectors across 
the economy. While the inclusion of the opt-out had ensured the securing of an 
agreement between the Member States, a review clause was contained in the 
original directive requiring both the opt-out and the reference period to be reviewed 
10 years after its implementation. At the time of the original negotiations, it was 
hoped that such a timeframe would enable the UK to move away from its long hours 
working culture and that during subsequent revision of the directive, would result in 
a removal of the opt-out.  
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While the original directive was negotiated as a piece of health and safety legislation, 
it has often been referred to as a cornerstone of the European social dimension, as 
behind the legislation laid the normative argument that, as a symbol of progress in 
EU employment and social policy, the EU should regulate working time. But while 
Britain had been in a minority position during the 1992 negotiations, by the time of 
the revision of the directive in 2004 (12 months later than was originally planned), it 
was able to command a majority position within the EU’s political space. Britain’s 
position had strengthened as a result if a strategic agreement with Germany, 
extensive resource deployment by British governments (both the governments of 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown), and support from the CEE states (with the exception 
of Hungary). The negotiations witnessed deep divisions between EU actors along the 
clash of capitalisms political constellation with the liberal coalition arguing that the 
opt-out should remain and the reference period extended (beyond the current three 
months to twelve months). In contrast, the regulatory coalition argued that the opt-
out should be removed and any requests for further flexibility could be achieved, as 
a compromise, by extending the referencing period. After 5 years of negotiations the 
EU was unable to reach an agreement on the revision of the directive and the 
original directive, including the opt-out, remains in force across the EU.  
 
The proceeding chapter analyses the negotiations of the revision of the WTD 
between 2004-2009.  In particular it pays attention to the positions and contribution 
of the CEE states during the negotiations. The first part of the chapter analyses the 
political economy of working time within the EU, thus highlighting the potential for 
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political divisions between actors within the EU’s political space. While the second 
part of the chapter focuses on the negotiations and the inability of EU actors to 
reach an agreement. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the positions and 
contributions of the CEE states during the negotiations.    
 
I: The Political Economy of Working Time 
 
Working Time in EU Member States 
Average hours worked across the EU vary significantly, but actual comparison 
between different Member States can be difficult for a number of reasons. First, 
comparable data is not collected in all Member States. Second, there is no uniform 
method of calculating working hours with some Member States using annual 
calculations while others prefer weekly calculations. Therefore establishing 
comparable normal weekly working hours is problematic, as a weekly average 
calculated from an annual aggregate may include holiday entitlements and so distort 
the data. A second problem is the inclusion of part time work into any calculations, 
as this will underestimate the average working week of full time paid employees. 
One possible solution to the latter problem is to ensure that EU Member States 
provide calculations for average full-time employees, but then the problem here is 
that calculations may not necessarily reflect a ‘typical worker’ given the increasing 
prevalence of part-work across the EU over the last two decades (European 
Foundation, 2011: 2).  
 
  
124
To address some of these problems the European Foundation for the Improvement 
of Living and Working Conditions (2011: 1-33) produces calculations based on 
Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey which are weighted in order to reflect the relative 
size of a country in terms of persons aged 15-64 who are employed full time. From 
the Foundation’s 2010 data, workers in Romania work the most number of hours per 
week in the EU (41.3) while workers in Finland work least (37.8). For the same 
period, the EU-27 average is 39.7 hours, the EU-15 average slightly lower at 39.4, 
and the EU-12 average (all of the 2004 and 2007 new Member States), slightly higher 
at 39.9. While the difference between the EU-15 states and the CEE Members is 
relatively small, it should be noted that with the exception of Slovakia all of the CEE 
states have an average hourly working week above the EU-27 average. In this 
respect, the CEE states align themselves more with liberal countries such as the UK 
where working hours are traditionally longer.  
 
Burgoon and Baxandall (2004) argue that in accordance with Esping-Andersen’s 
categorisation of welfare states, Social Democratic, Liberal and Christian Democratic 
countries also form three worlds of working time. Analysing the data from 1980-2000 
in terms of both annual hours per employed person (capturing how much time 
employed people spend on the job) and annual hours per working-age person (how 
much work takes place averaged across all people of working age, including the 
unemployed, disabled and others outside of the paid labour force by choice or 
tradition) gives rise to three clusters. Social Democratic countries such as Sweden 
combine relatively low hours per employed (1560 per year) with medium hours per 
working-age person (1,142). Liberal countries such as the UK work high hours by 
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both measures (1,801 and 1,238 respectively). And the Christian Democratic 
countries work relatively medium hours per employed person (averaging 1,604) and 
particularly low hours per working-age person (981). Data on the number of hours 
worked per worker compiled by the European Foundation confirms this trend 
between the different clusters (European Foundation, 2011: 1-33).   
 
The Working Time Directive (1993) 
The WTD sets a 48-hour limit to an employee’s working week as well as 
requirements for rest and annual leave. The original 1993 Directive has five 
provisions: a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period 
(Article 3) and at least one rest day in seven (Article 5); a rest break if the working 
day is more than six hours (Article 4); a maximum weekly working time of 48 hours 
on average (Article 6); at least four weeks paid annual leave (Article 7); and a 
maximum of eight hours night work on average in each 24 hours (Article 8) (Council 
Directive 93/104/EC). According to the 1993 Directive, the average working week is 
to be calculated over a four month period, known as the ‘reference period’, although 
this could be extended for up to 12 months via collective agreement. Importantly, 
the Directive contains the opt-out clause which permits Member States not to apply 
the maximum 48-hour limit on the basis of voluntary agreements between 
employers and employees (Article 22). Where the opt-out is implemented, 
employees are unable to work longer than 78 hours per week and employers are 
required to keep records and make them available to the appropriate authorities.   
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Britain had been a staunch opponent of the WTD and had argued that it was a 
employee’s fundamental right to choose the amount of hours worked and that the 
WTD would reduce the flexibility of the British labour market. The opt-out was 
therefore included to gain British support and since 1993 the UK is the only Member 
State to make full use of the opt-out (European Parliament, 2004b: 7). For the then 
Commission and the majority of Member States the opt-out was something of a 
‘gentlemen’s agreement’ that would gain British support in the short term. In the 
long-term it was hoped to provide the impetus for the UK to reduce its long hours 
culture therefore converging on the European ‘norm’. The original justification for 
the directive had been that working time was a health and safety issue and that 
excessive working hours over a prolonged period was detrimental to health. 
Although a number of studies supported this argument, it is also clear that behind 
the legislation laid a normative argument that the EU should regulate working time 
as a symbol of progress in EU employment and social policy.1 In 2000 the Directive 
was amended with effect from 1 August 2003. This extend working time measures in 
full to all non-mobile workers in road, sea, inland waterways and lake transportation, 
to all workers in the railway and offshore sectors, and to all workers in aviation who 
were not covered by the Sectoral Aviation Directive. Furthermore, the regulations 
were to apply to junior doctors from 1 August 2004 (Department for Business 
Enterprise and Reform, 2007). As subsequent amendments were made to the WTD, 
the British implementation of the opt-out came under fire, particularly from the 
ETUC. The opt-out clause required employees to sign an agreement with their 
employer and employers are required to maintain a record of the necessary 
documentation. ETUC research had estimated that two thirds of British workers 
  
127
were unaware of the 48-hour limit. In addition it was calculated that two thirds of 
British workers who worked long hours had not signed an opt-out and that one third 
of those said they were not given the choice (ETUC, 2007). There had also been 
allegations that companies were not maintaining the correct records or making them 
available to the authorities when requested to do so.    
 
Why was the Working Time Directive Revised?   
The 1993 Directive contained two review clauses which required the opt-out and the 
calculation of the reference period to be reviewed seven years after implementation 
i.e. before November 2003. Furthermore, two European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings 
had questioned whether the inactive part of on-call time was to be considered as 
working time. The 1993 Directive made no reference to such working conditions and 
two court cases known as SiMAP and Jaeger were taken to the ECJ for clarification. 
The Syndicate of Doctors of Public Assistance (SiMAP) in Spain had raised the issue of 
on call time in the Superior Tribunal Justice (Court) of Valencia2. SiMAP argued that 
all on-call time should be considered as working time and calculated into the 48 hour 
week limit, regardless of whether an employee was being active or inactive. The 
Spanish Court referred five questions to the ECJ in 2000 for clarification and the 
court ruled that ‘time spent on-call by doctors in primary health care teams must be 
regarded in its entirety as working time and, where appropriate as overtime, within 
the meaning of Directive 93/104 if they are required to be at the health centre’ (ECJ 
Case C-303/98).  
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The second case in 2003 between Norbert Jaeger and Landeshauptstadt Kiel in the 
court of Landesarbeitsgericht of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany was similar to the 
SIMAP case3. On this occasion the ECJ was asked give its views on the question of 
whether on-call services should be considered in their entirety as working time, even 
if the party concerned does not in fact perform his professional duties but is 
authorised to sleep during the time concerned. According to the jurisdiction of 
referral, this question was not asked and, as a result, the Court did not reply to it in 
the SIMAP judgment. The Court held that ‘Directive 93/104 must be interpreted as 
meaning that a period of duty spent by a doctor on call, where presence in the 
hospital is required, must be regarded as constituting in its entirety working time for 
the purposes of that Directive, even though the person concerned is permitted to 
rest at his place of work during the periods when his services are not required’ (ECJ 
Case C-151/02). According to the Commission the Court rulings clearly marked out 
the member states’ room for manoeuvre in interpreting the definition of working 
time (European Commission, 2004e). The overwhelming majority of EU member 
states had interpreted the original Directive as saying that the inactive part of on-call 
time was not working time and as a result doctors were considered to be working 
within the 48 hour week. The ECJ rulings said the opposite and as a result many 
health sector workers were exceeding the 48 hour weekly limit. This had particular 
significance for healthcare systems where under the ECJ rulings, many healthcare 
employees were now considered to be exceeding the 48-hour week (European 
Commission, 2004c). Statistics released by the Commission highlighted the 
associated costs of implementing the Court rulings, but even if the financial costs 
  
129
could be overcome, in the short-term it would be near impossible for Member States 
to fill the new posts given the training and skills required for such jobs.4  
 
A result of the court rulings was that France and Spain, two of the WTDs most ardent 
supporters, chose to apply the individual opt-out in their healthcare systems - 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and after 2004 Slovenia, also followed suit. Both 
the Commission and the Council became anxious to find a solution to the issue of on-
call time, as the SiMAP and Jaeger judgements went beyond the original underlying 
principles of the directive (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2004: 32). 
The Commission therefore decided to combine the revision of directive (i.e. the 
reference period and the opt-out) with a review of the definition of working time. 
According to one representative, had it not have been for the ECJ rulings then the 
Commission would have ignored the review clause in the Directive.5 
 
The Revision of the Working Time Directive and the European Social Dimension 
 
The main issues within the revision of the WTD are the opt-out clause, the reference 
period and on-call time. A revised WTD that removed the opt-out and maintained a 
short reference period would strengthen the directive and create full harmonisation 
across the EU. However, if the opt-out were to remain indefinitely and/or the 
reference period was extended, this would weaken the directive and represent a 
setback for the ESD. A failure to agree on a revision could also undermine the 
directive, as the use of the opt-out could spread across the Member States, making it 
potentially more difficult to remove in the future. Therefore the liberal coalition will 
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prefer an indefinite continuation to the opt-out and a long reference period, while 
the regulatory coalition will aim to end to end the opt-out and maintain a short 
reference period.     
 
With respect to on call time, the issue is less divisive than the opt-out and the 
reference period between EU actors, particularly within the Council. Both the 
Commission and the Council disagreed with the ECJ’s ruling of the SiMAP and Jaeger 
cases, and argued that only the active part of on-call time should be considered as 
working time. The financial implications of the ruling combined with the inability of 
most Member States to meet the required short and medium term employment 
levels, resulted in even the most ardent supporters of the WTD to argue that the 
decision should be overruled. Therefore, although this particular point is important 
to the re-negotiation of the WTD, it does not form a central issue in which the liberal 
and regulatory coalitions divided.  
 
II: Negotiating the Revision of the Working Time Directive: Proposal, Negotiation, 
and Stalemate 
 
The negotiation process is characterised by two traits: firstly, deep ideological 
divisions between the Member States which have been strengthened and deepened 
by the inclusion of the 2004 and 2007 CEE states; and secondly, a stalemate between 
the EU institutions (the Council and the Commission versus the European 
Parliament). The liberal coalition argued that it was an employee’s fundamental right 
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to choose their own working hours and that restrictions on this right, as well as the 
overall burdens imposed by the directive, would inhibit growth at a time when the 
European economy required flexibility. The regulatory coalition argued that it was an 
employee’s right to be protected against the health and safety risks of excessive 
working hours (such as stress, depression, and illness), and that the continuation of 
the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ opt-out was unnecessary and morally unjustified in the advanced 
capitalist economies of the EU. The regulatory coalition argues that governments 
should focus on ensuring that employees are capable of achieving a sufficient 
income without working excessively long-hours. The latter can be achieved through 
a variety of policy approaches, including a focus on education and training or 
government transfers such as a minimum income guarantee.      
 
Preparations for the Release of a First Proposal  
 
The Commission launched its consultation for the revision of the Directive on 15 
January 2004 with participants given until 31 March 2004 to submit their comments 
and suggestions. The communication asked parties to consider five issues: the 
reference period; the definition of working time following the ECJ rulings; the opt-
out; measures to improve the balance between work and family life; and whether an 
interrelated approach to these four issues would allow for a balanced solution 
capable of providing a high level of health and safety protection while 
simultaneously providing the necessary flexibility for employers (European 
Commission, 2004c: 22-23). Although the communication called upon EU actors to 
submit their opinions, the document itself clearly favoured a more flexible and 
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liberal approach to a revision of the Directive. The Commission noted that the 
implementation of the opt-out had been abused, but argued that the solution to the 
problem was a better monitoring of the situation, rather than a phasing-out of 
Article 22 (the opt-out). The Commission also made it clear that the definition of 
working time should run counter to the ECJ rulings in that the inactive part of on-call 
time was not to be considered as working time.    
 
From the initial stages the Commission was pushing for a more neoliberal and 
flexible approach to the issue of working time. The Commission had noted that the 
implementation of the opt-out had been abused, but argued that the solution to the 
problem was a better monitoring of the situation rather than a phasing-out of Article 
22. In an attempt to gain greater influence in the consultation process the 
Parliament launched its own report drawn up by MEP Alejandro Cercas, known as 
the Cercas report, which was adopted by a majority vote in the Employment and 
Social Affairs Committee on 11 February 2004. The report called for: the amendment 
of the directive as soon as possible; underlined the importance of addressing 
problems in the health sector arising from the SiMAP and Jaeger rulings; criticised 
Member States for introducing opt-outs to resolve these problems; supported 
additional steps to reconcile work and family life; and demanded the abolition of the 
opt-out as soon as possible (European Parliament, 2004b: 16). The report also 
argued that ‘sufficient evidence has been built up over the seven-year period to 
prompt the conclusion that the opt-out mechanism is not the way to achieve 
flexibility in the working week, but rather a certain means of distorting the objective 
of improving health and safety at the workplace’ (European Parliament, 2004b: 7). 
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Furthermore, between 1993 and 2003, the introduction of the opt-out in the United 
Kingdom had witnessed the number of employees working more than 55 hours 
increase substantially (ibid).  
 
The Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council (EPSCO) had an 
informal discussion on the communication on 4 March 2004. Although the meeting 
indicated there to be various dividing lines between the governments of the 
Member States, there was little indication of the problems which the Council would 
subsequently encounter during the protracted negotiations. On 19th May 2004 the 
Commission issued a second phase of consultation with the social partners at the 
Community level. The purpose of the consultation was two-fold: firstly to summarise 
the opinions of the various EU institutions; and secondly to invite the social partners 
to reach an agreement on the WTD which would then become law as a revised 
Directive. The consultation paper reiterated the point that any revision of the WTD 
needed to strike a balance between the protection of health and safety on the one 
hand and the need for flexibility in the organisation of working time on the other 
(European Commission, 2004d: 8). Accordingly, the Commission was highlighting 
‘the global and interdependent character of the amendments proposed, which must 
be interpreted in this context’ (ibid). That is, a revised WTD should be more flexible 
than the original 1993 Directive because of the demands of globalisation. The 
Commission had asked the social partners to forward their recommendations or to 
initiate negotiations and include where appropriate, a detailed assessment of any 
alternative put forward. But a refusal to participate in the negotiations by 
BusinessEurope prevented any agreement taking place.   
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The release of the first proposal  
The Commission released its first proposal for the amendment of the WTD on 22 
September 2004 which maintained the use of the opt-out, extended the reference 
period from four to twelve months, and where the opt-out was used, there was to 
be a maximum 65 hour working week, although this could be exceeded via 
agreement between the two sides of industry. The Commission argued it had found 
the best solution which ‘ensured a high level of protection of worker’s health and 
safety, whilst allowing companies flexibility in managing working time’ (European 
Commission, 2004b: 4). The proposal also addressed the issue of on-call time and 
proposed that the inactive part of on-call time was not to be regarded as working 
time. After five years of the implementation of the Directive, the Commission was 
required to produce a report which reviewed the opt-out and if necessary, 
introduced a phasing-out. Under the co-decision procedure the proposal was sent to 
the European Parliament and the Council. In the regulatory coalition, the ETUC 
expressed its deep concern with the Commission’s proposal and stated that it was 
‘unacceptable’ (ETUC 2004).   
 
The release of the proposal coincided with the Dutch Presidency in the second half 
of 2004, and discussions within the Council concerned mainly technical issues at this 
stage. 6  The December 2004 meeting of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives (COREPER I) reached no agreement on the opt-out and the 
reference period, but agreement was reached on the issue of on-call time in 
accordance with the Commission’s proposal. At this early stage of the negotiations 
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there was a clear divide among the Member States in the Council on the opt-out and 
the reference period. With respect to the opt-out, the Dutch Presidency had drafted 
a proposal which aimed to slowly eliminate its usage. A monitoring Committee 
would be set up comprised of a working group of social partners and Member State 
representatives with the aim of convincing British employers that the abolition of 
the opt-out was the best solution to managing labour. The Dutch presidency wanted 
to stress that the opt-out was not a good solution to mange labour and wanted to 
introduce flexible definitions so that in the future the opt-out could not be used.7 
The Belgian, Spanish, French, Greek Portuguese and Swedish delegations clustered 
to form the core the Member States in the regulatory coalition and jointly stated 
that the opt-out should be phased out. Britain, Poland, Slovakia and Malta formed 
the core of the liberal coalition and argued that the Directive needed to respect the 
distinctive characteristics of the Member states’ industrial relations systems.8 The 
UK, which spearheaded the coalition, argued that although the majority of UK 
workers did not work more than 48 hours a week, ‘there was strong evidence to 
support the retaining of the opt-out because of its importance to UK 
competitiveness’ (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2004: 7). Austria, 
Germany, Denmark and Finland stressed the need for a lasting solution taking into 
account the different systems of the Member States, while the remaining 11 
Member States abstained from declaring their positions at this stage (Council of the 
European Union, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). Such a pattern of divisions, as established 
during the early months of the negotiations, were to remain for the following years 
albeit with some minor shifts.   
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With little agreement in the Council, attention switched to the European Parliament. 
Alejandro Cercas, a Spanish MEP from the Socialist Party (PES), was appointed as the 
rapporteur for the directive. Mr Cercas was able to draw on the support from the 
MEPs of the Member States within the regulatory coalition, who were increasingly 
concerned by the growing strength of support for the continuation of the opt-out.9 
The Cercas Report had generated significant opposition within the Parliament to the 
Commission’s liberal proposal. It is worth reiterating the main points of the report. 
The Parliament would accept the extension of the reference period from 4 to 12 
months on condition that the opt-out was removed. It was argued that such a 
compromise would give employers the necessary flexibility on working time, while 
simultaneously  protecting the health and safety of employees. With respect to on-
call time, the report followed the ECJ rulings and argued that all on-call time was to 
be considered as working time, regardless of whether it was spent either active or 
inactive (European Parliament, 2004b 13-14). ‘We cannot lightly alter the Acquis 
Communautaire and legislate against the case law of the court of justice which has 
repeatedly supremely well argued and established that on-call duty is working time’ 
argued the report, ‘it is essential that the European institutions respect the 
inviolability of the acts that they have adopted and which affect the legal situation of 
legal persons’ (ibid: 8). The Plenary vote on the amendments was scheduled for 9-
11th May 2005. In the weeks preceding the vote Mr Cercas and his aides tried to gain 
as much parliamentary support as possible to ensure that his amendments would 
obtain an absolute majority. It was hoped that a strong majority would send a clear 
signal to the Council and the Commission and that any re-drafting of the proposal 
would need to be more in agreement with the position taken by the Parliament. On 
  
137
11 May 2005, Cercas gained sufficient support to pass his proposed amendments by 
an absolute majority of 58 % (381/653) (Keter, 2009: 7). The vote crossed party lines 
and MEPs voted in line with the views expressed by their Member States in the 
Council, rather than their party affiliation in the Parliament. In total, the strongest 
support for Parliament’s amendments came from France, with 97.1 per cent of its 
MEPs voting in favour, then Greece with 90.5 per cent, and Portugal with 89.5 per 
cent. The lowest levels of support came from the core group of countries in the 
Council which were against the removal of the opt-out, and this included Poland 75 
per cent, Ireland 73 per cent, Czech Republic 67 per cent, Latvia 60 per cent, Slovenia 
57 per cent and the UK 56 per cent.10 Britain is usually considered to the strongest 
opponent of the WTD, but the vote reveals that a number of countries had a much 
stronger opposition than the UK, the majority of which were from the CEE states.  
 
In accordance with the co-decision procedure, the amended draft Directive was 
returned to the Commission where it was hoped that the recommendations would 
be passed to the Council for agreement by the end of June 2005. However, the 
Commission intervened and argued that the Parliamentary proposal ‘did not 
constitute an improvement to the Directive’ and would ‘make it more difficult to 
obtain an agreement or a sufficient majority in the Council’ (European Commission, 
2005: 3). The Commission was concerned with two amendments made by the 
Parliament: the definition of working time and the phasing-out of the opt-out. On 
the definition of working time, the Commission believed that the original draft was 
the best solution to the problem and pointed out that an agreement had been 
reached in the Council during the Dutch Presidency. On the issue of the opt-out, the 
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Commission considered Parliament’s amendment of a phase-out within 12 months 
of the Directive as being too ambitious. In the amended proposal (released on the 
31st May 2005) the Commission reintroduced its original definition of working time, 
as well as the opt-out, albeit for a period of 3 years.  A proviso was added whereby 
any Member State could apply for an extension to continue the opt-out beyond the 
three-year period (European Commission, 2005: 6). The extension could be given ‘for 
reasons relating to their labour market arrangements’ and was to be awarded by the 
Commission (ibid: 10). In other words there was no confirmed end to the opt-out, as 
Member States would be allowed to apply for a seemingly indefinite extension in the 
name of labour market conditions. In the regulatory coalition the ETUC expressed its 
disappointment that the Commission had seemingly ‘ignored the only democratically 
elected institution in the EU policy-making process’.11 In its defence, the Commission 
claimed that its aim was to ‘preserve the balance of the initial text and to ensure 
that a sufficient majority could be obtained in the Council’ (European Commission, 
2005: 3).    
 
The Cercas report and the vote in the Parliament had attracted a considerable 
amount of media attention that had aroused support in both the pro and anti opt-
out groupings. This had seemingly increased the costs associated with losing the 
debate and had helped to ensure that discussions in the Council would be more 
complicated and tense. In the latter half of 2005, the negotiations in the Council 
coincided with the British Presidency. Few representatives in the Brussels 
institutions expected the UK to be able to forge an agreement, as it had such a 
vested interest in the revision of the directive.  However, the UK had reached a 
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compromise agreement with Germany: Germany would support the UK on the WTD 
in return for British support on the Takeover Directive (Financial Times, 2004).12  This 
arrangement had brought Austria into the liberal coalition on this occasion and with 
support from Poland, Britain felt confident that it could tackle the WTD.13 The Baltic 
States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia all declared their support for the 
opt-out and for the first time in the history of the EU’s social dimension the liberal 
coalition appeared to have gained control of the negotiations. For the UK, the 
balance of influence had been relatively easy to change once the 2004 Member 
States had joined the negotiations, and at times the latter appeared to be more 
hard-line and vocal with respect to the maintenance of the opt-out than Britain.14 
Enlargement was therefore helping to tilt the balance of power between the two 
coalitions and this had boosted the confidence of the UK and its aim to push for an 
agreement. Britain invested a considerable amount of resources into finding a 
solution to the WTD. The then Blair government devoted approximately one 
hundred civil servants to the Directive who had been given strict instructions that 
the opt-out was to stay.15 A charm offensive was launched and during his visits to EU 
capitals, Tony Blair placed the WTD high on the agenda for discussion. In particular, 
the CEE states were identified as key targets that could be persuaded by the liberal 
cause, as their positions were less entrenched and more sympathetic than some of 
the EU-15 Member States.16 The spearheading the liberal coalition the British 
government was able to ensure that EU and member state institutions were 
continuously lobbied by UK ministers (ibid). As one interviewee commented ‘it was 
the most impressive and professional attempt I have seen by a member state to 
influence and gather support for a proposal’.17 During September and October 2005 
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the WTD was being discussed on a weekly basis in the Working Party on Social 
Questions (WPSQ), a working group comprised of representatives from the EU 
Permanent Representations which undertakes more detailed analysis of Commission 
proposals than the committees which surround COREPER I. Almost all member 
states submitted various proposals and recommendations which concerned the 
definition of working time, compensatory rest and the reconciliation of work and 
family life. Some member states issued joint proposals whilst others did so 
individually.18 The main sticking point in the debate, the opt-out, was not discussed 
in the WPSQ.   
 
The British Presidency had been undertaking various bilateral meetings with all 
governments in which it aimed to gauge the political climate and to influence the 
outcome of the debate.19 Combined with the discussions in the WPSQ, the British 
Presidency scheduled formal discussions on the revised WTD to be negotiated in the 
Permanent Representatives Committee at the meeting on the 25th November 2005. 
A technical report covering the status of the discussions, that is a summary of the 
main findings of the WPSQ, was presented to the Committee, although it did not 
include the opt-out. The British proposal contained the indefinite use of the opt-out, 
a twelve-month reference period, and a definition of on-call time whereby only the 
active part was to be considered as working time. Within the revised paragraphs of 
article 22 the British had introduced a clause that it hoped would pacify opposition 
to the opt-out. The clause stated that a member state which did not wish to make 
use of the opt-out could prohibit all workers on its territory, regardless of their 
country of origin, from working more than 48 hours a week. It was hoped that such a 
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condition would help to overcome the fears associated with the opt-out, but what 
the British failed to realise, whether intentionally or accidentally, was that the 
Posting of Workers Directive already covered such a condition.20 Within the Council 
the UK was able to secure the support of all of the CEE states (with the exception of 
Hungary), as well as Austria, Germany, Ireland and Malta. However, the regulatory 
coalition remained able to secure a strong minority voice and the British Presidency 
failed to achieve its aim of securing an agreement in its favour (Council of the 
European Union, 2005). Under the Council’s qualified majority voting (QMV) system, 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary, Spain and Sweden formed a blocking 
minority.21 The remaining Member States maintained their neutrality at this stage. 
During the meetings of the WPSQ a number of Member States had asked for 
clarification on whether the directive was to apply per worker or per contract. Its 
application per contract enables an employee to work more than the 48-hour limit 
per week, as a worker could have two contracts with different employers with the 
aggregate total number of hours worked exceeding the 48 limit. In particular, during 
their implementation of the directive Poland and Lithuania (and later Romania) had 
interpreted the WTD to apply per contract. This uncertainty helped to bolster 
support for the opt-out within the CEE States who feared that its removal, combined 
with the possibility of the directive applying per worker, would reduce labour market 
flexibility.22 More damagingly for the regulatory coalition was the discovery that 
both France and Sweden were applying the WTD per contract and not per employee. 
The UK used this information to highlight the poor implementation of the directive 
and to publicly criticise the regulatory coalition for being inconsistent.23     
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The Financial Times (2006a) reported that the failure of the British Presidency on the 
WTD was due to the deep rooted ideological divisions between those Member 
States insistent on a flexible labour market and those who aimed for a more ‘social 
approach’. For both coalitions the negotiations not only concerned the opt-out, but 
also what the directive signified in terms of the process of European integration. The 
continuation of the opt-out would signify that the EU was predominantly a market-
making project with a social dimension that was simply an ‘add-on’ to appease 
certain interest groups and Member States. However, the removal of the opt-out 
would signal that the process of European integration was one that created markets 
as well as protecting workers and citizens. Although the UK was unable to reach an 
agreement on the WTD, it is credited with strengthening the liberal coalition. 
 
Austria took over the EU Presidency in the first half of 2006. The timing of the 
Austrian Presidency coincided with intense negotiations over the Services Directive 
and this took precedence over reaching an agreement on the WTD. The Commission 
had been applying pressure on the European Council to reach an agreement on the 
Services Directive, not only to appease the negative publicity that the proposal had 
attracted, but also to give the Barroso Commission an achievement to its name.24 
The Austrian minister who was in charge of the Services Directive, Martin 
Bartenstein, was also responsible for the WTD and considerably more attention was 
given to the former than the latter.25 The Austrian presidency had scheduled 
negotiations on the WTD for June 2006, but in preparation for an agreement very 
little time was devoted to the issue. Not only had the Austrian Presidency been 
concentrating on the Service Directive, but it had also underestimated how deep 
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political division between the two sides had become. Although the Presidency had 
held consultations with each of the Permanent Representations in Brussels, the 
political effort which was put into the preparations was probably the least of all the 
Presidencies (ibid). The result of such an approach was that the June 2006 Council 
meeting failed to reach an agreement on the opt-out and hence the WTD.    
 
By the time of the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2006, the negotiations 
were entering their fifth successive Presidency. Recognising this, the Finnish 
Presidency announced that the WTD would be its top priority and that it would aim 
to reach an agreement at the November 2006 Council meeting. Finland worked hard 
to craft a proposal that would appease both sides and the then Finnish Prime 
Minister, Matti Vanhanen, organised bilateral meetings with his counterparts, as 
well as other EU institutions, interest groups and the social partners.26 At the 
beginning of the negotiations the deadlock between the two sides appeared to be 
equal, but the Finnish bilateral discussions had helped to reduce the margins 
considerably and as a result most countries had become more flexible.27 In the 
proposal the opt-out was to remain, but it was to be the ‘exception’ and there were 
a number of safeguards put in place to ensure that its abuse would be minimal. A 60-
hour limit calculated over a three month reference period was added to the 
Directive for those who made use of Article 22. Furthermore, a clause was added to 
the Directive which stated that after two years of implementation, Member States 
who made use of the opt-out were required to inform the Commission of the 
reasons, sectors, activities and number of employees concerned (Council of the 
European Union, 2006). On the same date the Commission was required to set up a 
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working party of representatives from the Member States and the European social 
partners, which was to monitor the implementation of article 22. After three years 
of implementation of the Directive, the Commission was required to release a report 
which ‘re-examined the use of the option provided by Article 22 with a view to the 
gradual ending of the use of this option’ (ibid).         
 
The Finnish proposal represented a potentially workable compromise between the 
two sides, as the opt-out would be subject to review with the possibility of it being 
slowly phased out. It was hoped that over time support around the UK in the liberal 
coalition could be reduced and the opt-out eventually removed.28 Yet such a 
proposal proved to be insufficient to overcome the divide between the two 
coalitions.29 The majority of the Member States were in favour of the compromise, 
but the core group of countries in the regulatory coalition maintained their 
insistence on a clear and definitive end to the opt-out. The revised Finnish proposal 
was due to be discussed in the Extraordinary Council Meeting scheduled for 7th 
November 2006, a meeting which had the sole aim of reaching an agreement on the 
WTD. In preparation for these discussions, the Presidency organised an informal 
meeting of problematic countries on 26th October 2006. The aim of the meeting was 
to get the two opposition groups together to see if a compromise could be reached. 
Six countries took part in the negotiations, Britain, Germany and Poland on one side 
and France, Italy and Spain on the other. The meeting was not particularly successful 
as Member States simply reiterated their positions and the Finnish Minister of 
Labour, Tarja Filatov, did not push either group into making a compromise.30 In the 
words of one representative ‘the meeting was nothing more than a catastrophe as 
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France, Italy and Spain wanted to see a very clear end to the opt-out and no one was 
asked to make a compromise’.31 
 
For regulatory coalition, the absence of a clear end to the opt-out was simply 
unacceptable. France, Italy and Spain had released a combined proposal that 
eliminated the opt-out within ten years.32 The Finnish strategy of slowly eliminating 
support around the UK proved to be an insufficient guarantee for the coalition who 
were increasingly alarmed at the support for the opt-out, particularly in the context 
of an enlarged EU. Furthermore, the Finnish proposal relied on the Commission to 
take the initiative over the elimination of the opt-out and given that during the 
negotiations the Commission had proved itself to consistently side with the liberal 
coalition, combined with a context in which the directive was perceived as only 
being revised as a result of the of the ECJ rulings, the regulatory coalition was 
concerned that the Commission would not honour its future obligation of such an 
agreement. The official message from the regulatory coalition was that it was 
unprepared to negotiate on the Finnish proposal. Nevertheless the Finnish 
Presidency continued with its preparations for 7th November Extraordinary Council 
meeting, as the informal messages from French, Italian and Spanish civil servants 
was that the official line was part of the negotiation game and that there was some 
room for manoeuvre.33 It then came as something of a surprise to the Finnish 
Presidency when on 6 November French President Jacques Chirac declared on 
national television that he and his allies were unprepared to negotiate on the opt-
out and that it was important to respect the opinion of the trade unions both in 
France and at the EU level (Financial Times, 2006b). This effectively torpedoed the 
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Council negotiations scheduled for the following day and no agreement could be 
reached.  
 
When Germany took over the EU Presidency in 2007 it announced that the WTD 
would not feature on the Council’s agenda. The lack of political agreement after 
three successive high profile Council meetings provided little incentive for Germany 
to take up the issue. Furthermore, Germany had a vested interest to keep the WTD 
off the agenda because of its deal with the UK - a lack of agreement ensures that the 
original directive, and hence the opt-out, remained in place. With the exception of 
Hungary, all of the CEE states joined the liberal coalition and enlargement therefore 
shifted the balance of power against the regulatory coalition. As Alistair Darling 
noted during the Finnish Presidency: ‘what’s been striking is that we used to be in a 
minority for many years […]. A majority of people [at this week’s meeting] kept 
saying, like we did, we need flexibility’ (Financial Times, 2006c). While the UK had 
been in a minority position on the opt-out when the original directive had been 
agreed, by the time of its revision, it was able to gain sufficient support to defend its 
position. Hungary did not support the liberal coalition on this occasion because the 
48-hour limit to the working week corresponded with the Hungarian Labour Code. 
As a result there was very little appetite at the Hungarian domestic level to re-open 
the discussion and reform working time.    
 
From negotiation to conciliation 
In the second half of 2007, Portugal held the Presidency of the Council and was 
under pressure from the Commission to find a solution to the deadlock. The 
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European Ombudsman had criticised the Commission for its ‘inaction’ on the issue, 
particularly with respect to on-call time (Europolitics, 2007a). Furthermore, the 
election of Nicolas Sarkozy signified that France may change its position, which 
would be a serious blow to the regulatory coalition. During the election campaign, 
Sarkozy had promised an end to the French 35 hour week which implied that he may 
also be prepared to compromise on the WTD. 
 
To unblock the negotiations the Portuguese Presidency decided in July 2007, the 
beginning of its Presidency of the European Council, to try a different strategy to the 
deadlocked negotiations - to combine the revision of the WTD with the directive 
regulating temporary work (Council of the European Union, 2007: 8). There have 
been several failed attempts to regulate temporary workers since 1982, with the 
most recent attempt beginning in 2000 when the EU Social Partners began 
negotiations on a possible framework agreement. In May 2001 the negotiations 
broke down and in the following March the Commission issued a proposal, which, 
under the co-decision procedure, was transmitted, to the Council and the European 
Parliament. The proposed TAWs directive represented a number of initiatives by the 
EU to improve the employment rights of atypical workers, including the 1997 
Directive on Part Time Workers and the 1999 Directive on fixed term workers. The 
TAW’s directive had specifically been introduced in response to the growing criticism 
of the condition of temporary agency workers by the ETUC and the Dublin based 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working conditions 
(Eurofound). According to the International Confederation of Temporary Agency 
Work Businesses (CIETT), temporary work agencies in the EU employed 7 million 
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workers in 2001 (1.9 per cent of the work force) and such jobs tend towards lower 
pay and poorer working conditions than most forms of employment (CIETT, 2002: 
21). Subsequent research by Eurofound (2007: 6) also confirms that temporary 
agency workers are often young and normally have a lower educational level than 
the average employee. According to the UK Trade Union Congress (TUC) (2005: 11) 
although agency work is often claimed to be a stepping-stone into permanent 
employment for ‘disadvantaged’ groups such as working mothers, the unemployed 
and ex-offenders, there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. Across 
Europe, between a third and two-thirds of temporary agency workers move on to 
permanent jobs within two years but these are most likely to be highly employable, 
educated workers aged 25 - 34 who have not been unemployed in the last five years. 
The proposal put forward that a temporary agency worker could not be treated less 
favourably, in terms of basic working conditions (working time, rest periods, 
holidays, pay), than a permanent member of staff doing a comparable job.34 After 
four Employment Council Meetings however, the negotiations stalled in 2004 and 
the proposal had remained off the Council’s agenda. The main divisions concerned 
the length of the qualifying period for implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between permanent and temporary workers (the draft directive proposed 6 weeks 
subject to agreement for a longer period between the social partners), as well as any 
specific derogation from the directive for certain contracts (e.g. the Commission 
proposed a derogation for contracts with a duration of less than six weeks) (EurActiv, 
2007a).    
 
  
149
By simultaneously negotiating the two directives, the Portuguese Presidency hoped 
that such a strategy would allow ‘Member States to find a balance between the two 
directives that would be acceptable from a political point of view’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2007: 8). In this respect, the negotiations would produce 
something for both coalitions and enable no one side to lose face, particularly France 
and the UK.35 It was anticipated that the liberal coalition would compromise on the 
TAWs directive, while in return for this progress, the regulatory coalition would 
compromise on the WTD, in particular the opt-out. The Portuguese proposal for the 
WTD reintroduced the Finnish compromise, namely: an opt-out allowing for a 
maximum working week of between 60-65 hours; the clarification that on-call time 
would not be counted as working time except where provided for by national law or 
an agreement by the social partners; and finally, a more neutral revision clause 
which deleted the objective of phasing out the opt-out. Where the opt-out was used 
(and the proposal stated that it was to be the exception) to prevent its abuse a 
number of safeguards for were introduced and included: 1) employers being unable 
to make their employees simultaneously sign both the opt-out and their contract of 
employment (thereby protecting workers from having to sign the opt-out as a 
condition of employment); and 2) the condition that any employee who refuses to 
work more than the 48-hour limit would not suffer as a result (Council of the 
European Union, 2007: 10-11). On the TAW directive, the Portuguese Presidency left 
open the negotiation of the specified time-period required for equal treatment 
between permanent and temporary workers. During the summer months of 2007 
bilateral talks were held between the Presidency and the national delegations to 
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begin work on a new compromise deal that would be signed off at a meeting of 
employment ministers that December.      
 
To reduce division between the two sides the Portuguese Presidency held bilateral 
consultations with the different Member States and the Commission. This helped to 
soften the now entrenched positions between the two sides (Europolitics, 2007b). 
Formal discussion and negotiation of the two directives was scheduled for the 5/6 
December EPSCO Council meeting. Within the liberal coalition the majority of the 
CEE claimed that a compromise could be made, as long as the opt-out remained.36 
Germany, Malta, the UK and Poland remained opposed to an agreement on either 
directive and the coalition began to fracture. In light of this development the UK 
Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, called his Portuguese counterpart to link the current 
EU labour law negotiations to the successful signing of the Lisbon Treaty due to be 
signed in the Portuguese capital on 13 December (EurActiv, 2007b). During the 
ESPCO Council meeting the Portuguese Presidency decided not to call a formal vote 
and no agreement was reached. Nevertheless, the Presidency noted that a vast 
majority of Member States had spoken in favour of an integrated solution for the 
directives, building a global equilibrium between the two, and that many Member 
States had pressing needs to address labour market regulation problems which 
depended on a solution to the two files (ESPCO Press release, 2007: 8). It also 
concluded that the progress achieved under its Presidency gave a real margin for a 
political decision in 2008 “building on the solid basis for progress that the Council 
has just built” (ibid).  
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The deadlock in the Council was finally broken in June 2008 during the Slovenian 
Presidency. Initially the Slovenian Presidency hesitated to push for an agreement on 
the two directives, but developments in the UK signalled that an agreement could 
finally be reached. On 20 May the British government endorsed an agreement by the 
UK social partners (the Trade Union Congress and the Confederation of British 
Industry) entitling temporary workers the same rights as permanent staff after 12 
weeks of employment. Reacting to the news, the Slovenian Presidency said: 
‘developments in the UK are encouraging for the work of the Presidency on this 
dossier. Agency Workers and Working Time Directives have been put on the EPSCO 
agenda of 9 June’ (Agence Europe, 2008). Divisions between the two sides remained, 
but importantly the two main opposing Member States within the two coalitions, 
France and the UK, had signaled a compromise. In France, the recent flexibility of the 
UK on the TAW Directive combined with the upcoming French Presidency of the 
Council, which did not want the WTD on its agenda, convinced the government to 
also move to the centre ground.37  
 
In preparation for the June ESPCO Council meeting the Slovenian Presidency held 
bilateral negotiations with each of the Permanent Representations of the Member 
States in Brussels to ensure that agreement could be reached. The Commission also 
exerted pressure on the Member States with the Employment Commissioner, 
Vladimir Špidla, contacting governments to stress the importance of reaching an 
agreement after five years of negotiations.38 The Slovenian proposal for both 
directives remained identical to those put forward by both the Finnish and 
Portuguese Presidencies. During the scheduled Council meeting the regulatory 
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coalition continued with its fierce opposition to maintaining the opt-out, albeit with 
the absence of France. Spain and Greece voted against the proposal for the WTD, 
while Belgium, Cyprus and Portugal abstained. The final agreement in the Council on 
the revision of the WTD: maintained the opt-out with a maximum working week of 
no more than 65 hours (down from 78); split on-call time into active and inactive 
working time; maintained a 3 month reference period; and agreed to review the 
situation of the opt-out after 7 years of the new directive coming into force. On the 
Temporary Agency Workers Directive, it was agreed that employees were to be 
given equal treatment as of day one with respect to terms of pay, maternity leave 
and annual leave – albeit it is possible to derogate from this through collective 
agreements and agreements between the social partners (European Commission, 
2008a).   
 
Within the regulatory coalition there was a sense of disappointment over the WTD, 
but not total defeat as under the co-decision procedure the agreement in Council 
was to be sent back to the Parliament. The ETUC criticised a “highly unsatisfactory 
and unacceptable” agreement, “in respect to the new provisions on on-call time and 
the continuation of the UK opt-out” (Europolitics, 2008c). The Commission gave its 
support to the two texts agreed and argued that in view of the strongly divergent 
positions of the Member States during the very protracted and difficult first reading 
on amendment of the WTD, the Commission perceives that: “supporting the 
common position is the best way of allowing the legislative procedures on this 
important amending proposal to continue” (Commission, 2008b: 10). As the 
proposed agreement was passed to the Parliament, governments from the two 
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opposing coalitions began to lobby their MEPs, particularly with respect to the WTD 
and the opt-out. . The regulatory coalition published a declaration expressing their 
opposition to the agreement on the WTD and called on the Parliament to amend the 
text along lines favourable to workers (Europolitics, 2008b). In contrast the liberal 
coalition argued that the agreement signified progress for workers over the TAWs, 
and progress for both workers and their employers over the WTD.   
 
Vladimir Spidla, the Employment Commissioner, repeatedly urged the European 
Parliament not to split the directives and to respect the agreement made within the 
Council. However, in the build-up to the European Parliamentary elections, the 
Parliament decided against this advice. 39 Mr Cercas said that EMCO was ‘not 
amused’ by the political linking of the two directives and progress for workers should 
be achieved in both the TAW and WTD and not just one of them (Europolitics, 
2008a). He also added  “we really disapprove of this attitude of the Council. They 
want to sacrifice one directive for the other. But we don’t fall for the Council’s 
blackmailing. The EP has its dignity. We take decisions independently. The Council 
should stop its authoritarian attitude” (Europolitics, 2008a). In this respect, the 
Parliament could claim to be the ‘true voice of European citizens defending their 
interests’.40 On 7 October 2008 the Employment and Social Affairs Committee 
(EMCO) discussed the TAWs directive and voted 31 in favour, 1 against and 3 
abstentions to adopt the amendments made by the Council. Following this, two 
weeks later the proposed directive was adopted in plenary without amendment.41  
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With respect to the WTD, on 5 November EMCO amended the proposal agreed in 
the Council by reintroducing the ECJ’s definition of on-call time, that all on-call time 
be treated as working time, and removing the opt-out. The amendments were 
adopted with 35 votes in favour, 13 against and two abstentions During the six 
weeks preceding the plenary vote, MEPs were subjected to an intense round of 
lobbying from both within the Parliament and from external sources. At this stage in 
the negotiations, political division was appearing to move beyond the liberal / 
regulatory coalitions within the EU’s political space, and pitted the European Council 
and Commission against the European Parliament. The office of Alejandro Cercas 
went on the offensive to ensure the broadest possible support.42 The main targets 
for lobbying were MEPs from the regulatory coalition who had crossed party lines 
during first plenary vote. Although MEPs from the liberal coalition, particularly those 
from CEE were also targeted, it was widely believed that it would be more difficult to 
persuade them to support the rapporteur’s position.43 For its part, EU business 
lobbies (Eurochambres, BusinessEurope, CEEP and UEAPME) provided a coordinated 
attempt to influence the vote by writing to all 785 MEPs urging them to support the 
‘pragmatic’ compromise adopted by governments. A no vote, they said, “is 
something that the EU simply cannot afford in the present economic climate” (The 
Guardian, 2008).   
 
The plenary vote was a victory for Alejandro Cercas and the regulatory coalition. 421 
MEPs voted in favour of the proposal put forward by Mr Cercas. In a statement 
following the result Mr Cercas said that “this is a triumph for all political groups in 
the European Parliament. It is clear that the Socialists did not clinch this victory on 
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their own. The Council now has to follow the position of the European Parliament, 
they have to back what the citizens want. I call of the Commission to stop supporting 
the Council and play the role of an arbitrator” (Europolitics, 2008d). As in the first 
round of Parliamentary voting, MEP voting patterns crossed party lines and 
demonstrate a strong correlation with their government positions in the Council, 
albeit their were some minor shifts. The strongest support in favour of the 
amendments tabled by Mr Cercas and thereby the regulatory coalition came from 
Austria and Spain with 100 per cent support from their MEPs, followed by Portugal 
(96 per cent), Hungary (91 per cent), Italy (74 per cent) and France (72 per cent). 100 
per cent of MEPs from both Latvia and Malta voted against Mr Cercas’s 
amendments, followed by the UK (73 per cent), Slovenia (71 per cent), Slovakia (70 
per cent), Lithuania (66 per cent) and the Czech Republic (68 per cent). The vote 
reveals the continued support during the negotiations of the CEE states (with the 
exception of Hungary) to the liberal coalition.  
 
Within the regulatory coalition there was a sense of relief that Parliament had 
defended the removal of the opt-out. Following two failed attempts of negotiations 
between the Council and the Parliament, the third and final stage of the co-decision 
procedure involves the forming of a conciliation committee between the two 
institutions.44 On 23 January 2009 the Council gave the then Czech Presidency a 
mandate to begin negotiations with the Parliament to reach an agreement during 
conciliation. Prior to the formal three conciliation meetings, informal meetings are 
held between the three EU institutions. During the first informal meeting the 
European Parliament requested that the Council provide a clear written mandate of 
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its position, but the Czech Presidency was unable to provide this (Europolitics, 
2009d). It was not the beginning of the three formal conciliation meetings that the 
Presidency was able to present a compromise text to the Parliament. The 
Commission continued with its position of supporting the liberal coalition and 
argued that any agreement between the Council and the Parliament could be 
reached if the former moved towards the latter’s position on the issue of on-call 
time, while the Parliament should consider moving towards the prevailing opinion 
among the Member States regarding the opt-out (Europolitics, 2009a). In contrast, 
the Parliament believed that and compromise should witness it moving towards the 
Councils position on the issue of on-call time and in return, the Council should agree 
to remove the opt-out.45 While both institutions were prepared to compromise, they 
had very different ideas as to how a compromise could be achieved.    
 
Within the regulatory coalition there was concern that the Czech Presidency would 
be more favourable to the liberal coalition, given its loyalty during previous 
negotiations.46 The Czech Presidency gave itself until March to find a compromise 
within the Council and thereby begin formal conciliation meetings with the 
Parliament scheduled for 17 March 2009. In the Council although the majority of the 
Member States were keen to reach an agreement on on-call time, divisions 
regarding the opt-out remained. The governments of Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK continued 
to support a revised directive that included the opt-out, while Spain, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Hungary, Greece and Cyprus called for its removal. The remaining Member 
States declared that they were flexible on the opt-out (Europolitics, 2009b).          
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Conciliation during the Czech Presidency proved to be something of a disaster for 
the regulatory coalition - the Presidency had allegedly been briefed by the British 
government that the opt-out was to remain, added to which the Czech government 
collapsed during the process.47 The result was that within the Czech Presidency there 
was little impetus to negotiate and to push for a compromise deal between the 
Council and the Parliament. At first formal conciliation meeting the Committee’s 
chair, Vice President of the Parliament Mechtild Rothe, ‘the Council did not put any 
“real” compromises on the table. We are ready to compromise, but they are not’ 
(Europolitics, 2009c). The Czech Presidency’s first proposal included a definition of 
on-call time which included the inactive part within the calculation unless national 
law/collective agreements stipulated otherwise, while the opt-out was to remain 
indefinitely. This proposal was near identical to the previous agreement reached in 
Council, albeit the wording was slightly different. In response the Parliament issued a 
non-paper containing various compromise proposals to be examined by the Council, 
including the removal of the op-out, albeit without a specified time period. The final 
three-way talks were held on 27 April 2009, just weeks before the scheduled 
European Parliamentary Elections, but no compromise could be achieved and the 
talks broke down. In the eyes of the regulatory coalition the majority position within 
the Council did not favour a comprise deal, particularly with respect to the opt-out, 
and furthermore, the Commission did very little to support a compromise deal.48 
Conclusion  
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Following five years of negotiations, an agreement on the revision of the WTD could 
not be reached and the original 1993 directive continues. As a result, the use of the 
opt-out continues to spread. While some Member States only make use of the opt-
out in their healthcare sectors following the SiMAP and Jagear rulings (and this was 
based on the assumption of being only a temporary arrangement until an agreement 
on on-call time could be included in a revised directive), for other States there has 
been a more general spread of the use of the opt-out.49 The problem with this is that 
the longer the opt-out is used, the more difficult it will become to gain a broad 
consensus for its removal should the negotiations ever be re-opened. Failure to 
reach an agreement on the revision of the directive therefore serves to benefit the 
liberal coalition. Furthermore, while CEE states such as the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia had introduced the use of the opt-out in their 
healthcare systems following the ECJ rulings, attempts to resolve the issue of on-call 
time as part of the negotiations and thereby eliminate the need to use the opt-out, 
did nothing to reduce support in such states for a revised directive in which the opt-
out was removed.  
 
Failure to reach an agreement on the revised WTD illustrates the inability of the EU 
to move forward on a piece of social legislation that is central to the ESD. Although 
the ESD policy-making process has a history of deep divisions, such divisions have 
rarely prevented a piece of legislation from being passed. Even when Britain 
objected to the Social Protocol in 1992, it was decided by the then 11 other Member 
States to go a head with the amendment of Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome 
without UK. The UK eventually signed the Social Protocol in 1997, but the point is 
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that even with objections from one or a few Member States, the ESD continued to 
be constructed and expanded. Liberal forces within the ESD have often found 
themselves in a minority position when legislation has been negotiated, but the 
revision of the WTD reveals that this has changed.  
 
How has enlargement affected the negotiations? It should first be noted that the 
WTD has become a symbol of the ESD and a struggle between liberals who regard it 
to be a fundamental right for an employee to chose the number of hours worked 
and thereby maximise their own income vs. those in the regulatory coalition who 
argue that employees should be entitled to a decent standard of living without the 
detrimental health and safety effects of working long hours. One of the most striking 
observations from the negotiations is the support that the liberal coalition received 
from the CEE states (with the exception of Hungary). The UK invested substantial 
time and resources into the negotiations to ensure that the opt-out would not be 
removed from a revised directive, but it also gained considerably from the support of 
the CEE states. Initial support from Germany and Poland gave the UK the confidence 
to go on the offensive and recruit other Member States in the Council into the liberal 
coalition. The result was that with the exception of Hungary, all of the CEE states 
joined the liberal coalition. This not only gave the liberal coalition a strong voice, but 
it also put it in a majority position. Furthermore, following the 2007 enlargement, 
the liberal coalition was also able to secure the backing of Romania and Bulgaria.                                                         
1  Despite the opt-out, Britain’s Conservative government remained unsatisfied with 
the Directive prompting it to challenge the WTD’s legal basis in the ECJ. The British 
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government argued that that the WTD was not a health and safety issue and that it 
had been wrongly implemented via health and safety provisions of the SEA (Article 
118A) which permitted decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting, and 
thereby overruling British opposition (Blair et al, 2001). This was specifically because 
the UK considered those areas of social policy not embraced by the Maastricht opt-
out should be subjected to unanimous voting. But this view was not shared by the 
ECJ which declared in 1996 that the WTD was a health and safety issue and that 
Britain had to implement the Directive (ibid). A reluctant Labour government 
implemented the WTD two years later in 1998, although it decided to use the opt-
out for all sectors.  
2  Judgment of the Court of 3 October 2000 in case C-303/98, request submitted to 
the Court by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Comunidad Valenciana (Spain) in 
the dispute between Sindicato deMédicos de Asistencia Pública (SIMAP) and 
Conselleria de Sanidad y Consumo de la Generalidad Valenciana, ECR 2000, p. I-
07963. 
3  Judgment of the Court of 9 October 2003 in case C-151/02, request submitted to 
the Court by theLandesarbeitsgericht Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) concerning the 
dispute pending before that court between Landeshauptstadt Kiel and Norbert 
Jaeger. 
4  In its communication the Commission (2004c: 20) cited the German government as 
stating that the SiMAP and Jaeger cases would increase staffing requirements by 24 
per cent and between 15,000 and 27,000 additional doctors would have to be 
employed, although far fewer doctors were out of work in Germany. The estimated 
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costs associated with such measures would be approximately EUR 1.75 billion. In the 
UK the estimates were put at between 6,250 and 12,550 doctors and 1,250 staff 
other than doctors. The additional costs would come in between £380 and £780 
million.  
5 Interview 14, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (05 March, 
2007).   
6 Interview 9, Representative of a Permanent Representation to the European Union 
(13 March, 2007).  
7 Interview 14, Representative of a Permanent Representation in Brussels (05 March, 
2007).   
8 Interview 5, Member of the European Parliament (7 March, 2007).      
9 Interview 19, Assistant of the European Parliament (7 March, 2007).   
10 The statistics were calculated from the following rollcall vote dataset: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+PV+20050511+RES-RCV+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN, 
accessed 18/12/2009.   
11 Interview 2, Representative from the European Trade Union Confederation (26 
March, 2007).  
12 The German government had calculated that the cost of losing the Takeover 
Directive was much greater for the German Economy than that involved in accepting 
a liberal version of the WTD. 
13 There was no formal agreement between the UK and Austria, but Austria also 
supported the German position on the Takeover Directive and was eager to support 
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the UK/German agreement to ensure its long term interests could be achieved; 
Interview 2 Representative of the European Trade Union Confederation  (26 March, 
2007).  
14 Interview 10, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (15 March, 2007).     
15 Interview 19, Member of the European Parliament (7 March, 2007).  
16 Interview 18, Member of the European Parliament (7 March, 2007).  
17 Interview 5, Member of the European Parliament (7 March, 2007).      
18 Interview 29, Assistant in the European Parliament (25 November, 2010). 
19 Interview 29, Assistant in the European Parliament (25 November, 2010). 
20 Interview 2, Representative from the European Trade Union Confederation (26 
March, 2007). 
21 Under the Council’s voting system a majority requires the number of votes cast to 
represent a majority of the member states and to be a minimum of 72.3 per cent of 
the vote; see Eurostat, http://europa.int.eu 
22  Interview 24, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (15 March, 2007).  
23 Interview 2, Representative from the European Trade Union Confederation (26 
March, 2007).  
24 Interview 20, Member of the European Parliament (3 April, 2007).   
25 Interview 9, Representative of a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (13 March, 2007). 
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26 Interview 3, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (22 March, 2007).  
27 Interview 2, Representative from the European Trade Union Confederation (26 
March, 2007).  
28 Interview 16, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (20 March, 2007).  
29 For the Finnish Proposal see Council of the European Union (2006) 
30 Interview 10, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (15 March, 2007).     
31 Interview 3, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (22 March, 2007). 
32 Interview 2, Representative from the European Trade Union Confederation (26 
March, 2007). 
33 Interview 3, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (22 March, 2007). 
34 Temporary agency workers are defined as: ‘workers with a contract of 
employment or employment relationship with a temporary work agency who are 
assigned to user undertakings to work temporarily under their supervision and 
direction’ (European Council, 2008: 7). 
35  Interview 25, Representative from a Permanent Represenation to the European 
Union (9 November, 2010).  
36 interview 26, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (17 November, 2010).  
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37 Interview 25, Representative from a Permanent Represenation to the European 
Union (9 November, 2010). 
38 Interview 27, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (4 November, 2010).  
39 Interview 28, Member of the European Parliament (16 November, 2010). 
40 Interview 29, Assistant in the European Parliament (25 November, 2010). 
41 During the plenary vote the Party of the European Left- Nordic Green Alliance 
(GUE-NGL) tabled 7 amendments to the proposal, but they were all rejected in 
favour of the proposal adopted by the Council and EMCO (66 in favour of the 
amendments, 617 against and maintaining the EMCO agreement, and 15 
abstentions).    
42 For example, EU business lobbies wrote to all 785 MEPs urging them to support 
the ‘pragmatic’ compromise adopted by governments. A no vote, they said, ‘is 
something that the EU simply cannot afford in the present economic climate’ 
(Guardian, 2008).   
43 Interview 29, Assistant in the European Parliament (25 November, 2010). 
44 The committee, which is made up of twenty-seven members of the Council and an 
equal number of representatives from the Parliament, has to be set up 6 weeks after 
the Council’s second reading. The Committee has 6 (or 8) weeks to draw up a 'joint 
text' from the date of its first meeting. Again within a period of 6 (or 8) weeks, the 
joint text is submitted by the Presidents of the EP and Council delegations for 
approval by the Parliament and the Council, without any possibility of amendment. 
If, on the other hand, the Conciliation Committee does not reach an agreement or if 
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the 'joint text' is not approved by the Parliament or the Council, the act is deemed 
not to have been adopted. See: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/code/about/default_en.htm  - accessed 
10/05/2012.   
45 Interview 29, Assistant in the European Parliament (25 November, 2010). 
46 Interview 30, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (3 November, 2010).  
47 Interview 31, Representative of the European Trade Union Confederation (19 
November, 2010).  
48 Interview 32, Representative from a Permanent Representation to the European 
Union (10 November, 2010).  
49 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and the United Kingdom allow use of the opt-out, 
irrespective of sector. While Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain allow for the 
use of the opt-out in certain jobs that use extensive on-call time (European 
Commission, 2010: 87).  
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5: The Negotiation of the Europe 2020 Poverty Target 
  
The final case study addresses the negotiations of the EU poverty target included as 
part of the Europe 2020 - the successor to the Lisbon Strategy. The target aims to 
remove at least 20 million people living in poverty across the EU by 2020. Although 
the EU has had a long history of attempting to tackle poverty and social exclusion, 
practical and political differences between governments and the broader set of EU 
actors has resulted in very little progress in terms of substantive output (Daly 2012). 
While the Lisbon Strategy initially prioritised tackling social exclusion, it contained no 
explicit quantitative target to guide the Member States. Furthermore, the 2005 re-
launch of the Lisbon Strategy under the banner of ‘Growth and Jobs’ effectively side-
lined the open method of coordination in social inclusion. As ter Haar and Copeland 
argue (2010: 287-288) the re-launched Lisbon Strategy in 2005 essentially shifted its 
aims from one in which economic growth was to be combined with social cohesion, 
to one in which economic growth was to create social cohesion. In other words, it 
was reconfigured around the liberal aim whereby social cohesion was articulated as 
the result of economic growth and employment, rather than being an independent 
objective in its own right.    
 
During the formation of Europe 2020, within EU institutions there were general 
expectations that the European Commission would develop new ideas to replace the 
Lisbon Strategy (Copeland and Daly, 2012: 276). In its first draft of Europe 2020 the 
European Commission proposed the inclusion of a headline target to reduce poverty 
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within the EU by 25% by 2020 (European Commission, 2010a: 5). Poverty was to be 
calculated via one single measurement of ‘at risk of poverty’ (that is, people living on 
less than 60 % of the national median equivalised income). The target was to be 
supported by one of the seven flagship initiatives to encourage progress on the 
guidelines – the European Platform against Poverty. However, EU actors initially 
failed to agree on the proposed target, and this, combined with political divisions 
over the education target, delayed the agreement on Europe 2020.  
 
In contrast to the previous two case studies, the negotiations surrounding the 
poverty and social exclusion target were relatively short (three months) given that 
the European Commission aimed to reach an agreement on a successor to the Lisbon 
Strategy before the end of 2010. This chapter analyses the clash of capitalisms 
surrounding the negotiation of the poverty target. The governments of the UK, 
Ireland, Sweden and the majority of the CEE states formed the core of the liberal 
coalition and strongly opposed to the Commission’s proposal. It argued against 
having one unifying measurement of poverty, particularly that which only focussed 
on a relative poverty definition. To strengthen its cause the liberal coalition 
highlighted the weak legal foundation of a quantitative target for the area of poverty 
and social inclusion. In contrast, the position papers of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
France, Italy, Portugal and Spain all argued that the achievement of the Internal 
Market should not be considered as an end in itself. Rather, progress in growth and 
jobs should go hand in had with the preservation and strengthening of the European 
social dimension. This group of 7 Member States, along with the EU social actors 
such as the European Anti Poverty Network (EAPN) and the newly elected President 
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of the Council, Herman Van Rompuy, formed the regulatory coalition and defended 
the proposed target. The remaining Member States suggested that they could be 
flexible on the issue and did not formally attach themselves to either coalition. While 
the poverty target was eventually agreed in the summer of 2010, it was very 
different to the initial proposal put forward by the Commission.  
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The first part analyses the political economy of 
poverty and social exclusion within the EU, highlighting the potential for political 
divisions between actors within the EU’s political space. While the second part 
focuses on the negotiations and the final agreement reached on the target. It 
concludes by reflecting on the positions and contributions of the CEE states during 
the negotiations.    
 
I: The Political Economy of Poverty / Social Exclusion 
 
Poverty/Social Exclusion within the EU  
 
The EU’s attempts to address poverty date back to the 1970s. This is because the 
presence of poverty in the EU Member States has always been regarded as 
conflicting with the basic policy targets of good economic performance in 
conjunction with a high level of social protection, education and social dialogue 
(Eurofound, 2007: 1). A 1974 Council resolution agreed that economic expansion 
was not to be seen as an end in itself, but should also result in an improvement in 
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the quality of life (OJ 12/02/1974, No C 13/1). Since the Community did not have 
direct powers to intervene within social policy, the Commission launched the Social 
Action Programme which set out to achieve three broad based objectives: the 
attainment of full and better employment; the improvement of living and working 
conditions; and the increased involvement of management and labour in economic 
and social decisions. The programmes were designed mainly as ‘knowledge-
generating activities’ about anti-poverty strategies and activities (Bauer, 2002).  The 
programmes took this form mainly because the legal and political mandate for EU 
action in this field was very constrained, and in fact a fourth programme was blocked 
on legal grounds (By the Germany and the UK). To stimulate action and monitor 
progress around the three objectives, the Commission also initiated a number of 
European networks and observatories. Although these developments were relatively 
minor in they did not result in substantive policy output in the short-term, the 
creation of the European networks and observatories established the foundations 
for future social policy development and helped to establish the EU ‘poverty 
community’ actors (Hantrais, 2007: 5; Daly, 2006: 462-465).     
 
Although tackling poverty remained on the political agenda throughout the 1980s 
and 1990, as noted in chapter 1 activity was confined to the margins of the European 
integration process. The signing of both the Social Protocol under the Treaty of 
Maastricht (1992) and the creation of the European Employment Strategy under the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) both indirectly attempted to address poverty, albeit 
with a limited success of deepening integration within the field. The failure to 
generate any integration momentum within the policy area resulted in the 
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Commission adopting a different strategy by framing the debate as one of ‘social 
exclusion’ rather than poverty. (Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000: 437). The term social 
exclusion had begun to establish itself over the course of the 1980s and 1990s in 
both policy and academic discourses. The concept is rooted in a set of social ills such 
as unemployment, marginalisation, low education and skills, low income, or 
homelessness, first appeared in French Social Policy Discourse in 1974 (Levitas, 1998; 
Silver 1994). However, social exclusion is a concept with a more wide-ranging set of 
references than individual social problems or financial shortages (as in poverty) and 
is meant to pick up on the culmination of numerous situations of disadvantage, with 
a particular emphasis in those at the margins (Daly, 2012: 70-71). At a more macro-
level, it offers a structural critique of economic and social change and indeed of the 
welfare state, pointing to how processes like deindustrialisation and the way they 
have been handled led to whole sectors of the population being marginalised (ibid). 
The flexibility of the concept of social exclusion, given that it can be defined and 
therefore addressed in a number of different ways, has resulted in it being used 
alongside the issue of tackling poverty at the EU level. In fact, since the mid 1990s 
and up until the launch of the Europe 2020 poverty target, EU attempts to address 
poverty have been predominantly framed within the discourse of social exclusion. 
 
The Lisbon Strategy, launched in 2000, aimed to put social exclusion at the heart of 
the EU’s drive to improve competitiveness and make it: ‘the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic 
growth and with more and better jobs and with greater social cohesion’ (Council of 
the European Union, 2000: 5). At the heart of the original Lisbon Strategy was the 
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policy paradigm of combining economic growth with social cohesion. The March 
2000 Presidency Conclusions made continuous reference to the modernisation of 
the ‘European social model’ as a necessity for its future preservation and this was to 
be done via the utilisation of the flexible new mode of governance, the OMC (see 
chapter 1). Under-employment, poverty and social exclusion were perceived as the 
main challenges facing Europe and the Lisbon Strategy was conceived to provide an 
EU coordinated solution to such problems. The emphasis on adapting Europe’s 
existing social models in order to embrace globalisation and the new knowledge 
economy was very much a product of the political climate within the EU at the turn 
of the 21st century. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Spanish Prime Minister Jose 
Maria Aznar both shared the belief that the answer to Europe’s economic problems 
lay in the adaptation of Europe’s social model through micro-economic reforms 
aimed at raising competitiveness and productivity (Bulmer, 2008; James, 2012). Tony 
Blair’s ‘third way’ in the UK combined centre-right thinking on economic policy with 
centre-left thinking in social policy, and this discourse had been picked up in other 
Member States with Gerhard Schoeder’s ‘Neue Mitte’ in Germany and Wim Kok’s 
‘Polder Model’ in the Netherlands (see: Jenson and Pochet, 2002; Pochet, 2006).    
 
However, the guiding EU philosophy of combining economic growth with social 
cohesion proved to be short-lived. Despite Lisbon I (between 2000-2005) providing 
an umbrella for which a broad range of actors could govern the modernisation of the 
EU’s political economy (both social actors and business actors), the re-launched 
strategy (Lisbon II 2005-2010) established a very different political landscape. Lisbon 
II (2005-2010) provided a more centre-right political paradigm in which to guide the 
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modernisation of the European economy. The Lisbon Strategy had always been a 
governance architecture in which different narratives of competitiveness competed 
for prominence, but the shift post 2005 placed growth and jobs firmly at the centre 
of priorities (James, 2012: 22-27). From 2005 onwards references to the 
modernisation and preservation of the ‘European social model’ in official documents 
became scarce (Copeland, 2012: 233) and in Lisbon II, social cohesion was 
articulated to result from progress made in economic growth and employment. 
While the OMC Social Inclusion was one of the weaker OMCs during both Lisbon I 
and Lisbon II (particularly when compared to employment), the re-launched Lisbon 
Strategy further undermined the policy area, as it was politically sidelined. During 
the Lisbon decade, Member States were required to write only four National Action 
Plans for the OMC social, compared to one each year in the Employment Strategy.  
And as Daly (2012: 74-75) notes a feature of the OMC social inclusion was one of ‘no 
targets, no recommendations, few benchmarks or deadlines other than for the 
purpose of reporting, and no sanctions of any consequence’.    
 
In terms of outcomes, the main achievements during the Lisbon decade in the area 
of poverty and social exclusion were agreements at the EU level on definitions of 
poverty and exclusion, and cognitive shifts within actors, rather than policy 
outcomes and convergence across the Member States (Daly, 2012: 68-87). For 
example, it was only in 2009 that a set of indicators for defining poverty as ‘material 
deprivation’ was agreed. Lisbon II continued with the EU’s historic asymmetry that 
favours economic integration over social policy. Despite the considerable level of 
activity in the policy area during the Lisbon decade, substantive outcomes are 
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difficult to find and Member States maintained a high degree of autonomy in the 
policy area. This outcome is indicative of the politically sensitive and diverse nature 
of poverty and social exclusion, and of the difficulties posed in generating an 
integration momentum and convergence of social policy across the EU. Typically, 
welfare spending (including education) as a percentage of GDP represents the 
highest component of government expenditure within EU Member States. For both 
governments and the electorate this is a politically sensitive policy area with a 
multitude of organised interests. Here, the Principle of Subsidiarity, the idea that 
decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen and the EU should not 
undertake collective action unless Union action is more effective, has provide itself 
to be a powerful weapon for governments who have aimed to limit encroaching EU 
intervention, including opposition towards EU social policy.      
 
 
As such, there have remained significant divergences in the levels of poverty and 
social exclusion across the EU, and the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have served to 
only increase such differences. Underpinning such differences are diverse normative 
constructions of poverty (measurements, causes, consequences and solutions) and 
different tolerances of a given level of poverty. The result is that national policy 
frameworks are considerably diverse.   Defined as the number of individuals at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion (discussed below), poverty within the EU varies from 
14-16 percent of the population in the Czech Republic and Sweden, to 43-46 per 
cent in Bulgaria and Romania (Eurostat, 2011). According to the varieties of welfare 
capitalism literature, the broader spectrum of EU welfare states is comprised of the 
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social democratic variety, typified by Sweden with high levels of equality and means 
tested universal benefits; the Christian Democratic type typified by Germany with 
benefit levels dependent on employment ; and the liberal variety, typified by the UK, 
with means tested universal benefits, albeit in a context in which benefit levels are 
low and inequality is considerably higher (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Cousins, 1995). 
Between the two extremes sit the remaining welfare states, although there is 
considerable debate as to where such countries should be situated (Arts and 
Gelissen, 2002; Hay and Wincott, 2012; Ferrera, 1996). Nevertheless, they each 
strike their own distinct balance between social protection and redistribution.  
 
Why was the Poverty Target Proposed? 
 
The Commission’s review of the Lisbon Strategy argued that any successor required 
a streamlined and simplified set of aims with a stronger governance mechanism. This 
was their opening position on the guiding principles to form the basis of Europe 2020 
(Commission, 2009a; 2010a; 2010b). The release of the Commission’s public 
consultation revealed that its philosophical position on Social Europe for Europe 
2020 was identical to that of Lisbon II: progress in social exclusion and poverty 
reduction was to follow from success in economic growth and job creation 
(Commission, 2009a: 7). However, this had clearly changed by the time the first draft 
proposal of Europe 2020 was released on 3 March 2010, since it included the 
headline target to reduce poverty within the EU by 25% by 2020  - the first EU 
quantitative target in the area of poverty and social exclusion. (i.e. 20 million 
individuals) (European Commission, 2010a: 5). The Commission originally proposed 
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that the calculation of poverty should be done via one single measure of ‘at-risk-of-
poverty’ (i.e. people living on less than 60% of national median equivalised income – 
the classic relative poverty measurement in the EU). In this respect, the initial 
proposal envisaged a convergence of how governments measure poverty across the 
EU. This, in turn, had the potential to generate some policy convergence across the 
EU, as measurements of poverty are not only normatively different, they also 
construct different policy responses to the problem. The target was to be supported 
by one of the seven Flagship Initiatives to encourage progress on the guidelines. This 
was the ‘European Platform against Poverty’ which would have the task of raising 
awareness of people experiencing poverty and social exclusion and transforming and 
strengthening ‘the Open Method of Coordination on social exclusion and social 
protection into a platform for cooperation, peer review and exchange of good 
practice’ (Commission, 2010a: 19). 
 
There were a number of reasons behind the emergence of the poverty target. First, 
it was significantly influenced by the politics surrounding the re-election of Manuel 
Barroso as President of the Commission and his new cabinet in the latter half of 
2009. 1  Although the Council appoints the President of the Commission, the 
appointment and that of the individual cabinet members requires an absolute 
majority vote in favour from the Parliament. During the election of the first Barroso 
Commission, the Parliament had delayed the ratification of the Commission and 
blocked several Commissioner appointees. During the course of the first Barosso 
Commission the relationship between it and the European Parliament had become 
strained. Not only did the Parliament heavily criticise Lisbon II for being too focused 
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on business interests rather than all EU citizens, but within the Parliament there was 
the perception that progress within the ESD had stalled and that the Commission 
held responsibility for this.2 Prior to the Parliamentary vote for his re-election on 16 
September 2009, Barroso argued for ‘a much stronger focus on the social dimension 
in Europe at all levels of the decision-making process’.3 To representatives in the 
Parliament, Barroso’s speech and the subsequent insertion of the poverty target 
within Europe 2020 was his attempt to appease the different interests (Commission, 
2010c: 11-12). 4  Furthermore, in the run-up to Parliament’s approval of the 
Commission, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) spent the summer of 2009 
lobbying both the Parliament and Barroso, calling for a strong commitment ‘to make 
a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty’.5  The EAPN’s actions included open 
letters to both the Commission and the Parliament, position papers, cross-party 
committee meetings in the Parliament and a publicity campaign under the banner of 
‘A New Vision: An EU we can trust’ (EAPN, 2009).   
 
A second, and significant, factor in the Commission’s change of heart was the 
influence exerted by a small group of Member States in the Council that called for a 
strengthening of the social component in Europe 2020. The position papers of 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain all argued that the 
achievement of the Internal Market should not be considered as an end in itself. 
Rather, progress in economic growth and jobs should go hand-in-hand with the 
preservation and strengthening of the ESD. These seven Member States lobbied the 
Commission for the inclusion of a social component to Europe 2020 and Spain used 
its strategic position, as President of the Council of the EU in the first half of 2010, to 
  
177
put Social Europe on the Agenda, both with respect to Europe 2020 and the broader 
process of European integration (Spanish Presidency, 2010).6 A further source of 
support for this position came from the new President of the European Council, 
Herman Van Rompuy, who had been given the specific task of formulating Europe 
2020 and who was himself committed to a strong social dimension. Van Rompuy 
argued that governments should adhere to a limited number of guidelines (five), of 
which a specific target should be set to reduce poverty.7 
 
The result of this activity was a proposal within the initial draft of Europe 2020 for 
the EU’s first quantitative target in the area of poverty and social exclusion. But as 
analysed below, the proposal was hugely contentious and political divisions 
regarding the poverty target (as well as the education target) delayed the agreement 
on Europe 2020 (EurActiv, 2010b).  
 
Poverty and social exclusion and the clash of capitalisms 
 
There are diverse normative constructions of poverty (causes, consequences and 
solutions) and thereby different policy frameworks at the national level. 
Nevertheless, within the spectrum that is European Welfare States and poverty 
policy, there are those that favour a redistribution of income and the minimisation 
of inequality (such as some Northern and Mediterranean countries) and those that 
believe in minimal redistribution and higher levels of inequality (such as the UK and 
Ireland, as well as the majority of the Central and Eastern European states). At the 
EU level a problem with this division is that poverty and social exclusion has more 
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than often been discussed with reference to the Subsidiarity Principle. While 
Northern European Members have the most egalitarian welfare states within the EU, 
they have often been hugely resistant to EU involvement in redistribution policy (in 
particular Sweden) fearing that any agreement that fell short of their own standards 
could undermine domestic welfare policy. During the negotiations of the poverty 
target it is expected that political divisions will be in accordance with the clash of 
capitalisms political constellations. The liberal coalition is expected to favour either 
no target, or where a target is agreed, it to be as flexible as possible will minimal 
obligation for both any form of redistribution at the national level and political 
engagement at the EU level. In contrast, it is expected that the regulatory coalition is 
supportive of a quantitative target to reduce poverty and social exclusion and that it 
will favour an approach in which redistributive policy is key. Furthermore it is also 
expected that the latter coalition will be supportive of a governance mechanism in 
which Member States are obliged to participate, rather than the target being merely 
voluntary.    
 
II: Negotiating the Poverty Target  
 
The release of the initial proposal 
 
The Commission’s initial proposal to reduce the number of individuals living in 
poverty by 25% caused something of a storm. While the Council was able to agree 
on the fundamentals of Europe 2020 in March 2010, the negotiations surrounding 
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the poverty target (and education) resulted in a stalemate during the meeting and 
the launch of the strategy was postponed until after the June Council meeting 
(Council of the European, 2010: 2). The proposal had represented an internal 
political compromise within the Commission - initially, with the support of the newly 
appointed President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, DG EMPL 
Commissioner László Andor had proposed a reduction in poverty of one third. This 
objective was deemed realistic by many, including the social NGOs, who usually 
advocate a 50 per cent reduction (EurActiv, 2010b). However, internal discussions 
between DG EMPL and the Secretariat-General reduced the target to 25 per cent for 
fear that such an ambitious proposal would not gain the broad support of the 
Member States.8 Clearly the political context of negotiations within the ESD during 
the first Barosso Commission were influential in this decision. The Commission 
proposed that the calculation of poverty should be done via one single measure of 
‘at-risk-of-poverty’ (i.e. people living on less than 60% of national median equivalised 
income). The poverty and social exclusion target was to form part of five quantified 
targets within Europe 2020 along with employment; spending on research and 
innovation; climate change and energy use; early school leaving and participation in 
tertiary education. In a second tier, the programme consists of 10 integrated 
guidelines containing both the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and those 
relating to Europe 2020. One of the latter guidelines, located under the heading of 
employment, relates to the poverty and social exclusion domain and commits the EU 
to “promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, clearly supporting income 
security for vulnerable groups, social economy, social innovation, gender equality, 
and the poverty headline target”.9  At a third level, there were to be the Flagship 
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Initiatives which, jointly undertaken by EU and national actors and steered by the 
European Commission, centre on thematic priorities intended to support the 
achievement of the five EU-level targets. One of the seven Flagship Initiatives was to 
be devoted to poverty and social exclusion known as ‘the European Platform against 
Poverty and Social Exclusion’.10 This would have the task of raising awareness of 
people experiencing poverty and social exclusion and transforming and 
strengthening ‘the Open Method of Coordination on social exclusion and social 
protection into a platform for cooperation, peer review and exchange of good 
practice,’ (Commission, 2010a: 19). 
 
Despite the initial target being internally watered down, the Commission’s proposal 
was ambitious: the target not only represented the first EU quantitative target to 
reduce poverty and social exclusion, but Member States were also expected to 
converge upon one single measurement of poverty – that of at-risk-of-poverty, 
rather than the very diverse official measurements of poverty that were in place at 
the national level. This classic relative poverty measurement (being below a 60 % 
cut-off of median income) is based on how one’s income compares to the societal 
average. As an approach to social policy it calls for either income redistribution (if 
poverty is seen in terms of falling below a relative income threshold) or the 
guaranteeing of a basic or minimum income threshold below which no one should 
fall (if an absolute approach is taken). To give some idea of the scale of the ambition 
of this initial proposal, over the course of the eight years of relative growth in Europe 
(2000-2008), the prevalence of relative income poverty in the EU as a whole 
remained more or less unchanged (Cantillon, 2011). 
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Opposition to the Commission’s proposal soon gathered momentum. Sweden, the 
UK, Ireland and Malta, along with the CEE states of the Baltics, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, all opposed the target and situated 
themselves at the centre of the liberal coalition. Actors such as BusinessEurope were 
also opposed to the target, but given that the proposed target would not directly 
affect EU businesses, it was less involved in the negotiation of the poverty target and 
focused its effects on other policy negotiations in Europe 2020, such as those to 
promote growth and innovation. The liberal coalition aimed to remove the target 
from Europe 2020, or at the very minimum to gain a political compromise in which 
the target was significantly weakened. The coalition argued that Europe 2020 should 
prioritise policies concerning economic growth and jobs, particularly given the 
impact of the Eurozone crisis on the European economy.   
 
However, opposition to the target per se within the liberal coalition was for different 
reasons. Sweden, with its relatively low level of poverty, took a strong position on 
job creation as the primary tool for tackling social exclusion and favoured reducing 
poverty via an increase in employment.11 This reflects the Swedish political economy 
which provides comparatively high levels of public services based on high rates of 
female employment which tend to crowd-out low paid service sector jobs (and 
poverty traps) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Steinmo, 2003). Evidence from neoliberal 
political economies (such as the UK), with a large low paid and low skilled service 
sector, demonstrates that under different political economy conditions, employment 
participation does not automatically lead to a reduction in poverty (Hills, 2004; 
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Kenworthy, 2008). Rather, employment in the low-paid service sector can encounter 
poverty traps. In the latter situation individuals can find themselves in a situation 
whereby following a period in which state welfare has been received, a return to 
work and thereby an increase in income results in a loss of benefits so that the 
individual is no better off. Alternatively, individuals who simultaneously claim 
benefits and work (usually through an income top-up scheme) can find that an 
increase in the hours worked results in no overall change to their net income.  
 
The other opposing Member States in the liberal coalition marshalled a different set 
of arguments and their positions were determined more by ideological, rather than 
practical purposes. A problem pointed out by these Member States focused on 
poverty measurement, and a reliance on relative income - if real income in the 
economy increases, but income distribution remains constant, the rate of relative 
poverty also remains constant. Within the majority of the CEE states, the argument 
against benefit dependency had gained ground during the transition process (King, 
2007; King and Sznajder, 2006). Furthermore, the CEE states were mindful of the 
financial costs to them of measures agreed at EU level, and pointed to the instability 
of the Mediterranean countries and the Eurozone crisis as an example of excessive 
government spending and its consequences. 12  While welfare spending as a 
percentage of GDP is much lower in CEE compared to EU-15, the Eurozone crisis was 
providing further justification that welfare spending should only be increased, if 
necessary, in the region once levels of economic growth ‘had caught up with the 
west’. Following the release of the Commission’s proposal for Europe 2020, Poland, 
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via its Permanent Representation in Brussels, coordinated opposition to the poverty 
target with its counterparts in Permanent Representations of the liberal coalition.    
 
Despite the different reasons for their opposition to the proposal, the unholy 
alliance between Sweden (a social democratic welfare that is often perceived to be a 
supporter of progress within EU employment and social policy, but has also proved 
itself on occasion to be a staunch opponent – see page ??) and the other more 
ideologically liberal minded states within the coalition held fast during the 
negotiations. The liberal coalition argued that the Commission had failed to consult 
the Member States on the proposed target and that the use of one signal indicator 
to measure poverty demonstrated that the Commission had given little thought to 
the issue. In the interviews carried out for this monograph the view was expressed 
that it had been inserted during last minute preparations to appease ‘social lovers’.13 
Since 2000 the EU has developed quite a complex and diverse set of indicators 
associated with the Open Method of Coordination in Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion, thereby recognising Member State social policy diversity and allowing 
Member States some flexibility in conceiving of the issues involved (Daly, 2010). The 
question then was why depart from this practice and adopt a unidimensional 
approach? Secondly, the liberal coalition also shared concerns about the poverty 
target as part of the governance mechanism of Europe 2020. In its draft proposal, 
the Commission argued that Europe 2020 required ‘a strong governance framework 
that harnesses the instruments at its disposal to ensure timely and effective 
implementation’ (Commission, 2010a: 27). The Commission was to be responsible 
for country surveillance and could issue Country Specific Recommendations for the 
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Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (under Article 121.2) and employment guidelines 
(under Article 145-150). In its draft proposal the Commission had incorporated the 
poverty target into the employment pillar which under Articles 145-150 (TFEU), gives 
the EU its competence within the Employment Strategy  - including the requirement 
for Member States to submit annual progress reports and upon review of such 
reports by the Commission, the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) 
in areas where more progress could be made. Articles 151-153 (TFEU) concern the 
EU’s competence in social policy, but do not prescribe an OMC–type governance 
procedure similar to that in Employment. While the Commission had made no 
reference in its draft proposal to the issuing of (CSRs) for the poverty target, 
Member States in the liberal coalition shared a concern about the possibility of such 
‘top-down imposition’ on the part of the Commission.14 In other words, the poverty 
target and its incorporation into the mainstream governance of Europe 2020 was 
perceived as an attempt to strengthen the EU’s mandate within social policy via the 
back door.15  
 
In support of the proposal the regulatory coalition consisted of the governments of 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Their position papers for 
Europe 2020 all argued that the achievement of the Internal Market should not be 
considered as an end in itself. Rather, progress in economic growth and jobs should 
go hand-in-hand with the preservation and strengthening of social Europe. A further 
source of support for the coalition came from the new President of the European 
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, who had been given the specific task of formulating 
Europe 2020 and who was himself committed to a strong social dimension. He 
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argued that governments should adhere to a limited number of guidelines (five), of 
which a specific target should be set to reduce poverty.16 These seven Member 
States and Van Rompuy, along with the social NGOs and the Socialists in the 
Parliament, had lobbied the Commission for the inclusion of a social component to 
Europe 2020 and Spain used its strategic position, as President of the Council of the 
EU in the first half of 2010, to put Social Europe on the Agenda, both with respect to 
Europe 2020 and the broader process of European integration (Spanish Presidency, 
2010).17 The Spanish Presidency also coincided with the launch of the EU’s Year for 
Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion, launched on 20 January 2010, and this 
further helped to maintain the profile of social Europe. Within the regulatory 
coalition the Year for combating Poverty and Social Inclusion provided a further 
inventive to produce policy commitment in the field, as it would symbolise that 
substantive progress could be made during the 12-month programme of events.18 A 
further strategy of the regulatory coalition was to highlight the progress and 
importance of the Social Protection Committee over the last decade and thereby the 
importance of balancing economic growth with progress in Social Europe.  
 
The remaining Member States (Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands) declared that they were flexible on the proposed 
target and did not attach themselves to either coalition. At the European Council 
meeting on 26 March 2010 the division between the coalitions resulted in no 
agreement being reached on the poverty target. In fact, in light of the time 
restrictions on reaching an agreement on Europe 2020 (i.e. summer 2010), the 
polarised division within the Council gave rise to speculation that the target may be 
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dropped altogether. In light of the promise made by to the European Parliament by 
President Barosso, the Commission became reluctant to withdraw the proposed 
target and expressed its commitment to the objective. Furthermore, the regulatory 
coalition (in particular the European Anti Poverty Network) lobbied both the 
Commission and the European Council / Council of Ministers to maintain the target 
and without such broader support within the EU’s political space, the poverty target 
may have disappeared from Europe 2020 altogether. The result was that the 
Member States agreed a willingness to tackle poverty and social exclusion as part of 
the Europe 2020 programme. However, the existence of a quantified target, its 
definition, and constituent elements, were to be opened-up for negotiation.  
 
Continued Liberal Coalition objections to the Target  
 
The European Commission and the Spanish Presidency had decided that, given the 
time constraints for negotiation, the best solution to reach an agreement was for 
individual bilateral negotiations between the Secretariat General and via their 
Permanent Representations in Brussels, the governments of the Member States. 
Members of the liberal coalition decided that a coordinated response during the 
bilateral negotiations would have the best possible impact on outcomes. 19 
Representatives from the permanent representations of the Baltic States, the Czech 
Republic, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, Poland and the UK established regular 
contact, such as phone calls and emails, to defend their position. Coordination 
between the group was also organised through the existing communication channels 
of the Social Protection Committee, which includes representatives (normally civil 
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servants) from the national administrations. However, in light of the publicity and 
general support that the creation of poverty target had already attracted from the 
regulatory coalition (particularly in the European Parliament), the general consensus 
within the liberal coalition was that the removal of target would be near impossible 
to achieve; the best possible outcome for the liberal coalition was to ensure that any 
agreement on the target remained flexible (particularly with respect to defining 
poverty and social exclusion) for the Member States with only voluntary 
obligations.20  
 
What particular contribution were the CEE Member States making to the 
negotiations? It should first be noted that the majority were initially opposed to the 
poverty target – the Baltic States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and 
Slovakia. Only Hungary and Slovenia remained outside of the liberal coalition, but 
importantly they did not formally join the regulatory coalition. When representatives 
from the two latter Member States were questioned on this position, they 
commented that they did not have a problem with an EU target that was ‘flexible 
and non-obligatory’.21 Second, the 8 CEE Member States that were opposed to the 
target, all were vocal about their opposition. Czech Minister for European Affairs, 
Juraj Chmiel, said of Europe 2020: ‘the biggest problem for us was the poverty target 
because is did not have any other explanatory value and it was not clear where the 
goal came from’. While Richard Kadlčák, from the government’s European Policies 
Coordination Department, said: ‘Poverty will be automatically reduced by fulfilling 
other objectives of the strategy’ (EurActiv, 2010b). High-level representatives from 
other Central and Eastern European Member States, including Romanian President 
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Traian Basescu and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, publically expressed their 
opposition to the target. Such a position, as expressed by Eastern Member States in 
the liberal coalition is in accordance with the liberal argument that improvements in 
the social condition of individuals can be achieved via the spillover effects of 
economic growth. Finally, Poland used its position, as the largest new Member State, 
to coordinate opposition to the target between the old and new Member States 
within the liberal coalition (EurActiv, 2010b).22     
 
The first tactic of the liberal coalition was to raise the issue of the EU’s legal 
competence in the area of inclusion and social protection, and to question the 
consequences of including a quantified target to reduce poverty within the 
governance area of employment. During their individual bilateral meetings with the 
Commission and the Spanish Presidency, governments of the liberal coalition asked 
for clarification on this issue and repeated the argument that the EU had no legal 
mandate for such a proposal and that the target was a ‘competence creep’ on behalf 
of the Commission.23 A second tactic was to push for a greater flexibility in defining 
poverty, rather than the use of one definition - ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ - stipulated within 
the initial proposal. In pushing for greater flexibility, the liberal coalition argued for 
the inclusion of a ‘jobless-household’ definition and that of ‘severe material 
deprivation’. Defining poverty in terms of ‘jobless-households’ is relatively new and 
emerged first in the neo-liberal countries in the 1990s (especially Australia and New 
Zealand). The problematisation of jobless households is driven by the possibility that 
joblessness may be a characteristic of particular types of families, the values they 
hold, the behaviours that they engage in (especially as parents) and the apparent 
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corrosive effects of worklessness on people and their families, children especially. In 
this sense it is a cultural term, a comment on micro (individual) behaviour magnified 
to a more meso (household and family) level. It links closely to the activation thrust 
of contemporary social policy and gives some security to those who fear that a focus 
on income poverty alone would lead automatically to redistributive policies. But the 
concept also has other resonances and roots and is larger than unemployment or 
worklessness. As a comment on labour market developments, it picks up on the 
possibility of growing polarisation of labour markets, especially as regards having a 
job at all and the quality of that job (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1998; Kenworthy, 2008). 
It also prioritises economic discourses of social exclusion. ‘Jobless households’ 
therefore cover a range of potential ‘problems’ and appeals, if not across the entire 
political spectrum, then at least to more than one constituency within the EU.  
Measuring poverty as jobless households had a particular appeal for the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, as well as the CEE states. As numerous 
interviewees from CEE commented: ‘low skilled work is better than nothing’ and 
‘work gets you out of poverty’.  
 
Measuring poverty with respect to ‘material deprivation’ also had a particular appeal 
to the CEE Members of the liberal coalition. Material deprivation measures poverty 
as being without at least four items out of a nine-item list of ‘deprivations’ and is 
meant to pick up on lifestyle and access to the customary standard and style of 
living.24 The measurement is a relatively new in the social policy constellation at the 
national and EU levels and it took 9 years of debate and contestation before 
Member States could agree on a set of deprivation indicators under the Lisbon 
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Strategy. The particular appeal of this measurement is that government strategies 
required to reduce poverty do not necessarily demand specific anti-poverty policies 
– and thereby increases in spending on reducing poverty. Typically, Member States 
with comparatively low per capita GDP can make considerable progress towards 
meeting a poverty target as a direct consequence of securing economic growth 
anticipated through the overall 2020 strategy (although measures might be required 
to prevent new wealth from being too highly concentrated leading to little or no 
improvement in the real value of below averages incomes) (Walker, 2010: 7). 
Substantial falls in poverty as measured by ‘material deprivation’ can therefore be 
achieved within Eastern Europe by no significant increases within overall welfare 
spending and relying on progress within other, namely macroeconomic, 
microeconomic and employment developments.   
  
Political compromise and the creation of a multi-dimensional poverty target  
 
Between April and June 2010, the Spanish EU Presidency worked alongside the 
Commission to address the fears and objections of the liberal coalition. The 
regulatory coalition opposed a multi-dimensional poverty target in which poverty 
could be measured in several different ways. Its objection centred on the argument 
that increases in economic growth and employment per se do not necessarily reduce 
poverty in accordance with either the ‘at-risk-of-poverty measure’ or ‘jobless 
household’ definitions. The problem for the regulatory coalition was that the liberal 
coalition was unprepared to support a target unless it provided flexibility in terms of 
both measuring poverty and its governance. Given the time constraints for the 
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negotiations and a realisation that the liberal coalition could potentially be blocking 
the broader Europe 2020 negotiations scheduled for agreement at the June 2010 
European Council meeting, the Spanish Presidency of the Council dropped the 
Commission’s proposal of having one measurement of poverty – at-risk-of-poverty - 
for all EU Member States. Bilateral meetings were held between the Commission 
and the Member States to produce a target and a mode of measurement that would 
gain broad support in the Council.25 What mattered above all, though, was that 
during the bilateral negotiations, there emerged what might be called a ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’ on Country Specific Recommendations whereby Member States were 
reassured that the poverty target within Europe 2020 would not feature Country 
Specific Recommendations, rather any recommendations would be merely 
guidelines with no obligation for Member States to respond at the national level.26 
 
On 17-18 June 2010 the European Council agreed to ‘lift at least 20 million people 
out of the risk of poverty and exclusion’ (European Council, 2010: 12). The agreed 
target consists of lowering by 20 million the number of people who are defined poor 
by one of the following three definitions: at risk of poverty; severe material 
deprivation; and people living in jobless households. It was agreed that Member 
States would be able to choose one, two or a union of all three measurements. They 
could also suggest their own measurement, although if they chose to do so, they 
would need to demonstrate the link between their selection and the EU target. 
Member States were to set their own national target, rather than being allocated a 
specific target by the Commission or the Council, although governments were to be 
encouraged by the Commission to set the maximum possible national target. The 
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target and the broader aims of the poverty and social exclusion objective within 
Europe 2020 are supported by European Platform Against Poverty and Social 
Exclusion.  The term ‘platform’ is meant to refer to a hub or host of initiatives 
oriented to bringing about social and territorial cohesion. Five areas of action have 
been identified for the Platform including: making EU funds deliver on the social 
inclusion and social cohesion objectives; promoting evidence-based social 
innovation; promoting a partnership approach and the social economy; and stepping 
up policy coordination between the Member States. (European Commission, 2010b, 
2010c). 
  
By extending the number of measurements that can be used within the target, there 
is a substantial increase in the target population from 80 to 120 million. The 
Commission’s initial aim was to reduce the numbers poor by 25% of a target 
population of 80 million, but with the newly agreed measurements and the 
subsequent increase in the target population, the aim to reduce poverty and social 
by 20 million now represents a 16 %b reduction. While the target can be conceived 
as a step forward for developments within the ESD, the necessary political 
compromise required to achieve the agreement has resulted in a lack of clarity 
surrounding the objective. In terms of policy approach, what seems like a coherent 
set of indicators actually digs deeply into diverse philosophies of welfare and views 
about the best approach to combat poverty and social exclusion. Research suggests 
that, while there is a strong relationship between income poverty and material 
deprivation, joblessness as a characteristic of households is a very different kind of 
phenomenon and one that is poorly correlated with either poverty or material 
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deprivation (de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan, 2011). Nolan and Whelan (2011: 16- 18) argue 
that joblessness might be better thought of as a factor leading to income poverty or 
material deprivation rather than as an indicator of poverty per se, as individuals 
living in jobless households may not necessarily be poor. In addition to this 
argument, the idea that once in employment an individual is lifted out of poverty is 
questionable. A further concern is that 14 Member States have opted to measure 
poverty via a combination of the three measurements implicit within the target. 
How these Member States intend to provide national policy coherence to reduce 
poverty, particularly given the ideological differences of the measurements which 
require competing policy responses, remains unclear. The three measurements of 
poverty implicit within the target are associated with normatively very different 
types of poverty that require contrasting, and potentially incompatible, policy 
responses from governments. The danger here is that governments have not 
committed themselves to a particular measurement of poverty, rather their 
incentive has been to use the flexibility within the target to ensure that the reporting 
of progress and data maximises the perceived progress towards the EU target at the 
national level. In other words, national level data will be fitted into the different 
measurements to maximise the perception that Member States are making 
progress, rather than the other way around.     
Conclusion 
 
Following a very short period of negotiations, the EU’s new economic reform 
programme includes the specific aim of removing at least 20 million individuals from 
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living in poverty or social exclusion by 2020. Member States are able to define 
poverty by one of three definitions: at risk of poverty; severe material deprivation; 
and people living in jobless households (increasing the target population from 80 
million to 120 million). They are also able to use a mixture of the three definitions 
and can even use their own definition if sufficient justification can be made. 
However, the target should best be seen as another EU compromise in which all of 
the actors involved were required to change their position at some point. The 
Commission’s initial proposal was to reduce the numbers poor across the EU by 25 % 
as measured as being ‘at-risk-of-poverty’ (20 million of a measured 80 million) and 
this approach gained broad support within the regulatory coalition. But opposition 
to the use of a single measurement of poverty by the liberal coalition has resulted in 
a more flexible and ideologically inconsistent target. Given that the three 
measurements of poverty implicit in the target have very different normative 
foundations, the target represents an uncertain compromise between those 
countries who prefer redistributive policies to address the situation for Europe’s 
most vulnerable and those which emphasise a job as the route out of poverty and 
social and exclusion. Member States are also able to choose their own national 
target and estimates available to date point to a shortfall in the EU target of 
between 5 and 8 million people.27 The uncertainty surrounding this shortfall results 
from the difficulties posed by using the variety of poverty measurements in national 
calculations. Therefore, while the Member States were able to reach an agreement 
on the poverty target, it remains questionable how seriously it will be taken forward 
(Copeland and Daly, 2013).  
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As with the previous case studies, the majority of the CEE states joined the liberal 
coalition. The exceptions are Hungary and Slovenia who did not attach themselves to 
the liberal coalition, but interestingly, had no particular desire to defend the 
Commission’s proposal and join the regulatory coalition either. Compared to the CEE 
states, as well as the other members of the liberal coalition, the position of Hungary 
and Slovenia reflected a different perception of the poverty target. Given the weak 
legal foundation of the target, both governments believed it to have few significant 
implications or burdens at the national level. Nevertheless, the remaining 8 CEE 
states proved to be crucial for the strength of the liberal coalition which, although 
unsuccessful in its ultimate aim to remove the target from Europe 2020, was 
successful in ensuring that the target was watered down and made as flexible as 
possible. While the position and contribution of the CEE states is one of several 
factors contributing to this outcome, they nevertheless proved themselves to be 
significant to the final outcome.   
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6: Conclusion - the European social dimension and the clash of 
capitalisms in a post 2004 EU 
 
The monograph has assessed the impact of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements 
upon the political economy of European integration. At the heart of the European 
integration process is the political economy debate over whether the EU should be a 
market-making project, or if it should combine this with integration in employment 
and social policy. It is in the context of this political debate that the research has 
analyzed the impact of the two rounds of enlargement by focusing on developments 
within the European social dimension (ESD).   Debates concerning the varieties of 
capitalism within the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states have remained 
inconclusive: for King (2007), King and Szelényi (2005), King and Sznajder (2006) and 
Vaughan-Whitehead (2003), the CEE states represent a neoliberal bloc of countries; 
but for Keune (2006), Bohle and Greskovits (2006; 2007a; 2007b) and Feldmann 
(2006, 2007) there remain significant differences between the CEE states and claims 
of a neoliberal bloc are too simplistic. In this respect, the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements were conceived to have either little impact on the political economy of 
European integration, as the CEE states will join the different political coalitions 
during policy negotiations and will have little overall impact on the EU’s political 
space, or the CEE states will predominantly join one particular political coalition and 
this will either strengthen or undermine the ESD.    
 
  
200
To analyse the impact of the influence of the CEE, the previous three chapters have 
analysed their policy positions and contributions during three policy negotiations 
surrounding the ESD. The three case studies each relate to a different aspect of the 
ESD: norms and values (the Services Directive); hard law (the Working Time 
Directive); and soft law (the Europe 2020 Poverty Target). To guide the analysis the 
research has been situated in the clash of capitalisms approach to European 
integration and applied a modified version of Stone Sweet’s and Sandholtz’s (1997, 
1998) supranational governance approach to the process of European integration. 
EU policy negotiations are conducted within a transnational political space, and as 
well as governments of the Member States, transnational actors are capable of 
exerting their influence during the process. During policy negotiations governments 
of the Member States and the broader set of EU actors (European Commission, 
European Parliament, social partners, interests groups) divide into the regulatory 
and liberal coalitions. The two broadly defined coalitions are relatively loose 
groupings and as a result, no one social bloc has been able to dominate and impose 
its interests across all the relevant regulatory sub-spheres of the European political 
economy (Callaghan, 2008).  
 
In this conclusion it is argued that the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have had a 
profound impact on the clash of capitalisms surrounding the ESD. With few 
exceptions the CEE states joined the liberal coalition during the three case study 
negotiations. The outcome has been a strengthening of the liberal coalition, which 
has made policy outcomes of a more substantive nature for EU employment and 
social policy more difficult to achieve. The second section considers why the CEE 
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states are supportive of the liberal coalition and the final part of the chapter 
explores the future of the ESD in the context of enlargement and the EU’s current 
political climate.   
I: The clash of capitalisms in the European social dimension and the impact of the 
2004 and 2007 EU enlargements  
 
Historically, different rounds of EU enlargement have had different political impacts 
on the process of European integration. For example, the 1995 enlargement (in 
which membership was extended to Austria, Finland and Sweden) is credited with 
creating a more expansive role for the EU in the areas of employment and social 
policy, particularly with respect to the formation of the European Employment 
Strategy (Velluti, 2010). With respect to the 2004 and 2007 rounds of EU 
enlargement, the CEE states were predicted to have either a sizeable impact on 
negotiations, with the majority joining the liberal or regulatory coalition, or given the 
perceived heterogeneity of the region, to split between the liberal and regulatory 
coalitions during negotiations and thereby have a negligible impact on the EU’s clash 
of capitalisms and the ESD. However, during EU policy negotiations Member State 
positions can be influenced by a variety of factors including the ‘goodness-of-fit’ of a 
proposed policy within their domestic situation, the parameters of the domestic 
variety of capitalism, the possibility to use EU policy as a political opportunity 
structure to change the domestic status quo, deals with other Member States in 
which governments will trade their support or opposition to a particular policy in 
return for support elsewhere, or government changes at the national level. To 
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minimize the uncertainty of the multitude of reasons that contribute to government 
positions during the negotiation of EU policy, the three case studies cover a six year 
period between 2004-2010 and this enables the research to observe the political 
tendencies of the CEE states over time. In the CEE states there were a variety of 
governments in power during the period of analysis: Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia had 
centre-right governments; while Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia all had 
centre-left governments; The Czech Republic, Poland, each had two or more 
governments during the period, with at least one government from the centre-left 
and one from the centre-right. And between EU accession in 2007 and 2008 
Romania had a centre right coalition government followed by a grand coalition 
between the main centre-left and centre right parties.  
 
In all three case studies the majority of the CEE states joined the liberal coalition. The 
result of this has been to strengthen the liberal coalition within the EU’s political 
space; make policy agreements within the ESD more difficult; render further 
integration within the employment and social policy fields increasing unlikely; and to 
situate the process of European integration much closer to being a mere market-
making process, rather than one in which economic integration is simultaneously 
combined with the aim to provide citizens with an adequate level of employment and 
social protection.   
 
During the negotiations of the Services Directive all of the CEE states joined the 
liberal coalition. While the proposed Directive aimed to liberalization services across 
the EU and thereby was concerned with the Single European Market (SEM), the 
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ensuring debate focused on the effects it would have on employment regulations 
and welfare standards across the EU.  During the negotiations two factors were 
central to the position of the CEE states. First the restrictions placed on the free 
movement of workers from east to west post-2004 which were considered unfair by 
all of the new Member States and the proposed Services Directive, it was argued, 
was just another attempt by some EU-15 Member States to maintain restrictions on 
the free movement of workers. Second, the domestic politics of reform within the 
region was also significant, as the proposed directive was perceived to complement 
the reform process of the previous 15 years and would provide an opportunity to 
boost domestic growth and jobs, particularly given the associated low costs of the 
region. By joining the liberal coalition the CEE governments demonstrated that they 
had little regard for the more extensive systems of employment regulation and 
social protection found within some the EU’s Member States. For CEE, the idea that 
the proposal would undermine social Europe was considered to be merely 
protectionists and against the principles of the SEM.  
 
Throughout the negotiations of the revision of the WTD, the CEE states also joined 
the liberal coalition. Over the five-year negotiations the liberal coalition, 
spearheaded by UK, was for the first time in the history of the ESD in a majority 
position. The 1993 Directive contained an opt-out whereby employees are able to 
work beyond the 48-hour weekly limited and this had been included to gain the 
initial support of the UK. It was intended that over time the UK would move away 
from its long-hours working culture and so the directive contained a clause whereby 
the opt-out was to be reviewed 10 years after its implementation. However by the 
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time of the revision, the UK, which has traditionally been in a minority position on 
the issue of the opt-out, was able to defend its removal. The UK had reached an 
agreement with Germany and was able to draw on the broad support of the CEE 
states (with the exception of Hungary) to argue that the opt-out should remain. 
Following five years of negotiations, no agreement could be made on the revision of 
the directive and the opt-out remains. The only CEE state not to join the liberal 
coalition during the negotiations was Hungary. Its position was influenced by the 
goodness-of-fit of its domestic policy on working time - the Hungarian labour code 
sets a maximum working limit of 48-hours a week per employee -  as a result there 
was little appetite at the domestic level to re-open discussion and reform working 
time. 
 
Finally, during the negotiations of the Europe 2020 poverty target, with the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia, once again all of the CEE states joined the liberal 
coalition. As part of the EU’s new economic reform strategy, the European 
Commission initially proposed to reduce the number of people living in poverty by 
25% - 20 million of an 80 million target population as measured as being ‘at-risk-of-
poverty (the classic relative poverty measurement), but this proposal was 
significantly watered down. The Commission’s proposal gained broad support within 
the regulatory coalition, but opposition to the use of a single measurement of 
poverty by the liberal coalition resulted in a more flexible and ideologically 
inconsistent target. In the agreed target Member States have committed themselves 
to reducing poverty by 20 million to be calculated by one of three measurements: at 
risk of poverty; severe material deprivation; and people living in jobless households. 
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They are also able to use a mixture of the three measurements and can even use 
their own definition if sufficient justification can be made. This has increased the 
target population from 80 million to 120 million with the result being that the 20 
million reduction in the numbers poor represents a fall of some 16.5 %, rather than 
the initial target of 25 %. As discussed in chapter 5, given that the target represents 
an uncertain compromise and draws on very different normative foundations of 
poverty and its reduction, it remains unclear how much progress will be made 
towards the agreed aim. Although Hungary and Slovenia did not join the liberal 
coalition, they did not formally attach themselves to the regulatory coalition either. 
Their position was formed from the belief that any agreement surrounding poverty 
and social exclusion would remain flexible as a result of the EU’s limited legal 
mandate in the field. In this respect, both governments saw little value in opposing a 
non-binding agreement.  
 
Of the few occasions where the CEE states have not joined the liberal coalition 
(Hungary during the WTD and Hungary and Slovenia during the negotiations of the 
Europe 2020 poverty target), the case studies illustrate that the particular positions 
have been formed, not from a deep-rooted belief that European integration should 
feature a social dimension with the convergence and harmonisation of employment 
and social policy across the EU, rather the positions have been formed by the 
particular circumstances of the negotiations. For Hungary, the 1993 WTD had a 
‘goodness-of-fit’ with domestic policy and there was little appetite to re-open the 
political debate at home, while during the negotiations of the Europe 2020 poverty 
target, both Hungary and Slovenia did not oppose the target because it was 
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perceived to be very flexible and thereby did not pose a threat to sovereignty in the 
field.     
 
 At the European level, the CEE states are more sympathetic to the liberal coalition 
and its arguments for the promotion of market integration and free trade. Although 
the liberal coalition is not always able to achieve its desired objectives during 
negotiations, as illustrated in chapter 3 during the negotiations of the Services 
Directive, enlargement has shifted the regulatory coalition, particularly within the 
Council, to a minority position. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements have therefore 
had a profound impact upon the EU’s political space. Given the historical difficulties 
of reaching agreements at the EU level in employment and social policy even during 
periods when the regulatory coalition has been able to secure a majority the 
Council,, the post-2004 political environment is causing a stalemate during policy 
negotiations and this is gradually changing attitudes at the European  level as to the 
desirability of further integration in the field. As such, future policy within the ESD 
may be incapable of moving beyond a basic measure of cooperation within the 
framework of existing policies and legal provisions. In this respect, EU enlargement 
has made the regulatory coalition’s aim to move the process of European integration 
beyond mere economic integration appeared to be both increasingly difficult and 
unlikely. 
II: The appeal of the liberal coalition for the Central and Eastern European States  
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Why have the CEE states consistently joined the liberal coalition, particularly given 
that between 2004 and 2010 governments from different political persuasions were 
in office? Despite the differences between the CEE states highlighted by work of 
Bohle and Greskovits (2006; 2007a; 2007b), Feldmann (2006, 2007) and Keune 
(2006) political differences have little over all bearing on the political economy 
tendencies of the region at the European level. To fully understand the rationale 
behind the position taken by the CEE states it is important to refer back to King’s and 
Szelényi’s (2005) argument that neoliberalism has served as an ideological cement 
that united different class factions against the state-socialist system and provided a 
powerful narrative in which to frame the transition to a market economy. This has 
resulted in the promotion of a type of capitalism within CEE in which foreign direct 
investment has had an overwhelming dominance and influence. One result is that 
the political environment in CEE is one in which economic growth has become 
dependent on the investment strategy of particular multinational corporations, the 
lending decisions of foreign owned banks, and the ability to import industrial inputs 
and capital from, and export manufactured goods to, the core of the capitalist world 
economy (King and Szelényi, 2005: 219-220). The majority of the banking sector 
within CEE is under foreign control, and is one area ‘where foreign penetration has 
reached record levels, almost unprecedented in other parts of Europe and the world’ 
(Bohle and Greskovits, 2007: 93). Galgóczi (2009) estimates foreign ownership of the 
banking system in CEE to be on average 80%. The transition process has given 
foreign investors an unprecedented, albeit indirect, influence within CEE. 
International mobile capital has been attracted to the region as a result of its low 
costs and governments attempt to maintain, and attract further, foreign investment. 
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More recent research by Meardi (2012) suggests that the particular political 
economy trends of the region have continued within a logic of liberal dependency. In 
their governance of employment relations, multinational corporations use the threat 
of relocation, and workers, left without the institutional channels to voice their 
concerns, such as trade unions and social dialogue, have reacted by leaving their 
countries to work in the EU-15 Member States.    
 
The pressures to maintain foreign direct investment in CEE and to attracted further 
injections of capital requires states to create favourable economic environments 
which usually come in the form of low taxes and low wages, as well as labour market 
flexibility such as easy dismissal rules which overwhelming benefit employers at the 
expense of employees. A problem with this model is that foreign direct investment is 
predominantly short-term in its outlook and constructing CME institutions under 
these conditions is more difficult than LME institutions, since they require a longer 
term perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001) with higher taxes and wages, and the 
embedding of such institutions to create their own institutional comparative 
advantage. Hall and Soskice (2001: 63) argue that CMEs are more difficult to emulate 
than LMEs, even when the relevant institutions can be put into place. This is because 
market relations within LMEs do not require the same levels of common knowledge 
among actors - CMEs are underpinned by informal networks of cooperation, 
collaboration and the sharing of knowledge which take a long time to establish. The 
CEE states have therefore been faced with a dilemma: to postpone large scale 
foreign direct investment, with subsequent short term consequences for growth and 
jobs, in favour of the possible institutionalisation of a CME which could increase 
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overall prosperity and equality; or to increase growth and jobs in the short term by 
competing on costs and attracting high levels of foreign direct based, but 
subsequently constraining such states from moving beyond LME institutions in the 
long term. From the case studies discussed here, the 2004 and 2007 CEE states 
appear to have chosen the latter option. Incumbent governments aim to remain in 
office and with elections being held every four or five years, governments take the 
short-term option of maximizing growth and jobs by capitalizing on the comparative 
institutional advantage of low costs. In countries which feature some CME 
institutions, such as Slovenia, these institutions have not proved themselves to be 
particularly resilient. For example, in response to their marginalization by the then 
centre-right government, between 2005-2008 trade union density fell from 40% to 
30% of the workforce (Stanojević and Matej Klarič, 2013)  
 
The policy trajectory of the transition period has been reinforced by EU membership 
in two ways. First, EU accession preparations, with their emphasis on strengthening 
domestic institutions associated with the functioning of the Single European Market 
(SEM) and employment and social policy, effectively communicated to the region 
that the process of European integration was one of market-making, rather than one 
in which integration is also promoted within the social and employment spheres of 
policy. Accession preparations for all of the new Member States involved extensive 
surveillance with annual assessments by the European Commission and as a result, 
they are consider as being ‘good students’ in terms of their transposition and 
implementation of EU policy (Falkner and Treib, 2007: 9). But as Keune (2008) 
argues, despite the good transposition in CEE of the social acquis, not only is the 
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social acquis relatively small, but just as with EU-15 Member States, there is 
significant room for interpretation at the national level during their implementation. 
Therefore, while the transposition of the social acquis has in some cases led to a 
raising of standards, in others standards have declined or remained insufficient 
because of ‘pro forma’ transpositions.  For Keune (ibid) there has been no ‘exporting 
of the European social model’ to the EU’s newest members. With respect to the 
findings of this book, we can see that developments at the national level in CEE 
manifest themselves at the European level by the states giving very little support for 
a deepening of integration within the ESD.   
 
Second, the economic integration of EU membership promotes a liberal dependent 
form of capitalism. European integration has opened up Member States to internal 
competition in the capital and product markets and simultaneously protected them 
through monetary integration and the Internal Market (Schmidt, 2002). The result is 
a reduction or elimination of certain macro-economic tools to govern and 
manipulate national economic policy (such as exchange rate devaluations or 
subsidies for specific sectors or industries). The reduced sovereignty and scope of 
macro-economic policies for the Member States, without the creation of a 
formalised federation (cf. Rosamond, 2002), constructs a competitive space in which 
Member States compete more fiercely to defend their comparative institutional 
advantage. As Strange (1998: 104) argued: ‘because the EU is not a federation and 
because its national governments worry more about their national balance of 
payments and export earnings, their policies are often highly competitive with one 
another’. This results in a more pronounced form of the competition state whose 
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main focus, as defined by Cerny (2000: 136), becomes: ‘the proactive promotion of 
economic activities, at home or abroad, that will make firms and sectors located 
within the territory of the state competitive in international [and/or European] 
markets’. The established CMEs of northern Europe can draw from their ‘their 
resource endowments and strategic capacities’ and can therefore resist some of the 
pressures associated with liberalization and deregulation (Humphreys and Simpson, 
2008: 852). The institutionalisation of their ‘infrastructure, education systems, 
workforce skills and quality of life amenities’ (Cerny, 1997: 271) has been prior to the 
rise globalization and the constraints of European integration. But for the CEE states, 
all of which are required to join the European Monetary Union with preparations 
and membership requiring limits to government spending and budgetary 
constraints, competing within the EU as a low cost base for multinational 
corporations is one of the few policy tools they have left at their disposal.  
II: The future of the European social dimension in the context of an enlarged EU 
and the Eurozone crisis 
 
The outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone in 2010 plunged the EU 
into an unprecedented political and economic crisis. As the EU struggles to restore 
confidence and credibility in both its single currency and political institutions, there 
is a passionate debate regarding the future of the EU. Much attention has been 
directed to the structural inadequacies of the Economic and Monetary Union project 
and the EU’s ultimate inability to police fiscal discipline amongst its Member States. 
The narrative of the EU political debate surrounding reform is one that sharply 
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contrasts the macroeconomic records of southern European ‘sinners’ to northern 
European ‘prudes’ (Papadimitriou, 2012: 1). Initially, it was believed that the 
European economy would be largely immune to the financial turbulence that began 
in the late summer of 2007 (Commission, 2009b: 8). Such perceptions dramatically 
changed in September 2008 with the rescue of the mortgage providers Fannie Mae 
and Freddy Mac, the bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and fears 
that the collapse of the insurance giant AIG would take down major US and EU 
financial institutions. Developments in the US also revealed the vulnerability of 
major European banks to the US (sub-prime) market. The summer of 2008 witnessed 
a number of European banks requiring bailouts from their respective governments, 
among them the UK’s Halifax and Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS), Belgium’s Fortis and Germany’s Hypo Real Estate Group. As 
confidence mostly disappeared in the global financial market, the European financial 
system appeared increasingly fragile; market valuations of financial institutions 
evaporated and the interbank lending market practically ceased. 1  While the 
breakdown of the interbank lending market affected the whole EU banking system, it 
was the major European banks from EU-15 Member States that were the most 
vulnerable, owing to their investments in the US sub-prime market. The drying up of 
liquidity on the international market made the finances of a number of EU Member 
States appear increasing fragile.  
 
Before Greece floundered and the threats to the Eurozone emerged, from the 
autumn of 2008 three EU members that were not members of the Eurozone were 
confronted with balance of payments difficulties: first Hungary, then Latvia, and 
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finally Romania. To help these countries the EU reinforced its Balance of Payments 
facility, endowed with 50 million euros (Degryse, 2012: 20). Greek Parliamentary 
elections in October 2009 were to reveal that the economy was adrift. Following the 
PASOK victory the new Prime Minster announced that the government deficit was 
not 6% of GDP, but 15.4 %. The result of this announcement was a loss of confidence 
within the Eurozone, a downgrading of credit ratings for countries deemed to be 
risky, and an increase in the cost of government bonds on the international financial 
market. Greece was the first country to turn to the IMF for a bailout in May 2010, 
followed by Ireland (albeit for different reasons) in November 2010 and in May 2010, 
Portugal. In May 2013 Cyprus received its first IMF bailout (although it was given 
bilateral assistance in December 2011) and speculation also mounted that Italy and 
Spain would require bailouts. During the crisis much attention has focused on the 
Mediterranean Member States and the EU’s (in)ability to resolve financial turmoil – 
but what has been happening in the CEE states?  
 
During the early stages of the crisis, Raffeisen, Erste, UniCredit and Swedbank, which 
dominate the banking sector in CEE, were all facing liquidity problems at home and 
became reluctant to transfer capital to their subsidiaries in CEE. Second, the drying 
up of the foreign investment in the region which had plugged current account 
deficits by providing a steady flow of hard foreign currency left many governments 
struggling to repay their international credit obligations. Credit ratings of state bonds 
were downgraded and country risk indicators deteriorated sharply. National 
currencies were shaken with devaluations of between 20-25 per cent for the Polish 
Zloty, the Hungarian Forint, the Czech Koruna and the Romanian Lei. This created 
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further problems because a significant proportion of mortgages and private sector 
loans in these states are in foreign currencies (58 % of Polish and 85 % of Hungarian 
mortgages). The devaluations increased the costs of such liabilities and concerns 
were raised that CEE would suffer from a debt shock and be unable to repay its 
foreign denominated loans (see: Galgóczi, 2009). 
 
To resolve the effects of the financial crisis in CEE, governments have initiated a 
variety of policy responses. In the Baltic States and Hungary, governments have 
opted for internal devaluations to restore competitiveness (such as cutting wages). 
Despite not entering into recession Poland has nevertheless faced an increase in 
unemployment, particularly in the export driven sectors such as car manufacturing. 
To resolve some of these pressures, the Polish government has allowed the 
exchange rate in relation to the euro to devaluate by some 20-30 per cent (Meardi 
and Trappmann, 2013: 1-3).  Within CEE there have been political discussions 
focusing on the vulnerability of an economic model dependent on foreign 
investment and the economic cycles of other countries. However, this debate has 
focused on economic policy and has not spilt-over into the broader concerns of a 
liberal employment and social policy model. When employment policy has been 
discussed, it has been in relation to the vulnerability of employees under such an 
economic model, rather than concerns over the welfare of workers once they are 
actually in employment. In this respect, while economic policy in the region may 
witness some significant changes over the following decade, employment and social 
policy is likely to remain on its current trajectory given that since the onset of the 
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crisis, employment relations in the region have been further weakened (Meardi and 
Trappmann, 2013; Stanojević and Matej Klarič 2013).  
 
The financial crisis has proved to be an ‘exogenous shock’ to the EU, yet rather than 
being one which alters the fundamental direction of European integration, such as a 
greater emphasis on combining economic growth with social cohesion as embodied 
in the first half of the Lisbon Strategy, it is very much ‘business as usual’ in so far as 
market integration remains the number one priority. As the EU has responded to the 
Eurozone crisis, there has been little mainstream discussion of expanding its role in 
employment and social policy and EU governance has continued to prioritise market 
integration. Member States who have received bailouts or who have been under 
severe financial pressure have implemented austerity programmes that cut 
spending, increased taxes and have attempted to deregulate and liberalise certain 
aspects of their economies, including making labour markets more flexible. But even 
if there was such a political momentum at the EU level for a more balanced process 
of European integration between economic policy in the one hand and employment 
and social policy on the other, the extent to which integration within the European 
social dimension can be extended is questionable. Since 2004 the regulatory 
coalition has been weakened and the UK and its allies in the liberal coalition have 
shifted from being in a minority position on issues relating the ESD, particularly 
within the Council, to being an equal and sometimes majority position. This is not to 
say that the liberal coalition is always capable of achieving its objectives, but it is at 
least capable of ensuring that policy outcomes remain flexible and are difficult to 
achieve. While the road to integration in the ESD has always been slow and fraught 
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with difficulties, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements have ensured that current 
agreement and policy outcomes are even more difficult to achieve. The evidence 
presented in the proceeding chapters points to a more liberal dominated period for 
the EU’s clash of capitalisms and while the finger may be pointed at the Eurozone 
crisis as the factor behind the stalling of integration in the ESD, it is but one factor, 
given there was very little momentum to integrate in the years preceding the crisis. 
For those of us who aspire to something more than a mere free trade union on the 
European Continent, this is all disappointing news.                                                           
1 For more in depth analysis see: Carmassi, Gros and Micossi (2009); Eichengreen et 
al (2009); Hodson and Quaglia (2009). 
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